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INTRODUCTION 1 
 
 
Economic analysis has always focused on how individual decisions are interconnected 
through price interactions taking place in the markets. Non-market interactions were 
phenomena of smaller relevance, without an intrinsic importance and typically conceptualized 
as problems of ‘incomplete markets’, preventing the economy to reach a social optimum 
through the simple clearing markets mechanisms (Manski, 2000). Only starting from the late 
Nineties, a growing interest developed in understanding how social interactions beyond the 
marketplace affect individual decisions and outcomes (Blume and Durlauf, 2005). In the last 
decade, the importance of social interactions in shaping individual behaviour has been widely 
recognized in both the economic and the sociological literature (Jackson 2006). A number of 
studies produced empirical evidence documenting the influence of social interactions in many 
areas: consumption, criminal behaviour, on-the-job productivity and satisfaction, financial 
decisions (among others: Zimmerman, 2003, Hoxby 2000, Sacerdote 2001, Cipollone and 
Rosolia 2007, Falk and Ichino 2006, Mas and Moretti 2011, Moretti 2011)2. In the thesis, I 
refer to ‘social interactions’ as all forms of interdependencies among individuals in which 
preferences, beliefs and constraints faced by one socioeconomic actor are directly influenced 
by the characteristics and choices of others (Durlauf and Ioannides, 2009; Zanella 2004). 
These interactions do not occur because individuals are affected through the effects of the 
choices of others on prices, rather, social interactions typically have features that render them 
forms of externalities (Scheinkman, 2008)3.  
Pupils attending school may receive direct and indirect inputs for the development of their 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills, coming from a variety of sources: teachers, school 
facilities, parental investments, environment and neighbourhood, and, most importantly, 
schoolmates. Starting from the Nineties, a large and multidisciplinary literature has focused 
on the impact and the effects of a pupil’s schoolmate’s background characteristics and 
abilities on achievement at school (Gibbons and Telhaj, 2006). My research focuses on social 
                                                 
1
 The views expressed in the thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions 
he belongs to. The usual disclaimers apply. 
2
 Concerning the Italian context, evidence on educational peer effects can be found only in few and recent 
papers: Brunello, De Paola and Scoppa (2010), De Paola and Scoppa (2010), De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli 
(2010), De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2011); Cipollone and Rosolia (2007). Few other studies involve the analysis of 
peer effects at work (De Paola, 2010; Falk and Ichino, 2006), criminal behaviour (Corno, 2009), and 
hospitalization choices (Moscone, Tosetti and Vittadini, 2011). 
3
 In fact, social interactions are sometimes called ‘non-market interactions’ to emphasize the fact that these 
interactions are not regulated through the price mechanism. 
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interactions among pupils attending the same class or the same school. In the existing 
literature social interactions among schoolmates are commonly referred to as ‘peer effects’ or 
‘peer-groups effects’. This term usually indicates social interactions of children or young 
adults with people of similar age, in order to make a distinction from the broader 
‘neighbourhood effects’ stemming from interactions with superiors, family or teachers 
(Gibbons and Telhaj, 2006). Spanning the economics, education, sociological and 
psychological field, a rich literature has focused on these aspects, trying to model and 
measure the effects of social interactions on pupils’ attainment. The first empirical study on 
peer effects at school dates back to the ‘Coleman Report’ (1966), while, some years later, 
Becker (1974) was the first to provide a theoretical framework to social interactions. It is only 
starting from the Nineties that a vast literature has flourished, though a clear consensus on the 
issue has not been found yet. Indeed, educational peer effects are a complex phenomenon. 
First of all, peers may affect different outcomes (such as teen pregnancy, drug use, high 
school attrition, attitudes toward minorities, college choice), and they may have an effect in 
the accumulation and development of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills (Neidell and 
Waldfogel, 2010). Then, peer effects may work through multiple channels: a student’s ability 
can affect his peers through knowledge spillovers and direct peer instruction (i.e. students 
teaching one another), but also a student’s behaviour may affect his peers (Hoxby, 2000). 
Finally, peer influence in a classroom may follow a variety of lines, such as race, disability, 
gender, family income. This complexity is mirrored by the difficulties in the identification of 
these effects and of the underlying social mechanisms, which, in Manski’s words, “[…] is 
difficult to impossible” (Manski, 1993, p. 532). 
Albeit research on peer effects is a hard empirical challenge, in the end, it provides powerful 
insights for policy makers. Social scientists have been studying for a long time peer effects, 
because, if they exist, they potentially affect the optimal organization of any structure where 
individuals interact (schools, jobs, neighbourhoods, etc.). As outlined above, peer effects 
constitute a particular class of social interactions and may be considered as some kind of 
‘externalities’ in education production activities, or in the accumulation process of human 
capital. This interpretation justifies the ‘public hand’ intervention to correct them: 
externalities due to peer effects can be both positive and negative, and in both cases may 
prevent to reach a social optimum. As a consequence, there is room for policy interventions so 
to enhance social welfare. Some practical examples in the school context are concerned with 
tracking (under which students are exposed only with peers with similar achievement), 
grouping, desegregation policies (whether desegregation plans should assign students to 
schools outside the neighbourhood or district), or even school choice policy issues 
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(Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009). If peer effects at school exist and are sufficiently high, 
then the policy maker should care about a school system design that encourages an efficient 
distribution of peers because it will make human capital investments more efficient, and will 
also enhance macroeconomic growth (Hoxby, 2000). From a general policy making 
perspective, peer effects are also important because they may reinforce the effects of changes 
in private incentives. This amplification is known as ‘social multiplier effect’, and the 
presence of social multipliers has important implications for the policy design that is still 
greatly unexplored (Glaeser, Sacerdore and Scheinkman, 2003; Durlauf, 2004). 
 
Thesis outline - The thesis contributes to the existing literature in proposing different 
empirical strategy to identify social interactions parameters and linking the results to simple 
theoretical frameworks to shed light on the possible social mechanisms driving the estimated 
effects. I focus on junior high school students. Junior high school is generally considered by 
educational psychologists as a critical period in the students’ educational path, corresponding 
to students’ early adolescence and to the period in which friendships ties are usually formed 
and interactions with school mates take a relevant part of students’ time at school and outside 
school. The three chapters exploit rich and newly available datasets combining test score 
results in Math and Language from Invalsi4 (First Cycle Final Exam and National Evaluation 
Program), administrative records from Ministry of Education Statistical Office, and the Italian 
Population Census Survey 2001. The census dimension of Invalsi data allows to overcome 
problems of underrepresentation and measurement errors typical of international surveys on 
students’ attainment (such as PISA, TIMMS and PIRLS) substantially improving the 
originality and contributions of the research.  
The first chapter and the second chapter deal with social interactions between native and non-
native students. In the last two decades, a lot of Western countries have experienced massive 
immigration waves. While there is a vast literature on the effects of immigration on natives’ 
labour market outcomes, economic literature on the effects of non-native students on native 
peers’ attainment levels is quite limited and presents mixed evidence. Although it is widely 
accepted that non-native students typically face more problems at school and have lower 
scores in standardized tests, causes, consequences and policy implications are still unclear. 
There is not clear evidence on possible consequences of social interactions between natives 
and non-natives in educational settings, and it might happen that such interactions (if they 
exist) could tend either to increase or decrease the existing attainment gaps. For instance, 
Jensen and Rasmussen (2011) find a negative effect of school ethnic concentration on 
                                                 
4
 Invalsi is the National Institute that carries out  the evaluation of students’ attainment and schools in Italy.  
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cognitive outcomes for Danish native students. Brunello and Rocco (2011) provide cross-
country evidence of a negative but small effect of the share of immigrants on natives’ 
educational attainment. On top of that, even less is known on the possible underlying 
mechanisms that such peer interactions may follow. The study of peer interactions between 
native and non-native students has also important policy implications ranging from the 
implementation of re-allocation programs (e.g. the ‘Boston Moving To Opportunity 
Program’, Angrist and Lang 2004), to non-native students allocation rules across classes or 
schools, or even ‘share-cap’ rules that fix a maximum level to non-native students 
concentration in each school. 
 
The first chapter (“Social interactions between native and non-native students: mechanisms 
and evidence”) addresses the question of whether social interactions between native and non-
native students affect natives’ attainment measured by test scores in Math and Language. The 
chapter proposes a theoretical framework to stylize the possible mechanisms of peer 
interactions between native and non-native students based on a ‘disruption’ versus 
‘integration model’ of education production (Lazear, 2001), and tests the theoretical 
predictions identifying the causal link between non-natives’ school share and native students’ 
educational outcomes. The identification strategy hinges upon school fixed effects and 
selection on observables. Results show that non-native school share has small and negative 
impacts on test scores of natives’ peers. Negative effects on natives’ test scores are 
significantly different from zero only for sufficiently high values of non-native school-share 
and characterized by a convex relation (i.e. marginally increasing with respect to non-native 
school share). The empirical evidence is consistent with an integration model of peer 
interactions. 
 
The second chapter (“Acting-white? Social interactions among non-native students”) 
addresses the issue of the effects of social interactions within non-native students on their own 
attainment. The empirical analysis tests the existence and relevance of two potential 
behavioural channels that might help to explain the underlying mechanisms: ‘acting-white’ 
and ‘assimilation’. I label ‘acting-white’ the evidence that within-group negative social 
interactions are greater the greater is the segregation of minority students within each school. 
This is a sort of reinterpretation of the ‘oppositional culture behaviours’ sociological theory 
(Fordham and Ogbu, 1986). The ‘assimilation channel’ is tested restricting the analysis on the 
sub-group of first-generation non-native students who plausibly experience more difficulties 
to assimilate to the hosting country language and culture with respect to second generation 
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peers. The sources of endogeneity are tackled with an instrumental variable approach. I find 
negative within-group social interaction effects increasing with respect to the degree of school 
segregation and decreasing with respect to non-natives’ assimilation. These findings support 
the existence of ‘oppositional culture’ mechanisms (or ‘acting-white behaviours’) that 
exacerbate the negative social interactions effects within the non-native peer group. 
 
The third chapter (“Students’ cheating as a social interaction: evidence from a randomized 
experiment in a national evaluation program”) focuses on students’ cheating as a form of 
social interaction among classmates taking an official exam. Large-scale cheating has been 
uncovered over the last year at some of the US most competitive schools, and surveys 
conducted in US and Canada document that a relevant part of high school and college 
students admit to have cheated in official exams (McCabe, 2005). Economic literature 
suggests that students’ and teachers’ cheating activities has been growing hand in hand with 
the more extensive use of high-stake testing systems with detrimental consequences on the 
signalling value of the education on the labour market and on the incentives to invest in 
human capital accumulation. There is little evidence on the effects of cheating behavior for 
educational outcomes, as well as on the measures taken to contrast its diffusion. This chapter 
is one of the few work which analyses students’ cheating behavior in a social interaction 
framework.  In fact, when a student cheats during an exam, many others – who might 
otherwise have behaved honestly - end up being influenced thus reacting to such behavior. In 
this context, even an isolate cheating behavior may propagate and become larger through 
social interactions. We provide a measure of the social interactions due do students’ cheating 
while taking an exam in terms of ‘cheating social multiplier’. First, we build a theoretical 
model which defines the mechanisms that may drive social interactions in cheating behavior 
showing that students may optimally decide whether to engage in cooperative effort 
exchanging information and do so taking into account other students’ best response. Then, we 
estimate the structural parameter corresponding to the social multiplier in cheating behaviors 
using the Excess-Variance approach developed by Graham (2008) which is based on contrasts 
in the (excess) variability of conditional between- and within-variance at different levels of 
aggregation. The natural experiment in Invalsi SNV data is the perfect environment to retrieve 
the structural parameter as it provides a perfect randomization in the external monitoring 
technology to which classrooms were subject to during the evaluation. This chapter 
contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it is one of the few works studying the 
unintended behavioral consequences due to the introduction of testing systems in education. 
Second, it contributes to the general literature on social interactions as it is one of the few 
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papers estimating the endogenous part of the peer effects parameters à la Manski. Third, it 
develops a stylized theoretical model and directly estimates the structural parameters of the 
social interactions due to students’ cheating exploiting a relatively new identification strategy 
based on the Excess-Variance approach developed by Graham (2008). We find that cheating 
interactions play a substantial role so that tolerating this practice can have detrimental 
consequences which are substantially amplified by the effects of the social multiplier: 
cooperative behaviors, when a strict external monitoring is missing, may generate a change in 
the equilibrium of students’ achievements that is twice as big as the class average 
achievement. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN  
NATIVE AND NON-NATIVE STUDENTS:  
MECHANISMS AND EVIDENCE 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
I present an education production function with peers’ spillovers encompassing two 
alternative mechanisms of peer effects between native and non-native students: disruption and 
integration. The identification strategy exploits the idiosyncratic variation in non-native 
school share between adjacent cohorts and school fixed-effects to estimate peer effects on 
natives’ school mean test scores in Language and Math. I test the theoretical predictions 
exploiting a dataset covering the entire population of native and non-native students enrolled 
in Italian junior high schools. I find that non-native school share has negative impacts on 
natives’ school mean test score especially concerning Language skills. Effects are highly non-
linear: non-native school share below 15% does not affect  natives’ outcomes. The disruptive 
mechanism of peer interactions is partially rejected by the empirical analysis which rather 
supports the integration mechanism. 
 
JEL Classification: J15, I21, I28 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, most OECD countries have experienced increased migration, much of it 
of people whose home language is not the language of instruction in the schools that their 
children attend: according to PISA 2009 survey, the proportion of 15-years-old students with 
an immigrant background in the European Union countries was around 9% (PISA, 2009). 
While there is a vast literature on the effects of immigration on natives’ labour market 
outcomes, economic studies on the effects of non-native students on native peers’ attainment 
levels is quite limited (Gould et al., 2009). These students may be academically 
disadvantaged either because they are immigrants entering a new education system or because 
they need to learn a new language in a home environment that may not facilitate this learning. 
In both cases, they plausibly need special or extra attention from teachers and educators. 
Moreover, the educational disadvantage experienced by non-native students is substantially 
influenced by the new environment they face in the hosting country (Dustmann and Glitz, 
2011; Dustmann et al., 2011) and peer effects may play a crucial role in narrowing the 
existing gap - integrating non-native with native students - or exacerbating it - if self-
clustering and rejection behaviours are in place (Patacchini and Zenou, 2006). 
Starting from Coleman (1966), scholars in the sociology of education have long argued that 
peers’ influence and class ethnic composition are important determinants of students’ 
achievement. Nevertheless, the specific question of whether non-natives affect natives’ 
educational outcomes through social interactions has received relatively little attention and 
presents mixed evidence (Brunello and Rocco, 2011; Gould et al., 2009). Even less is known 
on the possible underlying mechanisms that such peer interactions may follow (De Giorgi and 
Pellizzari, 2011). The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, I propose a theoretical 
framework to stylize the two mechanisms of peer interactions between native and non-native 
students based on ‘disruption’ vs. ‘integration’ models of educational production. On the 
other hand, I test the theoretical predictions identifying the causal link between non-natives’ 
school share and native students’ educational outcomes. Assuming that non-native students 
have a higher propensity to disrupt compared to natives and grounding on Lazear (2001) 
educational production framework, the ‘disruptive model’ of peer interaction predicts that, in 
mixed schools, the presence of non-native students generates negative externalities on 
natives’ attainment which are marginally decreasing with respect to non-native share. This 
model embeds the classical ‘bad apple principle’ so that one ‘disruptive student’ is enough to 
generate bad spill-overs on all the students (Hoxby and Weinghart, 2006; Epple and Romano, 
2011; Sacerdote, 2010). The ‘integration model’ predicts that, for ‘sufficiently low’ values of 
 20 
non-native school share, non-natives students’ disruption does not hurt the educational 
production process. This is because non-native students are more easily integrated with native 
peers and engage less frequently in disruptive behaviours when they are not enough to 
constitute an independent cluster in the school. Exploiting this framework, I want to answer 
the following research questions: does non-native school share induce negative peer effects on 
natives’ attainment? Is the ‘disruption mechanism’ sufficient to explain peer effects between 
native and non-native students? Do different levels of non-native school share have different 
impacts on natives’ so that an ‘integration mechanism’ might be at work? 
From the empirical point of view, I identify peer effects exploiting the within school 
idiosyncratic variation in non-native share between adjacent cohorts. Our estimation strategy 
relies on the assumption that changes in non-native school shares between adjacent cohorts in 
the same school are not correlated with pupils’ unobservable characteristics that may be 
relevant in the educational production process. Solving problems of sorting and omitted 
variables bias is crucial in the correct identification of the effects. Sorting takes place within 
schools - as non-native students are non-randomly allocated across classes - and between 
schools because of  non-natives’ families residential decisions. I side-step the within school 
non-random allocation of non-natives across classes taking school-level averages, while 
school fixed effects control for across school sorting and non-native students endogenous 
placement. Selection on observables and school fixed-effects limit omitted variable bias in 
correlated effects (Hoxby, 2000; Gould et al. 2009; Brunello and Rocco, 2011). I use as 
outcome measure Language and Math test scores from the standardised exam taken by all 8th 
grade students enrolled in Italian junior high schools (Invalsi First Cycle Exams5).  
This paper contributes both to the general literature on peer effects in education and to the 
specific stream of the literature concerning social interactions between native and non-native 
students. First, I contribute to the general literature on peer effects as, to the best of our 
knowledge, our study is among the firsts linking the empirical estimation of peer effects 
parameters to a stylized theoretical framework6. In fact, although there is a large empirical 
literature on social interactions, still little is known about the economic mechanisms leading 
to the high level of clustering in behaviour that is so commonly observed in the data (De 
Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2011). Indeed, the use of a simple theoretical framework does allow to 
shed light on the interpretation of the results. On top of that, allowing for non-linearities in 
peer effects is crucial to test which possible mechanisms and which channels peer effects are 
following (Hoxby and Weinghart, 2006; Imberman et al. 2012). Second, I contribute to the 
                                                 
5
 8th grade students are attending  the third year of junior high school. The Italian ‘Junior high School Diploma’ 
corresponds to ISCED level 2. 
6
 De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2011) and Duflo et al. (2011) are two notable exceptions. 
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specific stream of the social interactions literature which examines the effects of non-natives 
on natives’ attainment providing new evidence on the existence and size of peer effects, and 
on the underlying mechanisms. Our work considerably improves the existing empirical 
findings on this issue as I exploit a dataset that contains census information on all native and 
non-native 8th grade students. Thanks to this characteristic, the population of non-native 
students in Italian junior high schools (10 -14 years-old students) is similar to the non-native 
population of students of many European countries, and especially those which experienced 
sharp immigration waves in the last decades (e.g. U.K., Spain, Portugal, Ireland) (Eurydice, 
2012). Moreover, the census dimension allows to overcome serious problems of under-
representation and attenuation bias arising when immigrant shares are included in reduced 
form estimations  providing more accurate results compared to existing studies exploiting 
survey data on students’ attainments (e.g. PISA, PIRLS and TIMMS) (Aydemir and Borjas, 
2010).  
Our results show that non-native school share has a negative impact on test scores of natives’ 
peers and that the effect is stronger for Language skills. However, negative effects on natives’ 
test scores are significantly different from zero only for sufficiently high values of non-native 
school-share and marginally increasing with respect to non-native school share. Thus, once I 
allow for non-linear effects in non-native school share, the general pattern of the results is 
more consistent with an ‘integration mechanism’ of peer interactions as negative peer effects 
are not at work for non-native school shares below 15% for Language test and below 20% for 
Math. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a review of the literature 
and Section 1.3 explains the theoretical framework. Section 1.4 discusses the main 
characteristics of the dataset and provides general descriptive evidence while Section 1.5 
describes the identification strategy. Section 1.6 and Section 1.7 discuss the results and 
conduct sensitivity checks. Section 1.8 concludes and derives policy implications. 
 
1.2. LITERATURE 
Despite the growing relevance of the immigration phenomenon in Europe and the well-
established desegregation literature in the U.S., works investigating peer interactions between 
native and non-native students in European schools are just a few and present mixed findings. 
There is no consensus on the effects of social interactions between natives and non-natives in 
educational settings: existing studies find both that  the presence of non-native students 
negatively influence natives’ attainment (Jensen and Rasmussen, 2011; Brunello and Rocco, 
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2011; Gould et al. 2009; Contini, 2011) or do not find sizeable effects (Ohinata and Van 
Ours, 2011; Geay et al. 2012) so that it might happen that such interactions (if they exist) 
could either increase or decrease the existing attainment gaps (Schnepf, 2007).  
Jensen and Rasmussen (2011) analyse the effect of school ethnic concentration on PISA test 
scores of Danish 9th grade students. To correct for the endogeneity in school ethnic 
concentration across schools, the authors apply school fixed-effects and IV. The instrumental 
variable is the ethnic concentration in the geographical area where each school is located. 
Results show that there is a negative effect of ethnic concentration on students’ outcomes 
which is statistically significant only for native Danish children. Brunello and Rocco (2011) 
study whether the share of immigrant pupils affects the school performance of natives using 
aggregate multi-country data from PISA. Aggregation at the country level is exploited to 
avoid sorting problems of immigrant students within each country, while country fixed effects 
and socio-economic indicators are used to control for across countries sorting and time trends 
in immigrants’ residential choices. They find that immigrant share has small negative effects 
on natives’ mean test and that a reduction of the dispersion of this share between schools 
would determine only a small increase in natives’ test scores. Gould et al. (2009) exploit the 
variation in the number of immigrants in 5th grade conditional on the total number of 
immigrant students in grades 4 to 6 to identify the causal link of the immigrant concentration 
on the outcomes of native students in Israeli schools. The approach is interesting under two 
main aspects: first, they use quasi-experimental evidence as early ’90 immigration waves to 
Israel are used as an exogenous variation in immigrants’ flows; second, they focus on long-
term outcomes. Their results point to a strong adverse effect of immigrant concentration on 
native outcomes. Contini (2011) exploits data from 5th and 6th grade students in Italy to study 
to which extent immigrant class share influences the attainment of both native and immigrant 
students. Her identification strategy is based on within school (across-classes) variation in the 
exposure to non-native peers. She conducts the analysis on a sub-sample of the original 
census population of schools for which a statistical test of students random allocation across 
classes is accepted. She finds that the immigrant class-share has weak negative effects on 
children test scores and that the effects are larger for pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds 
and negligible for native pupils from richer families. 
In opposition to the aforementioned studies, Geay et al. (2012) and Ohinata and Van Ours 
(2011) do not find sizable effects. Geay et al. (2012) look at the association between the share 
of non-native English speakers in the year group and the educational attainment of native 
English speakers at the end of primary school in England. They use two different approaches. 
First, they analyse how the effect changes using selection on observables in a standard value-
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added OLS model for the education production function. Then, similarly to Gould et al. 
(2009), they implement an IV approach exploiting the exogenous variation given by the influx 
of white non-native English speakers that happened after 2005, on account of E.U. 
enlargement to Eastern European countries. Using both approaches they do not find sizable 
negative effects. Finally, Ohinata and Van Ours (2011) analyse to what extent immigrant class 
share has effects on native Dutch attainments using individual level data from PIRLS and 
TIMSS surveys. Their estimation strategy exploits school fixed effects and does not retrieve 
statistically significant effects. 
Differently from European studies which primarily concern first-generation immigrants, U.S. 
literature traditionally focused on achievement gaps between ethnic minority students (blacks 
and Hispanics) and white students. Only in the last decades peers’ interactions have started to 
be seen as one the most important determinant of many observed different behaviours and 
outcomes between white and black students (Heckman, 2011). Early contributions were given 
by Evans, Oates and Schwab (1992) and Cutler and Glaeser (1997), while Hoxby (2000), 
Hanushek et al. (2009) and Hanushek and Rivkin (2009) are the first to define ‘racial peer 
effects’ as a particular group of social interactions taking place between students belonging to 
different ethnic groups. These works generally point to weak effects of immigrant school 
share on students’ achievement. The effects are higher within students of the same ethnic 
group than between students belonging to different ethnic groups. 
A common characteristic of both European and U.S. literature on peer effects is the main 
interest in empirical analysis. Theoretical investigation of the mechanisms of educational 
social interactions is usually neglected although it could help to provide consistent 
interpretations for the empirical evidence (De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2011). One notable 
exception is Cooley (2010) who defines a structural model to explain the achievement gap 
between black and white students and estimates it using data from North Carolina elementary 
schools. In line with the reduced-form estimations of racial peer effects, she finds that 
endogenous peer effects within the non-native peer group are much stronger than effects 
between natives and non-natives.  
 
1.3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this Section, I propose two models of peer effects between native and non-native students. 
First, I adapt the ‘disruption’ model à la Lazear (2001) identifying the two types of students 
who interact in a mixed school with native and non-native students. Then, I propose the 
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‘integration model’ which extends Lazear (2001) to allow for heterogeneity in the 
externalities according to different intensity of the exposure of non-natives to native peers.  
Disruption is a possible mechanism of peer interactions that directly influences the learning 
process and the attainment levels through externalities caused by peers’ behaviour7. The basic 
assumptions I made are two: (i) one child’s disruption hurts the learning process of all 
students (including the disruptive one); (ii) non-native students have a higher propensity to 
cause interruptions during the learning process. They are stylized assumptions on different 
‘behaviours’ that distinguish the two types. Indeed, the ‘disruption mechanism’ may follow 
many different channels and should not be associated to non-native students’ ‘bad’ behaviour: 
it could be thought as non-native students’ need of additional help which causes the teacher to 
slow down the teaching activity, as well as non-native students’ higher propensity to interrupt 
because of more difficulties to understand due to insufficient language skills. Descriptive 
evidence and discussions in Appendix A corroborate these hypotheses.  
 
1.3.1 The ‘Disruption’ Model À La Lazear  
Interactions between native and non-native students in the school are such that the 
misbehaviour of the ‘more disruptive’ type determines negative externalities on the learning 
production process which are captured by negative peer effects on per student outcome. 
Following Lazear (2001), I define p as the probability that any student is not hurting his own 
learning or other’s learning at any moment in the time spent at school. Given a class size of n, 
the probability that disruption occurs at any moment in time t is (1 – pn). Define V as the value 
of a unit of learning, which is influenced by the likelihood that a student is not engaged in a 
disruptive behaviour in the given instant t, and Z the total number of students in the school. 
Then, the total output for each school is given by Y=ZVpn, and the output per student by 
y=Vpn. As discussed above, I assume that non-native students (j=F) tend to interrupt more 
frequently (on average) with respect to native peers (j=N), so that I can identify to types of 
students (j=N, F) according to different values of pj ( pN > pF). Finally, define θ<0.5 the 
proportion of non-native students in each school so that type F is the ‘minority type’. This is 
consistent with the institutional setting and data used as in Italian schools - as well as in the 
majority of European schools - non-native students rarely constitute the majority of the school 
population (Table 1, MIUR, 2009a, 2010, 2011; Eurydice, 2012). Normalizing V to 1 and 
holding n constant, per-student output in mixed schools is: 
                                                 
7
 Hoxby and Weinghart (2006), De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2011), Epple and Romano (2011), Sacerdote (2010) 
and McKee et al. (2010) point to Lazear (2001) model as one of the potential model of peer interactions in the 
school. 
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Expressions [2] and [3] describe the main characteristics of the ‘disruptive model’ of 
educational production which embeds the so-called ‘bad-apple principle’. Eq. [2] states that 
increasing non-native school share always determines negative externalities on students’ 
outcome so that one disruptive student (i.e. ‘one bad apple’) is enough to generate negative 
peer effects on all schoolmates. The concave relation described by eq. [2] and [3] shows that 
as the share of non-native students increases, the school becomes more segregated and the 
negative effects on per student attainment marginally decreases. The decreasing and strictly 
concave relation between non-native share and per-student output can be represented as in 
Figure 1.  
[Figure 1 here] 
 
1.3.2 The ‘integration’model 
The ‘integration model’ embeds the ‘subcultural model’ proposed in the U.S. sociological 
literature (Fordham and Ogbu, 1986; Steele and Aronson, 1998) and exploited to ground the 
evidence of ‘acting-white’ behaviours in U.S. schools (Fryer and Torelli, 2010). Anytime an 
integration mechanism is at work, native students exert positive externalities on non-native 
peers so that the difference between native and non-native students, in terms of propensity to 
disrupt, tend to be attenuated (pF → pN). Integration, however, has some cost which I assume 
to be the effort made by native students to integrate non-native peers. Intuitively, if non-native 
students are relatively isolated, integration is less costly for native students (Lazear, 1999). On 
the contrary, anytime non-native students become prevalent enough to form a ‘critical mass’, 
the native type rejects them because the effort of integration becomes too high. The rejection 
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may be due to different reasons: natives may be willing to make sufficient effort to include a 
few minority members but unwilling to make the effort to include numerous non-native 
schoolmates, but also unwilling to include some non-native students while rejecting others 
(Hoxby and Weingarth, 2006).  
The ‘integration mechanism’ is formalized transforming the non-native propensity of disrupt  
(pF ) into a decreasing function of the proportion of non-native students θ (i.e. pF (θ)):  
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Thus, define pF(θ) as a continuous, twice differentiable function satisfying the following 
properties8: 
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In particular, notice that if non-native share is sufficiently small, the propensity of non-
disruption of non-natives approaches the natives’ one (i.e. 
'if 0  then ( )  and ( ) 0F N Fp p pθ θ θ+→ → → ) as a result of the integration process. On the 
contrary, if non-native share increases, the gap in the propensity of non-disruption between 
the two types grows (i.e. ' 'if 0.5  then ( )  and ( )F F F Fp p p pθ θ θ−→ → → ).  
As a result, the ‘integration mechanism’ determines important differences in the predicted 
effects due to non-native students’ school share with respect to the simple ‘disruption model’. 
In fact, contrary to the ‘disruption model’ which generates strictly negative externalities (eq. 
[2]), the ‘integration mechanism’ allows for non-negative externalities on students’ outcomes: 
 
                                                 
8
 For example, the function pF(θ) can be defined according to an integration index ( ) / (1 )I θ θ θ= −  representing 
the ratio between the number of non-native and native students. 
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In particular, the ‘integration mechanism’ makes the non-native peers’ negative spillovers - 
due to the disruption mechanism - decrease for sufficiently low non-native school shares9: 
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where k is a negative real number. 
[Figure 2 here] 
Figure 2 represents the basic intuitions from the ‘integration mechanism’ in eq. [6] and [7]: 
the dotted and dashed lines show two possible shapes of the relation between non-native 
school share (θ) and per student outcome (y) consistent with the ‘integration model’. The 
dashed line is globally convex, the dotted line is convex for θ approaching zero. This implies 
that, even without specifying a precise form of the function pF(θ), the externalities from 
‘disruptive non-native peers’ are close to zero for sufficiently low values of the share of non-
natives. This is because the education production function with the integration mechanism 
follows the predictions of the ‘subcultural model’ showing that the minority type can be 
integrated by the majority type as long as this does not entail high cost. As demonstrated by 
Lazear (1999), this ‘integration mechanism’ acts as a ‘cultural acquisition’ behaviour that 
cancels out the distinction between the two types ( F Np p→ ) and it is more likely to occur 
when the presence of non-native students in each school is below a certain ‘critical mass 
value’10. 
To sum up, the ‘disruption mechanism’ predicts negative and marginally decreasing peer 
effects of non-native school share on per student outcome. The ‘integration mechanism’ 
mitigates these effects and predicts ‘non-linear effects’ with respect to non-native school 
share which are close to zero when non-native school share is ‘sufficiently low’. I test these 
theoretical predictions in the empirical application exploiting a rich dataset containing census 
                                                 
9
 Analytical derivations in Appendix B. 
10
 Lazear (1999) presents a model of ‘cultural acquisition’ and shows that “[…] incentives to be assimilated into 
the majority culture depend on the size of the relevant groups. The smaller is the minority relative to the 
majority, the greater is the incentive of a minority member to acquire the culture of the majority” (Lazear, 2001, 
p. 791). 
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information on test scores and administrative records on all 8th grade native and non-native 
students for three subsequent school years. 
 
1.4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Many European countries - including Italy, Spain, U.K., Portugal and Ireland - experienced 
massive migration waves starting from the late Nineties. The share of foreign population has 
risen rapidly: from 1997 to 2007 Italy records an increase of 242 %, Spain 627%, the U.K. 
92%, Portugal 147% (OECD, 2010), and, as a consequence, non-native students are 
nowadays a relevant part of the school population and generate a wide range of occasions for 
peer interactions between students of different ethnic origins.  
[Figure 3 here] 
This gives rise to a quantitatively large, but relatively unknown, phenomenon. For instance, in 
school year 1996-97 only 0.7% of students in the Italian school system had a non-Italian 
citizenship, while in 2010-11 the share has grown up to 7.0%, with peaks of more than 9% in 
primary and junior high schools, in line with average trends in most European countries 
(Figure 3; Eurydice, 2012). This characteristic of rapid and sheer increase in the non-native 
school population also improves the identification of peer effects. In fact, the students’ 
populations used in this works are the first cohorts who have been exposed to the immigration 
externalities of non-native students on natives’ outcomes and this help to limit confounding 
long-term effects (Gould et al., 2009). 
We exploit a unique dataset that combines the Invalsi First Cycle Final Exam data11, 
administrative records from Ministry of Education Statistical Office, and the Italian 
Population Census Survey 2001. Invalsi First Cycle Exam (from now on ‘Invalsi IC’) data 
contain Math and Language test scores and administrative records on all students enrolled in 
Italian junior high schools. The census dimension of Invalsi IC tests allows to overcome 
problems of underrepresentation of immigrant individuals in sample surveys which lead to a 
substantial attenuation bias (Aydemir and Borjas, 2010). Additional information about socio-
economic family background are obtained as school-level averages of Census variables linked 
to each school using an original matching technique that identifies for each junior high school 
its ‘catchment area’.  
Test scores in Invalsi IC data range from 0 to 100 and refer to the fraction of right answers for 
each of the two subjects. Three waves are available, corresponding to 2007-08, 2008-09 and 
                                                 
11
 INVALSI (Istituto Nazionale per la Valutazione del Sistema Educativo di Istruzione e di Formazione) is the 
independent public institute carrying out the evaluation of Italian school system and test students’ attainment 
levels. 
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2009-10 school years final exams (about 500,000 students per wave). Individual information 
cover year of birth, gender, citizenship (Italian, non-Italian); how long the student is in Italy if 
born abroad (from primary school, for 1-3 years, less than 1 year); mother’s and father’s place 
of birth (Italy, EU, European but non-EU, other non-European country), grade retention (if the 
student is ‘regular’ i.e. if he/she is 14 years old at the end of the school year; ‘in advance’ i.e. 
younger than ‘regular’ students, or ‘retained’ i.e. older than ‘regular’ students). 
Administrative records from Ministry of Education Statistical Office provide general 
information about school characteristics (i.e. type of school, public vs. private, number of 
students enrolled and number of teachers, average class size) matched to Invalsi First Cycle 
data through an anonymous school identifier. Finally, Census 2001 contains information 
about resident population in Italy in 2001. Each school is matched to a group of census 
divisions through an original matching technique designed to associate to each junior high 
school a group of census cells constituting its ‘catchment area’ (Barbieri et al. 2011)12. This 
procedure allows matching to each junior high school variables from 2001 Population Census 
Survey covering a great variety of demographic and socio-economic information on resident 
population (gender, age, ethnic origins, education, labour force participation, occupation, 
households’ composition and houses characteristics).  
1.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
We exploit the panel dimension of the dataset which is constituted by 5616 junior high 
schools (s=1…5616) and three school years (t=2008, 2009, 2010)13. Mean test scores and 
mean individual characteristics are obtained  averaging at the school level individual level 
information. School characteristics are matched from Census and administrative school 
records as explained above. I define to as ‘non-native’ student an individual enrolled in the 
Italian school system and having both parents without Italian citizenship14.  
[Table 1 here] 
Panel A in Table 1 describes the general characteristics of the schools in the dataset (number 
of students and schools, non-native school share, average school size, average class size) with 
respect to geographical macro-area and Invalsi IC waves while Panel B provides descriptive 
statistics concerning non-native school share, school size and average class size. The 
distribution of non-native students across the territory is not homogenous: in Northern and 
                                                 
12
 See Appendix B for a detailed description of the dataset and the matching techniques used. 
13
 From the original population of 6290 schools, almost 5% are dropped because they appear in only one wave. 
To be consistent with the theoretical framework, we also exclude 22 schools with non-native school share in 8th 
grade greater than 0.5. Robustness checks show that results do not change even without dropping these schools. 
t=2008 stands for school year 2007-08 and so on. 
14
 This definition coincides with the definition of the Ministry of Education Statistical Office. 
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Centre regions the average non-native school share is around 11-10% while it dramatically 
falls in the South (2%). Moreover, in the Appendix A I provide a short description of the 
regulatory framework concerning allocation rules of non-native students across classes and 
schools and show that non-native students are not randomly allocated across classes in the 
same school. Average school and class size are generally equally distributed across the IC 
waves although sensibly smaller in the South of the country. This suggested appropriate 
robustness checks performed in Section 1.7.1.  
[Table 2 here] 
[Table 3 here] 
Table 2 shows school mean and standard deviation of test scores according to the native/non-
native status: gaps between mean test scores for natives and non-natives are large and 
statistically significant. In Table 3 I report the coefficient of the dummy variable ‘being non-
native’ obtained running individual-level pooled OLS regressions on the whole sample of IC 
2009 and 2010 students. I first show the raw coefficient of the unconditional attainment gap 
where I control only for cohort fixed effects to capture possible trends in the two IC waves: 
non-native students have test score lower than native peers by 11.65 points in Language, and 
8.36 points in Math. Then, I progressively add controls for individual characteristics (gender, 
retention, parents’ origins, time spent in the host country since birth), time-variant school 
characteristics (school size, average class size, pupil-teacher ratio) and school fixed-effects. 
The conditioned gaps turn out to be smaller than the unconditioned one, but still significantly 
different from zero: coeteris paribus, being non-native implies a lower test score in Language 
(-3.44 points) and in Math (-1.79 points). 
Two main results can be drawn from general descriptive evidence. First, there exists a sizable 
gap in test scores results between native and non-native students which is greater in Language 
than in Math skills. Second, even after taking into account individual characteristics, parental 
background, school characteristics and territorial differences, the attainment gap is reduced 
but still persists. Given that the gap does not disappear controlling for usual school and family 
background inputs, it is plausible to think that ‘social’ inputs and peers’ externalities may play 
a crucial role in explaining these gaps (Akerlof and Kranton 2002; Heckman 2011; Freyer 
2011; Patacchini and Zenou, 2006 among others). 
 
1.5. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The estimation of peer effects between native and non-native students must address several 
empirical difficulties concerning different types of students’ sorting and omitted variable bias 
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in correlated effects. First of all, non-natives’ concentration in the schools may be endogenous 
because of households’ housing decisions. One must take into account the endogenous 
placement of immigrants into some geographical areas that are usually more likely to be 
populated also by lower-achieving native students, regardless of the local level of immigrant 
concentration (Gould et al., 2009). Second, the peer group can be the result of individual and 
families choices: for example, given the residential choice of the household, individuals might 
choose a certain school on the basis of some (perceived) school quality. Third, given the 
school choice, the allocation of non-native students among classes is not random, but usually 
depends on school staff choices, previous school path, law or regulations (Ammermueller and 
Pischke, 2009). Besides self-selection issues, the estimation of a reduced form model 
retrieving the peer effect parameters is also difficult because of the problems arising from the 
presence of the correlated effects that will give rise to bias if they are correlated with peer 
group composition (Manski, 1993). The sorting processes described and the difficulty to 
control for all possible correlated effects may lead to a negative spurious correlation between 
attainments levels of native students and non-native school share, independently from the fact 
that non-native students actually cause some externalities on natives’ outcomes.  
Our estimation strategy relies on the assumption that changes in non-native school shares 
between adjacent cohorts within the same school are not correlated with pupils’ unobservable 
characteristics that may be relevant in the educational production process. The strategy 
implemented rests on averaging procedures and selection on observables to solve the sorting 
mechanisms described above (sorting across classes in the same school, sorting across schools 
in the same areas and endogenous placement across areas) and school fixed-effects to limit 
possible bias due to omitted variables in correlated effects. In the empirical specification I use 
as outcome variable natives’ per student outcome (yN) as the focus of this work is on peer 
effects on natives’ attainment due to non-native peers’ spill-overs. 
 
1.5.1. Baseline empirical model 
We solve sorting of non-native students across classes within the same school using school 
level averages (Card and Rothstein, 2007) and I identify the effect of non-native school share 
on natives’ attainment exploiting school by time variations in the data. In fact, any non-
randomness due to across classes sorting would give rise to a class-specific error term 
correlated with the observed variables which potentially bias OLS estimates from individual-
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level data15. Conducting our analysis at the school level solves the sorting of non-natives 
across classes in the same school as long as I assume that: (i) the class-specific error 
component averages to zero across all classes in the school; (ii) the individual-specific error 
component are mean zero for all natives in each school (Card and Rothstein, 2007). Thus, I 
start from the following empirical specification at the school level: 
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N
sty  is the school mean test score of all 8
th
 grade native students (j=N)  in school s and school 
year t; N
stX  is a vector containing mean characteristics of native students in school s and year 
t; φs are school fixed effects and the term φt includes cohort and territorial fixed-effects. FstP
 
is 
the variable of interest and it is defined as the share of 8th grade non-native students in school 
s and year t (henceforth ‘non-native school share’). School fixed effects solve omitted 
variable bias in individual mean characteristics and school mean characteristics which may 
influence natives’ attainment (i.e. the correlated effects). Notice that F
stP
 
is
 used as a proxy for 
average non-native peers’ characteristics ( F
stX ). The rationale for this stands in the fact that 
the share of non-native peers in the school is a good proxy of peers’ characteristics but it is 
also predetermined with respect to the outcome measure and thus not affected by common 
school-level shocks (i.e. the correlated effects) (Ammermüller and Pischke, 2009; Angrist and 
Lang, 2004). Indeed, the use of peers average characteristics ( F
stX ) may determine serious 
problems of collinearity with respect to individual characteristics and may be correlated with 
common shared variables. Moreover, because of the well-known ‘Reflection Problem’ 
(Manski, 1993), I cannot distinguish whether β  reflects the exogenous effects of peers’ 
characteristics or the endogenous effects operating through peers’ achievement. Anyway, 
finding evidence of the ‘social effects’ (i.e. both endogenous and exogenous peer effects) is 
still of substantial policy interest (Ammermüller and Pischke, 2009).  
                                                 
15
 Non-random allocation of non-native students across classes is common in many European countries. 
Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) provide evidence for primary schools in France and Sweden. Contini (2011) 
finds that for approximately 22% of junior high schools in Italy the null of non-random allocation of immigrant 
students across classes within the same school cannot be rejected (at 10% confidence level, 6th grade). 
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Another important source of endogeneity that must be addressed in our empirical model is 
across schools sorting of non-native students. School fixed-effects and geographical area 
fixed effects already capture this sorting16. However, I also exploit the original features of our 
dataset and add to the specification in eq. [8] a set of school by year variables (Wst) which 
capture the socio-economic characteristics of each school catchment-area and help to control 
for non-natives’ sorting across schools. The socio-economic variables are chosen to capture 
catchment-area characteristics that could have attracted immigrant families in the past and 
thus influence the actual non-native school share. For example, I include male and female 
occupation rates, population density, indicators for poor housing conditions which are 
considered relevant determinant of immigrants’ residential choices (Boeri et al., 2011). I also 
include the number of non-Italian residents in each school catchment area in 2001 (i.e. at the 
beginning of the sharp increase in the Italian immigration trend) which can be shown to be a 
strong predictor of the actual non-native school shares.  
A final concern may arise in cases in which the variation of non-native shares across 
subsequent cohorts is potentially endogenous because of some sort of ‘native flight’ or 
underlying time trends (Betts and Fairlie 2003, Hoxby 2000 among others). In this case, I 
apply the same strategy used by Gould et al. (2009) and Brunello and Rocco (2011) 
conditioning on the total stock of non-native students in the school (i.e. the total number of 
non-native students in 6th, 7th and 8th grades) and on total school size (i.e. the total number of 
students enrolled in the school) (Sst). Conditioning on these variables, the share of non-native 
students who attend 8th grade in each school can be considered as good as random, while any 
residual correlation between non-native shares and school characteristics is captured by the 
school fixed effects. I also include in vector Sst  relevant time-variant school characteristics 
such as average class-size, pupil-to-teacher ratio and ‘cheating dummies’17. Equation [9] 
represents our baseline empirical specification: 
 
N F N N
st st st st st s t sty P X W Sβ α δ γ ϕ ϕ η= + + + + + +  [9] 
 
[Table 4 here] 
Table 4 contains the complete list and description of the variables included in the Xst, Wst and 
Sst vectors. The estimation of β  in eq. [9] allows a causal interpretation of the effect of non-
                                                 
16
 Geographical area fixed-effects are in the form of interaction variables between five territorial dummies 
(North West, North East, Centre, South, Islands) and year dummies. In the sensitivity analysis we show that 
results are robust introducing up to 103 territorial dummies corresponding to school-districts and province level. 
17
 See Appendix C for detailed description on how catchment-areas are built and school variables are 
constructed. 
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native school share on natives’ attainment which I interpret as non-natives’ peer effects on 
natives’ attainment. If 0β <  I might conclude that the presence of non-native students cause 
negative externalities on the attainment of native peers and that a possible ‘disruption 
mechanism’ is at work.  
 
1.6. RESULTS 
In this section, I first present the results from the baseline specification and then I seek for 
non-linear effects in order to test the mechanisms illustrated in Section 1.3.  
[Table 5 here] 
Table 5 contains the results for the baseline model. The dependent variable is the Invalsi IC 
school mean test score for native students. I conduct our analysis separating Language from 
Math test score. The rationale for doing it being that I expect peer effects to have greater 
impact on Language tests because language skills are directly influenced by the use of Italian 
language with native peers. I progressively add school variables controls (Sst) in columns (II) 
and catchment-area socio economic variables (Wst) in columns (III). Thus, the coefficients 
estimated in columns (I) correspond to eq. [8], while the ones estimated in columns (III) to eq. 
[9]. Adding school and catchment-area controls significantly influences the estimates 
improving the school fixed-effects basic framework and limiting the possible biases due to 
across school sorting.  
Focusing on the estimates of β  from eq. [9] (columns III), I find negative and statistically 
significant effects and that natives’ Language skills are more influenced by peers effects 
compared to Math. Increasing non-native school share by 1% determines a decrease of -4.85 
points in native peers’ Language school mean test score and -3.53 in Math, corresponding to a 
decrease of 0.66 standard deviations for Language and 0.35 for Math. Given that school 
composition usually changes a lot from primary to junior high schools (MIUR 2009, 2010), 
these effects can be interpreted as the result of the cumulated externalities experienced by 
native peers in the exposure to non-natives during the three years of junior high school. 
Notice also that the cohorts used in this study are actually the first to be exposed to a 
‘relevant’ presence of immigrant students in the schools so that long-term confounding effects 
are limited in our setting thanks to the characteristics of the immigration waves (see Section 
1.4 and Appendix A).  However, non-native students can be enrolled during the school year 
or suffer higher grade retention compared to natives so that school composition could be 
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subject to sensible changes from grade 6 to 818. Because of the possibility of these changes in 
the non-native school composition, I can interpret the estimated peer effects as an upper 
bound of the cumulated externalities. 
Our results are in line with Brunello and Rocco (2011), Jansen and Rasmussen (2011), 
Contini (2011) and Gould et al. (2009). Brunello and Rocco (2011) find that a one percentage 
point increase in the share of immigrant students is expected to decrease by 1.38 points the 
average test scores for native students (0.018 standard deviations). Contini (2011) finds that 
the class share of immigrant students decreases 6th grade individual test score by 0.66 
standard deviations for Language and 0.14 for Math19. Jansen and Rasmussen (2011) find 
negative and significant effects only for Math: a 1% increase in immigrant school 
concentration reduces individual Math score by 1.05 points (0.011 standard deviations). 
The baseline model estimates improve existing empirical studies under, at least, two main 
aspects. First, I use the universe of native and non-native students and thus do not suffer from 
attenuation bias (Aydemir and Borjas, 2010). This can partially explain the fact that the 
effects I find are greater compared to Brunello and Rocco (2011) and Jensen and Rasmussen 
(2011), but in line with Contini (2011). Second, aggregation at the school level ensures 
consistent estimates for the peer effects parameter because estimations from individual-level 
OLS with school fixed effects are inconsistent as long as non-native students are non-
randomly allocated across classes (Ammermüller and Pischke, 2009)20. In any case, the 
magnitude of the estimated effects are only partially comparable to the aforementioned 
studies: Brunello and Rocco (2011) include in the sample several countries with immigration 
histories different from the Italy and, in general, continental Europe (such as the U.S., New 
Zealand, Mexico, Russia, Canada), while Jansen and Rasmussen (2011) and Contini (2011) 
exploit individual level data and within school variation in immigrant class shares.  
1.6.1. Non linear effects: ‘disruption’ vs ‘integration’ mechanism 
The theoretical framework predicts that in case the ‘integration mechanism’ plays a 
substantive role, the effects of non-native share vary substantially with respect to different 
levels of F
stP . Therefore, it is crucial to test for possible non-linearity in the peer effects to 
                                                 
18
 In the robustness checks (Section 3.7.1) we show that grade retention does not to induce bias in the results. 
The presence of non-native students enrolled since less than one year is actually negligible in our sample (about 
0.004%).  
19
 The effects are taken from the sum of the peer variables of the share of first and second generation immigrants 
(Contini, 2011, Table 6). 
20
 An alternative method to solve this problem would be to exclude all schools where the null of random-
allocation across classes is rejected (see Contini, 2011). However, given that this is more likely to happen for 
schools with a limited number of non-natives, it would be more difficult to test for non-linearity in the effects 
and underlying social mechanisms. 
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distinguish which of the two mechanisms is at work. To this purpose, I introduce a linear 
spline functional form in non-native school share dividing the non-native school share range 
into two intervals with the breaking point (0;0.5)T ∈ :  
 
1 2
1 2
          if 0
1      if T 0.5
N F F N N
st st st st st st s t st
st stFi
st
st st
y P P X W S
T
P
β β α δ γ ϕ ϕ η
θ θ
θ θ
= + + + + + + +
≤ <
= 
− ≤ <
 
[10] 
 
We accept the hypothesis that a simple ‘disruption mechanism’ is at work if two conditions 
hold: (i) peer effects are negative and statistically significant for every value of the non-native 
school share range (i.e.
 
1 0β <  and 2 0β < for every value of T ); (ii) a strictly concave 
relation exists between non-native school share and native educational outcome. This is 
because the ‘disruption mechanism’ implies that the estimated peer effects ( β ) should be 
greater for lower values of non-native school shares (i.e. 1 2| | | |β β> , the ‘bad apple 
principle’). On the other hand, I accept the hypothesis that an ‘integration mechanism’ is at 
work if: (i) peer effects are negative and statistically significant only for ‘sufficiently high’ 
values of T. (i.e. 1 0β =  and 2 0β < ); (ii) the ‘integration mechanism’ entails a convex 
relation between non-native school share and natives’ educational outcome (at least) as 
0θ → (i.e. 1 2| | | |β β<  for ‘sufficiently low’ values of T). 
To seek for structural changes in the effects I implement different values of the break point 
(T) and report the results in Table 6. This allows showing in a flexible way how effects vary 
above and below any given threshold. In the sensitivity analysis (Section 1.7) I present 
additional tests for non-linear effects in non-native school share implementing different 
methods.  
[Table 6 here] 
The effects are highly non-linear: I always reject the null that 1 2 0β β− = . Setting the 
threshold at the mean of the non-native school share distribution (T=0.068) I obtain that 
increasing by 1% the non-native share has not statistically significant effects if the non-native 
school share is below the threshold, while it decreases natives’ Language and Math test scores 
by almost 5 points if the share is above 6.8%. The general pattern of the results shows that the 
increase of non-native share has negative and statistically significant effects only for 
sufficiently large values of T. I cannot reject the null that 1 0β = and 2 0β <  for T<0.10, while, 
if T>0.10, 1β  and 2β are both negative and statistically significant for Language. Concerning 
the magnitude, effects are greater for higher values of non-native school share, thus rejecting 
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1 2| | | |β β>  both for Language and Math. The concave relation of the ‘disruption model’ in is 
not found in the empirical estimation of the effects, which are consistent, on the contrary, with 
a non-linear convex relation: negative marginal effects are present only for high levels of non-
native school share and are generally increasing with respect to non-native school share.  
[Table 7 here] 
In Table 7 I introduce a spline function with two break points, where the first one is fixed at 
10% (T1=0.10) and I set different values for the second (T2=0.15; 0.20; 0.30)21. The rationale 
is the following: with one break point I exclude that the structural break (T) is smaller than the 
threshold of 10%, indeed the effects above 10% are still unclear. Effects below the threshold 
of 10%  and between 10 and 15% are never statistically significant. Results for Language 
show negative and significant effects between 10 and 20%, 10 and 30% levels of non-native 
school share, while results for Math are negative and statistically significant only for high 
shares (above 20%). 
Summing up and interpreting together the results from Table 6 and Table 7 I find that non-
linear effects reject the hypothesis of concave relation. For Language, I cannot reject the null 
that 1 0β =  and 2 0β <  for T<0.15, while for Math the same result holds for T<0.20. Thus, our 
findings are more consistent with the theoretical predictions of the ‘integration model’ of peer 
effects rather than with the simple ‘disruption model’. Interestingly, effects are stronger for 
language skills where the ‘disruption’ plausibly occurs more frequently given the greater 
difficulties to learn a non-mother-tongue for non-natives. 
 
1.7. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We test the robustness of our results under three main dimensions. First, I test the robustness 
with respect to class-size effects and grade retention. Then, I test for possible concerns due to 
the main source of endogeneity (across school sorting). Finally, I show further evidence on 
non-linear effects. 
 
1.7.1. Robustness to class-size effects and grade retention 
Existing literature on class size effects in compulsory school reports controversial results 
exploiting both experimental and non-experimental data (McKee et al. 2010). The joint 
estimation of peer effects and class-size effects is hard in practice because class size could, in 
principle, both amplify or reduce existing social interactions if conformity type peer effects or 
                                                 
21
 Robustness checks for other thresholds between 0.10 and 0.30 are always consistent with these results. 
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oppositional behaviour are, respectively, assumed (Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Sacerdote, 
2010). For instance, Graham (2008) exploit random allocation of students  to large and small 
classes provided by the Tennessee STAR Project to estimate the intensity of peer effects in 
education attainments under the assumption that smaller classes intensify conformity types of 
social interactions among classmates. In our framework it is unlikely to disentangle the single 
contribution of these two channels to each student’s attainment in the absence of an 
exogenous variation in class size. For this reason, the theoretical framework is developed 
assuming no class-size effects (i.e. holding n constant). In the identification strategy, given 
that class size effects are part of the class-specific error component, they are assumed to be 
averaged out in the aggregation from individual to school-level data (Section 1.5). The 
estimation of the empirical model takes this into account and controls for average class size 
and its square in all the specifications.  
We perform robustness checks to ensure that class size effects do not play a substantive role 
in the data used. First, I noticed that the coefficients of the class size variables are never 
statistically significant. I also try a different specification for class size variable using a 
categorical variable instead of the continuous one implemented in the main specifications, but 
results never show differences. Then, given that average class size is relatively smaller in the 
South, I repeat the analysis adding an interaction between class size variables and a South 
dummy. Results  never show statistically significant coefficients (Table 8, column I). Finally, 
I interact the share of non-native students with a dummy variable equal to 1 when average 
class-size is greater of the median value (for each cohort). If some form of class size effects 
are at work, I would expect a statistically significant coefficient, so that the general peer 
effects captured by β  would be either reinforced or mitigated. Table 8 shows that this is not 
the case so that I can conclude that class size effects are adequately controlled for in the 
empirical specification and do not play a substantive role in the data at hand22. 
[Table 8 here] 
Contini (2011) underlines that non-native students in Italian schools typically face higher 
grade retention with respect to native. Data from Ministry of Education and Invalsi define to 
as ‘retained’ a student enrolled in a lower grade with respect to his/her age. However, grade 
retention for non-natives may occur for three different reasons. Non-native students are 
enrolled in a lower grade because (i) they are enrolled when the school year is already started 
and their language proficiency is insufficient to face the grade corresponding to their age; (ii) 
because of differences due to the previous school path in a school system which does not 
                                                 
22
 Additional robustness checks have been made concerning class size effects and are available from the authors 
upon request. However, we conclude that these effects, although theoretically relevant, are reasonably controlled 
for in the estimation strategy and do not induce bias in the results. 
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overlap with the Italian one; (iii) because they are held back at the end of the school year for 
insufficient proficiency and forced to repeat the grade (see Appendix A for details on the 
institutional setting). In our dataset 37.33% of non-native students are retained (compared to 
6.25% of natives), but I cannot distinguish which form of grade retention each student 
experiences. This is because data from Invalsi and official statistics from Ministry of 
Education do not distinguish among these different forms of grade retention for non-native 
students. Possible threats to the identification strategy arise only from the third type of grade 
retention as non-native students held back at the end of the school year (because of 
insufficient marks) and repeating the same grade the following year may undermine the 
idiosyncratic variation in non-native school shares between two adjacent cohorts.  
Although I cannot disentangle the fraction of retained because held back at the end of the 8th 
grade, surveys on immigrant students in the Italian school system (CNEL, 2011; CENSIS, 
2008) show that the first and second types of grade retention are widely used from teachers 
and School Heads as a tool to facilitate non-natives’ integration and language proficiency. 
More than one third of the junior high school teachers interviewed confirm that non-native 
students are usually allocated to a lower grade, especially if language proficiency is poor. 
Evidence from ad hoc elaborations from Ministry of Education and ISMU Foundation show 
that in the 2010-11 school year 47.9% of non-native students enrolled in junior high schools 
are classified as ‘retained’, but only 9.1% are ‘grade-repeaters’ because held back for 
insufficient proficiency at the end of the school year (MIUR, 2011). To test the robustness of 
our results, I perform the analysis exploiting as source of variation the difference between 
non-native shares in 2008 and 2010 Invalsi IC waves (i.e. dropping the observations for 
2009). In this way I exclude the possibility that a fraction of the non-native school share is 
composed by non-native grade-repeaters held back at the end of the 8th grade.  
[Table 9 here] 
Albeit less precisely estimated, results in Table 9 (column I) show that there are not 
significant differences in the effects. In column II I separate the fraction of the school share 
constituted by ‘retained’ and ‘non-retained’ non-native students. Retained non-natives include 
all three types of grade-retention. The externalities caused by ‘retained’ non-native students 
are not statistically significant, both for Language and Math test scores. On the contrary, ‘non-
retained’ students determine negative externalities on native peers. These results confirm the 
robustness of the analysis as the relevant part of negative peer effects seem to be driven by the 
non-retained fraction of non-natives students. Moreover, the negative externalities are 
statistically significant only for Language test scores suggesting that initial allocation to lower 
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grades directly befits non-natives in the improvement of language skills and indirectly benefit 
natives that do not receive negative externalities. 
 
1.7.2 Robustness to across schools sorting 
The identification is designed to control for across school sorting through school fixed-
effects, territorial by year fixed effects and school specific catchment-area socio economic 
variables. To test that the identification strategy is suitable to capture this main source of 
endogeneity, I split the sample of schools into two groups according to school location in big 
or small municipalities. I define ‘big municipalities’ those with three or more junior high 
schools in their territory, while ‘small municipalities’ have one or two junior high schools23. 
The enrolment rules are based on residency criteria. Students have to attend the junior high 
school in the same municipality where they live with their family. If there is more than one 
school, families have to enrol their child to the school of the area where they reside. They are 
allowed to enrol the child to another junior high school of the municipality only if free slots 
are available.  
Thus, the enrolment institutional framework limits per se across school sorting. However, 
‘cream-skimming’ and self-selection processes are still possible and more likely to happen in 
big municipalities where there is a sufficiently large number of schools and families have 
some degree of ‘choice’. On top of that, ‘big municipalities’ are located in more urbanized 
areas and benefit from higher public transportation means that could favour the commuting 
process to a distant junior high school, alternative to the one nearby home. Thus, I estimate 
separately eq. [9] on the subsample of small and big municipalities. If across school sorting is 
at work, the estimations should differ substantially in the two groups of schools inducing a 
negative spurious correlation between natives’ mean test scores and non-native shares, and 
downward bias in the estimation of β . Given that across school sorting is more likely to 
happen in urban areas (i.e. big municipalities group), concerns for across school sorting would 
then arise if I systematically find that 
_ _big municip small municipβ β> .  
[Table 10 here] 
Estimations in Table 10 reject this hypothesis: effects are similar in the two subsamples, 
though slightly larger, in absolute terms, in small municipalities. An additional sensitivity 
check was carried out using 103 territorial dummies corresponding to junior high school 
districts (which also correspond to Italian provinces, NUTS5) instead of the five areas 
territorial dummies (North East, North West, Centre, South, Islands). School districts by year 
                                                 
23
 This distinction comes from Invalsi IC data (see Appendix C for details). 
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fixed-effects and school fixed-effects would capture any kind of across-school sorting within 
each school district. Results in Table 10 do not show significant differences from the baseline 
estimates, confirming the goodness of the baseline model estimates. 
 
1.7.3 Tests for non linear effects in non-native school share 
We progressively add to the baseline model higher order terms of the non-native school share 
variable to test the possible concave relation predicted by the ‘disruptive model’ or even any 
cubic or quadratic relevant relationship. 
[Table 11 here] 
Table 11 shows that higher order terms do not have statistically significant coefficients neither 
for Language nor for Math. The negative sign for the coefficient of the quadratic term in the 
first column further rejects the hypothetical concave relation predicted by the ‘bad apple 
principle’ in the ‘disruptive model’. Then, I use the spline functional form to test whether it is 
possible to find evidence of statistically significant effects for some thinner intervals of the 
distribution of non-native school share.  
[Table 12 here] 
In Table 12 I let spline thresholds coincide with the 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentiles. This 
test increments the robustness of the findings concerning the use of only one threshold 
exogenously determined. Results show once more that negative and significant effects are 
concentrated in the upper deciles of the distribution of non-native school share. 
 
1.8 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper sheds light on peer effects between native and non-native students.  Results are of 
substantial interest given the limited evidence of peer effects between natives and immigrants 
in European settings, and given the growing relevance on the immigration phenomenon and 
its impacts, not only on the labour markets, but also on the education systems. Our results 
contribute to the existing literature in three main aspects. First, I provide a theoretical 
framework to interpret the underlying social mechanisms that determine evidence of peer 
effects; second, I estimate the effect of non-native school share on natives’ attainments 
identifying the peer effects parameter ( β ) exploiting a rich dataset covering the entire 8th 
grade students population of native and non-native students; third, allowing for non-linear 
effects, I provide empirical evidence to test the stylized predictions of the theoretical 
framework. Increasing non-native school share by 1% determines a decrease of -4.85 points in 
native peers’ Language test score and -3.53 in Math. These results are in line with a part of 
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the evidence from European literature on peer effects between immigrant and native students 
(Brunello and Rocco, 2011; Jensen and Rasmussen, 2011; Contini, 2011). Differently from 
Geay et al. (2012) and Gould et al. (2009) who find long-term effects of the exposure to non-
native peers, the effects I estimate can be interpreted as an upper bound of the externalities 
cumulated by native peers during the three years of junior high school. 
Introducing non-linearity and rooting our analysis on the comparison between the ‘disruptive’ 
and the ‘integration’ model of education production proposed in the theoretical framework 
allows interpreting the results in a more precise way. The overall pattern of our findings is 
more consistent with the ‘integration model’ of peer interactions and robust under many 
dimensions. In fact, negative effects are concentrated only in schools with sufficiently high 
values of non-native school share and are not marginally increasing with respect to non-native 
school share (i.e. not characterized by a strictly concave relation). In particular, peer effects 
are close to zero for non-native school shares below 15% for Language and below 20% for 
Math.  
This work also suggests important policy implications concerning allocation rules of non-
native students across classes and across schools. Notice that policy implications would be 
substantially different according to the mechanism that is at work. The simple ‘disruption 
mechanism’ would entail average outcome to be maximized when schools are totally 
segregated by type of student. On the contrary, the ‘integration mechanism’ let allocation 
rules play a substantive role in minimizing the negative externalities and fostering the 
integration processes. In fact, according to the ‘integration mechanism’ any allocation rule 
should be constructed so to avoid any concentration of non-native students in the same school 
and rather distribute them equally. As our empirical results support this latter mechanism of 
social interactions between native and non-native students, I can posit that a relative isolation 
of non-native students from other non-native peers is beneficial for natives as it forces the 
integration mechanism between the two peer groups. A non-native school share below 15% in 
each school would help the ‘integration mechanism’ to be at work. For example, a recent 
regulation act from the Italian Ministry of Education imposes a cap threshold of 30% to non-
native share in each school and class24. According to our findings, this threshold would be 
inefficiently high and may not have any effect to the educational production of Language and 
Math skills.  
                                                 
24See Appendix A for a details. 
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To conclude, the ‘disruptive mechanism of native/non-native students peer interactions’ is 
able to explain only a part of the empirical evidence. Once I add non-linearity, this 
mechanism is partially rejected by the empirical analysis which rather shows that, as long as 
non-native school share is sufficiently low, non-native students do not generate negative peer 
effects on native outcomes. Negative effects seem to be concentrated in schools where non-
native students are enough to form a ‘critical mass’ so that they tend to cluster and do not 
integrate with native peers. The ‘integration mechanism’ could be at work where non-native 
share is ‘sufficiently low’ so that it is not too costly for natives to make effort to interact and 
integrate non-native peers, and, on the other way round, non-natives are ‘forced’ to interact 
with native peers. This interpretation is also in line with the general evidence of ‘acting white’ 
behaviours in the U.S. schools. Interestingly, all the results are stronger for Language test 
scores, confirming that language is more influenced by peer interactions between natives and 
non-natives compared to mathematical skills. 
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APPENDIX A. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Immigration flows and the consequent presence of non-native children in the Italian school 
system have a relatively recent history. Italy experienced only limited immigration before 
1970: until the early Nineties there was a substantial internal migration (from the South to the 
North) and still relevant external migration. Massive immigration from North Africa first, and 
Eastern countries then, started in the Nineties, but sharply increased only in the last decade 
(Mencarini et al., 2009). The foreign resident population has risen rapidly: in 1999 it only 
accounted for 1.9% of the total resident population, in 2008 the share of foreign residents has 
grown up until 7.3% (Billari and Dalla Zuanna, 2008). The same pattern can be found in the 
total number and the share of non-native students enrolled in the school system in the last 
fifteen years (Table A1). Concerning the general time trends, the variation in non-native 
students’ population is now decreasing, after the peaks at the end of the Nineties and at the 
beginning of the present decade (MIUR, 2011). Students from European countries (EU and 
non-EU) and from Africa cover more than two thirds of the non-native students population, 
while students from Romania, Albania and Morocco contribute for almost 45% of the total 
non-native students population. 
 
A.1. Non-native students’ allocation rules 
D.P.R. No. 394/1999 constitutes the reference regulatory framework concerning non-native 
enrollment in Italian schools. The basic elements to recall here are three: first, the right and 
the duty for every immigrant individual in school age, to be enrolled in the suitable school 
institution, independently from their legal or illegal status; second, the duty for every school 
to accept and enrol immigrant students in every moment of the school year; third, the 
competence of the School Board and Head to allocate foreign students so to avoid the “[…] 
constitution of classes where their presence is predominant”. Non-native students should be 
allocated to the grade and class appropriate for their age (so called ‘age-rule’). However, the 
School Board is allowed to allocate non-native incoming students to a lower grade depending 
on the native country school system, language skills, and type of school path followed in the 
previous school system.  
To provide evidence of the non-random allocation of non-native students across classes in the 
same school, I calculate a dissimilarity index (D) at the school level. The index was first 
proposed by Duncan and Duncan (1955) and then extensively used in school and residential 
segregation analysis (among the others, Clotfelter, 1999; Echenique and Fryer, 2007). It 
provides a measure of the evenness in the distribution of non-native students. Given that in 
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each school there are Nj classes (c=1...Nj), the dissimilarity index at the school level (Ds) 
measures the percentage of non-native students that would have to change class for each class 
to have the same percentage of non-native students as the one of the whole school (i.e. the 
non-native school share). In symbols: 
 
1
1
2
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j c c
c j j
Natives Non nativesD
Natives Non natives
=
−
= −
−
∑    [A.1]
 
 
where Nativesc and Non-nativesc represent, respectively, the total number of native and non-
native students in class c of school j, and Nativesj and Non-nativesj represent the total number 
of native and non-native students in school j. Dj ranges from 0 (perfectly even distribution, 
meaning ‘no segregation’) to 1 (perfectly uneven distribution, i.e. ‘maximum segregation’). 
The graph box in Figure A.1 portraits the results distinguishing among three geographical 
macro areas. The distribution of non-native students across classes cannot be considered even: 
median value of the dissimilarity index is 15% in the North, 17% in the Centre and 13% in the 
South, so that, for example, in the North on average 15% of non-native students has to be 
reallocated from one class to another to obtain an ‘even’ distribution within the school. 
In January 2010, the Italian Ministry of Education introduced a new rule for the allocation of 
non-native students within classes and schools, establishing that classes and schools should 
not contain more than 30% of non-native students (i.e. students with non-Italian 
citizenship)25. The idea behind the implementation of such a threshold is to avoid social 
segregation in the schools and in the classes within schools, especially in areas where 
immigrant population is particularly high. The rule is enforced starting from the first-grade-
classes of primary, lower and upper secondary schools of the 2010-11 school year. Its impact 
is not huge but still relevant, especially in the North and Centre of Italy: in Lombardy, for 
example, more than 29% of the classes in the junior high schools have a concentration of 
more than 30% of non-native students (the percentage decreases to the 27% if I consider only 
non-native students born abroad) (MIUR, 2010). 
 
A.2. Non-native students’ behaviour at school 
The theoretical framework proposed in Section 1.3 hinges upon two main assumptions 
concerning the school behaviour of native and non-native students: (i) non-native students are 
                                                 
25
 “Indicazioni e raccomandazioni per l’integrazione di alunni con cittadinanza non italiana”, MIUR, Circolare 
Ministeriale No. 2/2010 (C.M. 8/1/2010, n. 2). 
 46 
more disruptive compared to native peers (pN>pF); (ii) disruption has similar effects on all 
students. In this section, I provide descriptive evidence to corroborate these hypotheses. 
International studies  show that language, culture and previous school path negatively affect 
non-natives’ school performance and behaviour (among others: OECD 2010, Stanat and 
Christensen 2006, Schnepf 2007, Dustman and Glitz, 2011). There is also direct evidence of 
the fact that minority students show lower discipline with respect to natives (Kinsler, 2010). 
Existing studies applying Lazear (2001) model to empirical estimates use the fraction of low-
income students in the school (i.e. students eligible for subsidized lunch) as a proxy for the 
fraction of the students with disruptive behaviour (Mueller, 2011; Mc Kee et al., 2010). Mc 
Kee et al. (2010) justify this assumption grounding on indirect evidence from the Early 
Childhood Longitudinal Survey where kindergarten teachers were asked to whether the level 
of child misbehavior interferes with teaching activities. The authors show that higher 
proportions of teachers agree or strongly agree with the statement are in schools with higher 
shares of students eligible for subsidized meals. 
Concerning the Italian context, evidence on non-native students behaviour at school can be 
drawn from two surveys about non-native students integration in the school system (CENSIS, 
2008) and non-native adolescents integration in society (CNEL, 2011)26. CENSIS (2008) 
survey interviewed a national representative sample of 414 teachers in schools with non-
native students and 608 immigrant households. Teachers were asked which kind of problems 
the presence of non-native students in the school entails on learning processes. Results 
reported in Table A.2 show that the main difficulties mentioned by teachers concern language 
difficulties in communicating with non-natives, slowing down the teaching activities and 
adapting the teaching activities to non-natives. Moreover, 83% of the teachers declare to have 
difficulties in communication with non-native students because of the language, 73% of the 
teachers undertake specific activities to help non-native students in catching up native 
attainment levels. CNEL (2011) survey interviewed a national representative sample of native 
and non-native students with the aim of assessing non-native adolescents integration in 
society. The results confirm that non-native have more difficulties at school: shyness, 
language and discipline are important factors determining these difficulties. The 
representative sample of non-natives interviewed declared to have had attainment difficulties 
at school (43.3%), difficulties in interactions with classmates (33.3%) and teachers (24%). In 
particular, they claim that difficulties in interactions are especially due to language (30.2%), 
                                                 
26
 CNEL (Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro) is the National Bureau for Economics and Labour 
Research; CENSIS (Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali) is a foundation carrying out socio-economic research 
since 1964. 
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integration (28%) and discipline problems (44.5%)27 (CNEL, 2011). Thus, descriptive 
evidence from both surveys is supportive of the first assumption showing that, on average, 
non-native students cause more disruption compared to natives. 
Additional evidence is obtained with the micro-data of the National Evaluation Program 
carried out by the Invalsi starting from school year 2009-10 on all 5th and 6th grade students 
enrolled in elementary and junior high schools in Italy (Invalsi, 2010b). I exploit information 
from 6th grade Students’ Questionnaire (6th grade students are enrolled in the first year of the 
junior high school). Table A.3 shows the share of native/non-native, low/high ability students 
who agree or strongly agree with statements concerning personal difficulties in studying 
(statements a.1 and a.2) and personal evaluations concerning the slowing down of the learning 
activities (statements b.1 and b.2). High ability and low ability students are classified 
according to whether the teachers’ mark for each student at the end of the first semester (in 
late January) is above or below the median. Non-native students suffer more difficulties in 
learning activities (especially in Language, statement a.2) but experience in the same way as 
native peers the slowing down of the teaching activity (statements b.1 and b.2). High and low 
ability students have different feelings about personal difficulties in learning activities 
(statements a.1 and a.2) but report the same impressions of the slowing down of the teaching 
activity (b.1 and b.2). The pattern of these answers thus supports both assumptions: non-
native students feel greater difficulties in learning activities and plausibly cause more 
interruptions during the lectures; the consequences of interruptions and disruptive behaviours 
affect in the same way native and non-native, and high and low ability students. 
 
APPENDIX B. ANALYTICAL DERIVATION 
Recall the education production function with ‘integration mechanism’ (yI) and its first 
derivative with respect to non-native school (eq. [4] and [5]) and complete the properties and 
definitions concerning ( )Fp θ  with the properties of the second derivative: 
                                                 
27
 Results are statistically different (at 5 or 10% level) with respect to the same answers given by a representative 
control group of natives. 
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where: 
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The second derivative of yI with respect to θ takes the following form: 
 
Then, for θ→0+: 
For θ→0.5- the second derivative is different from zero, but undetermined as it depends on the 
values ' '',  ,F F Fp p p :  
The sign of the second derivative globally depends on ( )Fp θ  functional form. However, it is 
possible to derive its sign for θ→0+ that together with the information on first derivative is 
sufficient for an horizontal inflection point to exist in a neighbourhood of θ=0+ (assuming 
'''
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decreasing slope and the horizontal inflection point in a neighbourhood of θ=0+, but 
undetermined concavity or convexity for θ>0. 
 
APPENDIX C. DETAILED DATASET DESCRIPTION AND CONSTRUCTION 
We match three datasets. The first contains individual level information on each 8th grade 
student who attended an Italian junior high school and sit the Invalsi First Cycle Final Exam 
(Invalsi IC) in school years 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10; the second contains school level 
information from administrative records from Ministry of Education Statistical Office; the 
third collects information of each school ‘catchment-area’ from Census 2001. To our 
knowledge, this is the first time that a dataset with such a variety of information and covering 
the universe of 8th grade students is made available for the Italian school system. 
Individual level information. Invalsi IC data are the first experience of standardized test scores 
census survey taken on all Italian students. The ‘First Cycle Final Exam’ was conducted since 
2007-08 school year. However, only starting from the 2009-10 s.y. test scores contribute for 
one sixth of the junior high school final grade. The dataset contains test scores and individual 
information on about 1,504,286 8th grade students, aged between 13 and 14, who took the 
Invalsi standardized tests at the end of the ‘first cycle’ of compulsory education (i.e. after five 
years of primary education and three years of junior high school). Math and Italian Language 
tests take place in June. Each part usually lasts one hour and between Language and Math test 
students have a fifteen minutes break. Data contain separate test scores for Maths and Italian 
Language ranging from 0 to 100 (percentage of right answers), and individual information is 
provided by the school administrative staff through school records (thus, not directly asked to 
students). Because of cheating evidence (Invalsi 2008,2009, 2010a), for each student I have 
both the raw and cheating-corrected Maths and Language test score. Sensitivity analysis 
confirms that raw and cheated-corrected results almost coincide once I control for 
geographical differences (i.e. I introduce in the model macro-area, regional or province 
dummies). Therefore, I use raw test scores, add geographical controls and a subject and 
school specific dummy indicating if the school has an high-cheating evidence. The ‘high 
cheating dummy’ is calculated starting from cheating coefficients obtained through a fuzzy-
logic correction procedure explained in detail in Invalsi (2010a) Appendix 9. The dummy 
identifies the schools with heavy evidence of cheating behaviours (it takes value 1 if the 
school is in the lowest decile of the distribution of the subject specific cheating coefficient). 
Robustness checks replicate the construction of the ‘high-cheating dummy’ with other 
percentiles (1-5, 1-15, 1-20) without showing differences in the results. 
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School level information. Invalsi and Ministry of Education Statistical Office provided us 
with additional school level information. For each junior high school I know: ownership (i.e. 
state school or private institution), administrative organization (i.e. whether it is an institute 
having both elementary and junior high schools, or whether it is a junior high school, 
administratively independent from other elementary schools); the province where the school 
is located; the total number of students enrolled in 6, 7 and 8 grade, and the total number of 
classes for each grade; the total number of teachers hired in the school; the total number of 
support teachers for students with handicaps or language difficulties; the number of students 
with disabilities for each grade. Because of restrictions imposed by Privacy Law, I have the 
information of the municipality only in the case in which the school is located in a 
municipality with at least three junior high schools. 
Catchment-area information. For each junior high school I define a ‘catchment area’ which 
identifies the area where the majority of school attendants live. A catchment area is composed 
by a number of census divisions linked to each school according to a given algorithm. The 
procedure for the association between school and census divisions assigns for each school the 
closest divisions (in terms of geographic distance) so that the ‘relevant resident population’ 
living in those divisions contains at least k>1 times the number of students enrolled in that 
particular school (Barbieri et al., 2011, Appendix A). The ‘relevant population’ is defined 
according to the 10-14 years resident population in the census data, while the multiplicative 
factor k is set equal to ten and it allows the overlapping of census divisions among different 
(but geographically not distant) schools. As a result, the matching procedure links each school 
j with Nj census divisions constituting its ‘catchment area’. For each school j the socio-
economic background variables are obtained as average of the socio-economic variables of 
the school catchment area from 2001 Italian Population Census Survey. 
Missing data correction. Missing values in school and catchment-area variables are due to the 
construction of the dataset. This fact would cause the number of schools in the regression 
estimates to shrink from 5611 in the estimation of eq. [8] in Table 5 to 4823. The variables 
containing missing values are two: the ‘stock of non-native students’ in the school (included 
in vector Sst) and the set of school specific catchment area variables (Wst). Preliminary 
analysis with probit regressions exclude any particular pattern in missing values due to 
geographical school location. The variable ‘stock of non-native students’ in the school is 
missing for 16% of schools due to school register data missing. I correct this variable 
replacing the missing values with the total stock of 7th grade non-natives students, one year 
lagged, from a different Invalsi data source. The correction replace all missing values. 
Catchment-area variables are missing for 6.3% of the schools. This is because the matching 
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procedure between the school identifier and the census cells failed due to some non-perfect 
overlapping between the school identifier in the Invalsi data and the one in the Census data. I 
replaced the missing values of the socio-economic variables of the school catchment-area 
with the average value of the same variables taken from the schools which are located in the 
same municipality. This correction procedure shrinks missing data on catchment-area 
variables from 6.3% to 4.6% of schools. Table C.1 shows that implementing the correction 
procedures allows keeping all the observations but does not modify previous results, which, in 
turn, are not due to some selection pattern in the missing data. 
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TABLES CHAPTER 1 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. School level characteristics. 
 
2008 2009 2010 
Panel A 
North Centre South North Centre South North Centre South 
No. Students 201,650 89,870 204,339 208,575 91,639 200,643 205665 90993 197675 
No. Schools 1762 832 2196 1837 857 2225 2080 906 2246 
% Non-native students 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.10 0.02 
Avg. No. Students per 
School 331.95 340.65 297.88 334.31 341.15 299.00 326.09 340.31 300.36 
Avg. No. Students per 
Class 20.96 21.20 19.35 20.61 20.85 19.75 21.45 21.03 20.15 
Panel B Mean Sd P25 P50 P75 P95 Max Min N 
% Non-native students 0.0683 0.0751 0.0053 0.0449 0.1075 0.2143 0.5 0 14941 
Avg. No. Students per 
School 318.71 197.68 172 267 424 718 1340 11 14941 
Avg. No. Students per 
Class 20.49 3.14 18.9 21 22.6 24.6 30 7 14941 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics. Invalsi IC school mean test scores for native and non-native students. 
 
 Language test 
 Native Non-native 
 Mean Sd Max Min Mean Sd Max Min 
2008 68.5 6.22 93.87 16.57 59.23 11.57 98 8 
2009 66.56 8.13 96.75 20 52.83 14.72 100 2.5 
2010 64.97 6.97 89.3 0 55.6 10.92 100 0.76 
 Math test 
 Native Non-native 
 Mean Sd Max Min Mean Sd Max Min 
2008 53.92 8.73 92.73 8.77 47.31 12.1 100 9.09 
2009 66 9.34 97.93 14.81 55.94 15.29 100 0 
2010 55.56 8.04 88.09 24.72 49.65 10.85 95 0 
 
Notes. Test scores range from 0 to 100 (percentage of right answers). The difference between test score means of 
native and non-native students is always statistically different from zero (p.val≤0.001); the ratio between test 
score sd of native and non-native students is always statistically different from one (p.val≤0.001). 
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Table 3. Gap in individual test scores between native and non-native students. Pooled OLS regressions on 
individual level Invalsi IC 2009-2010 data.  
 
 Dep. variable: individual test score  
 Language Math 
 (I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III) 
Non-native -11.6526*** -3.3199*** -3.4478*** -8.3664*** -2.6484*** -1.7929*** 
 (-0.121) (-0.2072) (-0.1892) (-0.1378) (-0.2665) (-0.1952) 
R sq. 0.064 0.1 0.199 0.171 0.19 0.3 
Clusters 5514 5514 5514 5514 5514 5514 
N 995190 995190 995190 995190 995190 995190 
Cohort FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Individual characteristics  yes yes  yes yes 
School characteristics and school FE   yes   yes 
 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the school level. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Coefficients are obtained from the dummy variable ‘being non-native’ through pooled OLS 
regressions performed at the individual level for Invalsi IC 2009 and 2010 waves. Individual control variables 
include dummies for gender, grade retention, having a father born in Italy, having a mother born in Italy, living 
in Italy since birth, living in Italy since elementary school, living in Italy since one year. School characteristics 
include total number of students per school and its square, average number of students per class and its square, 
pupil to teacher ratio. 
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Table 4. Control variables list: type (individual, school, catchment area) and description. 
 
Name Description 
Individual level (X) 
female Fraction of native females in school s (grade 8) 
late Fraction of native students retained in school s (grade 8) 
father place of birth Fraction of native students in school s and grade 8 with father born abroad  
mother place of birth Fraction of native students in school s and grade 8 with mother born abroad 
elementary_Italy Fraction of native students in school s grade 8 in Italy since elementary school 
always_italy Fraction of native students in school s grade 8 in Italy since birth 
School level (S) 
Non-native school share Fraction of non-native students in school s and grade 8. 
nonnatives_stock Total number of non-native students in the school (6, 7 and 8 grade) 
Pt_ratio Pupil to teacher ratio (8 grade) 
school_size and school_size2 School size (total number of students in the school, 6, 7 and 8 grade) and its square. 
avg_class and avg_class2 Average class size (average number of students in each 8 grade class) and its square. 
Cheating_dummy_math and 
cheating_dummy_language 
Dummy equal 1 if the school is in the 9th decile of the school cheating coefficient 
distribution (subject specific) 
Catchment area level (W) 
lpop Log of total resident population 
illiterate Fraction of illiterate pop. 
university_edu Fraction of pop. with university level education 
m_occup_rate Male occupation rate 
f_occup_rate Female occupation rate 
foreign_citizens No. of non-Italian residents 
agri_oc Fraction of workers occupied in agriculture 
self_empl Fraction workers self-employed 
commuter Fraction of residents commuting every day  
avg_family_members Average number of family members 
house_poor Fraction of houses without clean water 
house_new Fraction of houses built after 1980 
avg_rooms Average number of rooms per house 
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Table 5. Baseline model. Results from OLS regressions with school fixed-effects. 
 
 Dep. Variable: School Mean Score for Native students 
 Language Math 
 (I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III) 
Non-native school share -5.4294*** -4.7448*** -4.8530*** -4.7090** -3.4601* -3.5322* 
 (1.5697) (1.5370) (1.5251) (1.9606) (1.8583) (1.8465) 
R sq. 0.206 0.316 0.325 0.512 0.631 0.633 
Clusters 5611 5611 5611 5611 5611 5611 
N 14941 14941 14941 14941 14941 14941 
Individual characteristics, school 
FE and cohort FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
School characteristics  yes yes  yes yes 
Catchment area characteristics   yes   yes 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the school level. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See Table 4 for control variables list and description. 
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Table 6. Non-linear effects.  Results from OLS regressions with school fixed-effects and spline linear 
functions with one structural break (T). 
 
 Dep. Variable: School Mean Score for NATIVE students 
 Language 
 T=0.045 T=0.068 T=0.10 T=0.15 T=0.20 
 (P50) (mean) (≈P75) (≈P90) (≈P95) 
Share < T -3.0525 -1.9672 -2.0061 -3.3155* -4.0949** 
 (5.5378) (3.8010) (2.6718) (1.9491) (1.6728) 
Share > T -5.2763*** -5.9787*** -6.9270*** -7.6722*** -7.6323* 
 (1.7303) (1.8702) (2.1805) (2.9341) (4.1333) 
R sq. 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 
Clusters 5611 5611 5611 5611 5611 
N 14941 14941 14941 14941 14941 
 Math 
 T=0.045 T=0.068 T=0.10 T=0.15 T=0.20 
 (P50) (mean) (≈P75) (≈P90) (≈P95) 
Share < T -0.2107 1.6601 1.6118 -0.0889 -1.4300 
 (6.5980) (4.6177) (3.2537) (2.3788) (2.0450) 
Share > T -4.0741* -5.2888** -7.2790*** -9.2423** -11.2379** 
 (2.1109) (2.3010) (2.6745) (3.5908) (5.0951) 
R sq. 0.633 0.633 0.633 0.633 0.633 
Clusters 5611 5611 5611 5611 5611 
N 14941 14941 14941 14941 14941 
All Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the school level. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See Table 4 for control variables list and description. 
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Table 7. Non-linear effects. Results from OLS regressions with school fixed-effects and spline linear 
functions with two break points (T1=0.10 and T2=0.15, 0.20, 0.30). 
 
 Dep. Variable: School Mean Log Score for NATIVE students 
 Language Math 
 T1=0.10 T1=0.10 T1=0.10 T1=0.10 T1=0.10 T1=0.10 
 T2=0.15 T2=0.20 T2=0.30 T2=0.15 T2=0.20 T2=0.30 
Share < T1 -2.1148 -2.0087 -2.1650 0.9186 1.1445 1.4407 
 (2.8096) (2.7402) (2.6924) (3.3982) (3.3171) (3.2696) 
T1<Share<T2 -6.4917 -7.1019** -6.3709*** -2.7538 -4.7639 -6.1761** 
 (4.4532) (2.8148) (2.2355) (5.4557) (3.4608) (2.7377) 
Share > T2 -7.1952** -6.8600 -10.7928 -8.8420** -10.1483** -12.8443 
 (3.0312) (4.2071) (8.8243) (3.6920) (5.1695) (9.4230) 
R sq. 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.633 0.633 0.633 
Clusters 5611 5611 5611 5611 5611 5611 
N 14941 14941 14941 14941 14941 14941 
All Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the school level. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See Table 4 for control variables list and description. 
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Table 8. Sensitivity analysis. Robustness to class size variations. 
 
 Dep. Variable: School Mean Score for NATIVE students 
 Language Math 
 (I) (II) (I) (II) 
Non-native school share -4.8621*** -5.0857*** -3.5259* -4.4172** 
 (1.5262) (1.7513) (1.8490) (2.1916) 
Average class size -0.0658 -0.0782 0.0456 -0.0041 
 (0.3515) (0.3569) (0.3741) (0.3764) 
Average class size sq. 0.0027 0.0027 0.0019 0.0022 
 (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0077) (0.0076) 
Average class size * South dummy 0.0067 0.0173 0.2843 0.3267 
 (0.3841) (0.3879) (0.4071) (0.4078) 
Average class size sq. * South dummy -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0056 -0.0059 
 (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0077) (0.0076) 
Non-native school share * big class dummy  0.4824  1.9226 
  (1.4405)  (1.7893) 
R sq. 0.325 0.325 0.633 0.633 
Clusters 5611 5611 5611 5611 
N 14941 14941 14941 14941 
All Controls yes yes yes yes 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the school level. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See Table 4 for control variables list and description. 
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Table 9. Sensitivity analysis. Robustness to retained non-native students. 
 
  Dep. Variable: School Mean Score for NATIVE students 
                          Language Math 
  (I) (II) (I) (II) 
Non-native school share   -3.6392**               -3.3911               
 (1.8225)                (2.3977)               
‘Retained’ non-native students school share                0.2512                -1.3817    
             (2.4162)               (3.1068)    
‘Non-retained’ non-native students school share              -8.4408***             -5.8727    
                                      (2.9118)               (3.8812)    
R sq.    0.412       0.413       0.348       0.349    
Clusters     5592        5592        5592        5592    
N    10022       10022       10022       10022    
All Controls yes yes yes yes 
Only 2008 and 2010 cohorts yes yes yes yes 
 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the school level. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See Table 4 for control variables list and description. 
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Table 10. Sensitivity analysis. Robustness to across-schools sorting. 
 
 Dep. Variable: School Mean Score for NATIVE students 
 Language 
 Big municipalities Small municipalities Province by year FE 
Non-native school share -4.7285*** -6.8041** -4.1518*** 
 (1.7199) (3.4487) (1.5099) 
R sq. 0.331 0.331 0.362 
Clusters 3903 1085 5611 
N 11094 3012 14941 
 Math 
 Big municipalities Small municipalities Province by year FE 
Non-native school share -3.1641 -7.0337 -3.8518** 
 (1.9292) (4.8337) (1.8761) 
R sq. 0.647 0.608 0.651 
Clusters 3903 1085 5611 
N 11094 3012 14941 
All Controls yes yes yes 
 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the school level. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See Table 4 for control variables list and description. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 61 
Table 11. Sensitivity analysis. Non-linear effects adding higher order polynomials of non-native school 
share.  
 
Dep. Variable:School Mean Score for 
NATIVE students 
 Language 
Non-native school share (θ) -1.9658 -3.5082 -0.7507 
 (2.8974) (4.9352) (7.4583) 
θ
2
 -10.6773 2.2747 -38.3617 
 (9.7352) (33.5028) (85.5224) 
θ
3
  -23.9852 152.1057 
  (61.7825) (351.1655) 
θ
4
   -221.6964 
   (449.9035) 
R sq. 0.325 0.325 0.325 
Clusters 5611 5611 5611 
N 14941 14941 14941 
 Math 
Non-native school share (θ) 1.9595 2.1452 -3.8873 
 (3.4891) (5.7655) (8.7567) 
θ
2
 -20.3081* -21.8670 67.0276 
 (11.5681) (37.6217) (97.7579) 
θ
3
  2.8866 -382.3169 
  (66.0874) (388.8570) 
θ
4
   484.9629 
   (477.8939) 
R sq. 0.633 0.633 0.634 
Clusters 5611 5611 5611 
N 14941 14941 14941 
All Controls yes yes yes 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the school level. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See Table 4 for control variables list and description. 
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Table 12. Sensitivity analysis. Spline functions with intervals of five percentiles. 
 
  
Dep. Variable: School Mean 
Score for NATIVE students 
                         Language Math 
pc1 (θ) . . 
pc2 (θ) -15.9934 -18.2352 
 (11.6235) (13.5156) 
pc3 (θ) 5.1574 9.9346 
 (7.0422) (8.6081) 
pc4(θ) -3.9617 1.0133 
 (3.8899) (4.7890) 
pc5(θ) -6.9353*** -8.2250*** 
 (2.4676) (2.9980) 
R sq. 0.325 0.634 
Clusters 5611 5611 
N 14941 14941 
All Controls yes yes 
Notes. The first percentile is the omitted category. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the school 
level. Significance level: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See Table 4 for control variables list and description. 
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Table A1. Non-native students in the Italian school system.  
All levels Kindergarten Primary school Junior high High- school School Year 
Total No. % Total No. % Total No. % Total No. % Total No. % 
1996-97 59389 0.7 12809 0.8 26752 1.0 11991 0.6 7837 0.3 
… … … … … … … … … … … 
2001-02 181767 2.3 39445 2.5 84122 3.0 45253 2.5 27594 1.1 
2002-03 232766 3.0 48072 3.0 100939 3.7 55907 3.1 34890 1.3 
2003-04 282683 3.5 59500 3.6 123814 4.5 71447 4.0 52380 2.0 
2004-05 361576 4.2 74348 4.5 147633 5.3 84989 4.7 63833 2.4 
2005-06 424683 4.8 84058 5.0 165951 5.9 98150 5.6 83052 3.1 
2006-07 501445 5.6 94712 5.7 190803 6.8 113076 6.5 102829 3.8 
2007-08 574133 6.4 111044 6.7 217716 7.7 126396 7.3 118977 4.3 
2008-09 629360 7.0 125092 7.6 234206 8.3 140050 8.0 130012 4.8 
2009-10 673592 7.5 135632 8.1 244.457 8.7 150279 8.5 143224 5.3 
2010-11 711046 7.9 144628 8.6 254.644 9.0 158261 8.8 153513 5.8 
Notes. Elaboration from MIUR-ISMU Foundation (2011). Primary school (grades 1-5); Junior high school 
(grades 6-8); high-school (grades 9-13).Children enrolled in kindergartens are from 3 up to 5 years old and start 
primary school the month of September of the year they turn 6.  
 
 
Table A.2. Descriptive statistics. The three main problems experienced by teachers in approaching non-
native students. 
Main problems faced by teachers Average 
North-West  
Difficulties in communication because of the language 2.7 
Problematic family background 2.5 
Slowing down teaching activities 2.3 
North-East  
Problematic family background 2.9 
Difficulties in communication because of the language 2.8 
Adapting teaching activities to non-native students 2.6 
Centre  
Difficulties in communication because of the language 3.1 
Adapting teaching activities to non-native students 2.7 
Slowing down teaching activities 2.7 
South and Islands  
Difficulties in communication because of the language 2.7 
Slowing down teaching activities 2.1 
Problematic family background 2.1 
 
Notes. Elaboration from CENSIS (2008, table 13), “Main problems faced by teachers in approaching non-native 
students, distribution by geographical macro-area”. Average points: 1 means “no problems”, 4 means “a lot of 
problems”. I report the three answers with the highest average points. 
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Table A.3. Descriptive statistics. Evidence on the theoretical framework behavioural assumptions. 
 
  Native Non-native High ability Low ability All 
(a.1) "Studying Math is more difficult for me than 
for others" 29.76 37.54 23.26 27.17 30.54 
(a.2) "Studying Language is more difficult for me 
than for others" 24.48 39.36 19.9 33.9 25.96 
(b.1) "During Math lessons, we dedicate a lot of time 
to the same issue because class-mates do not 
understand" 
58.89 58.11 59.88 57.54 58.81 
(b.2) "During Language lessons, we dedicate a lot of 
time to the same issue because class-mates do not 
understand" 
47.83 47.49 48.33 46.36 47.8 
N 462,390 51,347 296,550 217,187 513,737 
 
Notes. The data are taken from the Student Questionnaire of the Invalsi National Evaluation Program, s.y. 2009-
10. The population refers to all 6th grade students enrolled in Italian junior high schools. High ability and low 
ability students are classified according to whether the teachers’ mark for each student at the end of the first 
semester (late January) is above or below median mark for all students. 
 
 
Table C.1. Robustness to missing data correction. 
 
 
School Mean Score for NATIVE 
students 
 Language 
 Baseline Without correction for missing data 
Non-native school share -4.8530*** -5.4214*** 
 (1.5251) (-1.5641) 
R sq. 0.325 0.328 
Clusters 5611 4823 
N 14941 13820 
 Math 
 Baseline Without correction for missing data 
Non-native school share -3.5322* -4.4357** 
 (1.8465) (-1.8926) 
R sq. 0.633 0.635 
Clusters 5611 4823 
N 14941 13820 
All Controls yes yes 
 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the school level. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Correction for missing data is explained in Appendix C. See Table 4 for control variables 
list and description. 
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FIGURES CHAPTER 1 
 
Figure 1. The ‘disruption model’. The figure shows the concave relation between non-native school share (θ) 
and per student output (y) in the ‘disruption model’. 
 
 
y 
θ 0 0.5 θ1 θ2 
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Figure 2. The ‘integration model’. The dotted and dashed lines in the figure show two possible shapes of the 
relation between non-native school share (θ) and per student output (y) consistent with the ‘integration model’. 
The dashed line is globally convex, the dotted line is convex for θ approaching zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
y 
θ 0 0.5 θ1 θ2 
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Figure 3. Non-native students the Italian school system. The graph shows the percentage of non-native 
students enrolled in Italian schools from s.y. 1996-07 to 2010-11for all education levels (primary, junior high 
and high schools) and junior high schools only. 
 
 
Source: elaboration on data from MIUR (2011).  
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Figure A.1. Dissimilarity index and non-native school share. The figure shows a comparison between the 
dissimilarity index calculated at the school level and the non-native school share across three geographical 
macro-areas. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
‘ACTING-WHITE’?  
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AMONG NON-NATIVE STUDENTS 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper focuses on social interactions within non-native students and analyses to which 
extent non-native students’ cognitive outcomes depend on the exposure to non-native peers in 
the school. The sources of endogeneity due to non-random allocation of non-native students 
across classes (within schools) and across schools (within school-districts) are tackled with an 
instrumental variable approach. Exploiting a rich dataset on Italian junior high schools, I find 
negative within-group social interaction effects increasing with respect to the degree of school 
segregation and decreasing with respect to non-natives’ assimilation. Increasing non-native 
school share has larger negative effects the more non-native students are unevenly distributed 
across classes in the same school and for the sub-group of first generation non-native 
students. These findings support the existence of ‘oppositional culture’ mechanisms (or 
‘acting-white behaviours’) that exacerbate the negative social interactions effects within the 
non-native peer group. 
 
 
JEL Classification: J15, I21, I28 
Keywords: social interactions, acting-white, school segregation, non-native students 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The recent developments in the study of social interactions between minority students and 
white peers underlines how a clear understanding of the internal dynamics of the ‘minority 
peer group’ is determinant to assess sources and mechanics of the minority students 
underachievement (Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Fryer and Torelli, 2010; Fryer, 2010). 
Nevertheless, despite the great variety of studies on social interactions in educational settings, 
empirical evidence and theoretical models on peer effects between native and non-native 
students still present mixed findings and limited evidence on possible channels and 
mechanisms at work. Social interactions take place within the reference group (within-group) 
or between two separate groups of individuals (across-groups) and influence cognitive and 
non-cognitive outcomes of students’ peers. What I name ‘within-group’ social interactions is 
generally referred to as ‘within-race’ social interactions in the U.S. literature and it refers to 
the specific aspects of peer effects inside the group of minority students and it has never been 
considered as an independent strand in the broad literature of ‘racial peer effects’. 
Identification problems and policy interpretations are generally different with respect to the 
ones derived from estimations of  ‘between groups peer effects’ and just a few and recent 
works look specifically at social interactions dynamics inside the ‘minority students peer 
group’ (Fryer and Torelli, 2010; Fairlie et al., 2011).  
In this work, I focus on within-group interactions and study to which extent non-native 
students’ cognitive outcomes depend on the share of the same non-native peers in the 
school28. My primary aim is to disentangle the possible causal link between the size of the 
non-native peer group and its average test scores: does the size of the non-native group (i.e. 
non-native school share) influence the attainment of the same non-native students? If it is the 
case, in which way? The second aim of the analysis is to test the existence and relevance of 
two potential behavioural channels that might help to explain the underlying social 
interactions mechanisms: ‘acting-white’ and ‘assimilation’. I label ‘acting-white’ the evidence 
that within-group negative social interactions are greater the greater is the segregation of 
minority students within each school. This is a sort of reinterpretation of the ‘oppositional 
culture behaviours’ sociological theory that asserts that minority students may underachieve 
and refuse assimilation to the majority behaviours in order to fit with their peers’ (Fordham 
and Ogbu, 1986). The ‘assimilation channel’ is tested restricting the analysis on the sub-group 
of first-generation non-native students who plausibly experience more difficulties to 
                                                 
28
 I distinguish native and non-native students referring to a citizenship criterion. This is because data from 
Italian Ministry of Education (MIUR) only distinguish between Italian or native and non-Italian or non-native 
students. In the sensitivity analysis I test the robustness of the results using the ‘immigrant’ status definition as 
defined by OECD (OECD, 2010). 
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assimilate to the hosting country language and culture with respect to second generation 
peers.  
The Italian context is an interesting case study under many aspects. From 1997 to 2007, Italy 
experienced one of the highest increase (+242.9%) in the percentage of foreign population 
among all OECD countries (OECD, 2011): foreign population more than doubled in less than 
one decade. Only Spain records an increase comparable to the Italian one. Of course, this 
huge phenomenon had direct consequences on students’ population. Over the same period, the 
school system has recorded a growing number of non-native students enrolments: in 1996-97, 
only 0.7% of students in the Italian school system was non-native, while in 2009-10 the share 
has grown up to 7.9% (+106%, Figure 4) (MIUR 2009a, 2009b, 2010).  
[Figure 4 here] 
The pattern of immigration has also been changing in the last two decades. In the past, 
immigration flows mostly consisted in low-skilled, low-wage and often undocumented men 
seeking work. A lot of them were seasonal workers, and they normally arrived and stayed for 
brief periods without their families. Starting from the late Nineties immigrants show the 
intention to settle permanently: immigration flows consist more and more of complete 
families and the number of children in immigrant families has rapidly increased (Mencarini et 
al., 2009). Consequently, in the last five years, second generation students have rapidly 
become part the Italian schooling population and constantly interact with first generation and 
native peers.  
From the empirical point of view, in this specific setting the identification of ‘social 
interactions effects’ – defined as a combination of endogenous and exogenous peer effects 
(Manski, 1993) - has to solve three main threats: first, within school sorting given by non-
random allocation of non-native students across classes in the same school; second, the 
separation of the effects of peers from other confounding influences in correlated effects; 
third, the endogeneity of non-native school share due to across schools sorting of non-native 
students generated by households’ residential and working decisions. The identification 
strategy is based on school-level averages in order to sidestep the non-random allocation of 
non-native students within schools (across classes) while the endogeneity of the non-native 
school share due to across-schools sorting is tackled with an IV approach. The instruments 
exploit the existence of ‘network effects’ in the residential decisions of non-natives due to the 
evidence that early settlements of migrants tend to have an attractive power to successive 
migrants waves. I use as outcome measures standardized test scores from a unique and rich 
dataset combining the Italian national assessment program of educational attainment at the 
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end of junior high schools (INVALSI First Cycle Exams29), with 2001 Census Survey data and 
administrative records on schools characteristics and socio-economic environment. The 
dataset overcomes problem of under-representation of non-native shares typical of survey data 
as it contains census information on all 8th grade students enrolled in junior high schools. I 
find robust evidence of negative within-group social interaction effects. Results also point to 
the existence of ‘acting-white’ behaviours among non-native students in Italian junior high 
schools.  
The paper contribution is twofold. First, it is one of the few works that specifically looks at 
social interactions within the reference ethnic group. Despite the limited evidence in U.S. 
literature, this is one of the first times that ‘within-group’ peer effects are found in European 
school contexts (Aslund et al. 2011 is a notable exception). Second, I find evidence that two 
important mechanisms (‘acting-white’ and ‘assimilation’) are at work in the context under 
study and are likely to influence the social interactions dynamics within the non-native group. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 I discuss the main results in the 
literature about the ‘intra-race peer effects’ and ‘acting-white behaviours’. Section 2.3 
describes the data and provides descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 discusses the identification 
strategy devoting particular care to the instrumental variable used. Section 2.5 contains the 
main results, while in Section 2.6 I speculate on the underlying social mechanisms. Section 
2.7 contains several tests to corroborate the robustness of the findings. Section 2.8 concludes 
and provides some policy implications. 
 
2.2. LITERATURE 
 
A new strand of the social interaction literature tends to reinterpret the general result that 
‘intra-race’ peer effects are stronger compared to ‘extra-race’ peer effects (Hoxby, 2000; 
Angrist and Lang, 2004; Hanushek et al., 2009; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2009) under the light 
of the ‘acting-white’ theory. This is a reinterpretation of the ‘oppositional culture behaviours’ 
sociological theory asserting that minority students may underachieve and refuse assimilation 
to the majority behaviours in order to fit with their peers’ (Fordham and Ogbu, 1986). Battu 
and Zenou (2010) exploit a similar intuition for outcomes of immigrant workers in the labor 
market.  Fryer and Torelli (2010) provide the first empirical evidence using the National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (AddHealth) and estimating the effects on 
achievement of an ‘index of social status’ based on the individuals’ contacts with same-race 
                                                 
29
 8th grade students are enrolled in their third year of the Italian middle grade comprehensive school (13-14 
years old). After passing the final exam they gain the ‘Junior High School Diploma’ (ISCED level 2). 
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friends within the school. They show that this ‘acting white’ proxy variable varies a lot with 
respect to school characteristics and individual achievement and that the effect is concentrated 
in schools with more interracial contact. Their coefficient for the ‘acting-white’ indicator is 
twice as large in schools that are above the median in terms of segregation, whereas it is 
significantly lower where black students are more isolated. Fairlie et al. (2011) implement the 
same intuition of the ‘acting white theory’ to study the extent to which academic performance 
depends on students being of similar race or ethnicity to their instructors. They use detailed 
administrative data from one of the largest community colleges in the United States and 
address the concern of endogenous sorting using both student and classroom fixed effects. 
The authors find that the performance gap, in terms of class dropout and pass rates between 
white and minority students, falls by roughly a half when minority students are taught by a 
‘minority instructor’, so that, for instance, African-American students perform particularly 
better when taught by African-American instructors. Friesen and Krauth (2011) use data on 
elementary school students in British Columbia (Canada) to assess the effects of the language 
spoken at home and attending ‘enclave schools’ on students’ attainment. The authors broadly 
define ‘enclave school’ as schools with higher shares of same ethnic minority peers and 
identify non-natives with Aboriginal, Chinese and Punjabi ethnic minority groups. In contrast 
with the rest of the literature, the authors find within-group effects weaker compared to 
across-groups effects and that attending an ‘enclave’ school has differential effects with 
respect to the prevalent ethnic minority (slightly positive effects for Chinese, negative for 
Punjabi). According to Friesen and Krauth (2011) the evidence that effects on achievement of 
attending school with more same-language peers varies with the achievement level of one’s 
own language group suggests that linguistic or ethno-cultural similarity to peers does not in 
itself play a significant role in immigrant success, but rather that human capital and cultural 
norms of peers is what matters. 
In European contexts, Aslund et al. (2011) for Sweden, Maestri (2011) for the Netherlands, 
Jensen and Rasmussen (2011) for Denmark use three different identification strategies to 
answer a variety of research questions dealing, to some extent, to assess the impact of the 
presence of non-native students on natives’ and non-natives’ educational outcomes. Aslund et 
al. (2011) is one of the few work that specifically focuses on peer effects within the minority 
students’ community and neighbourhood. They estimate to what extent the lower achievement 
of immigrant students is due to the characteristics of the neighbourhoods in which the 
immigrants grow up. The estimation strategy relies on a governmental placement policy that 
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generated exogenous variation in the initial residential distribution30. They show that the size 
of the local ethnic community is positively related to compulsory school grades. Separating 
this effect into its components, the authors find that one standard deviation increase in the 
fraction of highly educated peers raises student performance by 0.9 percentile ranks and that 
one standard deviation increase in the size of the ethnic community has about the same effect, 
albeit less precisely estimated.  
Maestri (2011) investigates how the heterogeneity of the ethnic minority composition within 
schools affects natives’ and non-natives’ attainment grounding on the idea that ethnic 
diversity can stimulate the creativity of students, push them to be proficient in the 
instructional language, and reduce the scope of ethnic identification with all its possible 
drawbacks as the ‘acting white’ effects. She exploits the within school cohort-to-cohort 
variation in the ethnic make-up of a rich dataset of primary schools in the Netherlands and 
finds that ethnic diversity has a positive impact on the test scores of minority students, in 
particular for language skills. She also finds evidence of a negative relationship between an 
ethnic diversity index, obtained as an inverted Hirschman-Herfindahl index, and an indirect 
measure of social interactions among pupils.  
Finally, Jensen and Rasmussen (2011) analyse the effect of ethnic concentration in schools on 
the cognitive outcomes of children. They use a rich dataset for Danish 9th grade students, 
based on PISA test scores, administrative and census information on students, schools and 
neighbourhoods. In order to correct for the endogeneity in school ethnic concentration, the 
authors apply school fixed-effects and IV, using as instrumental variable the ethnic 
concentration in a larger geographical area where the school is located. Results show that 
there is a negative effect of ethnic concentration on students’ outcomes but that these are 
statistically significant only for the native Danish children. In contrast to the majority of the 
results in the literature, they do not find statistically significant ‘within-group’ peer effects for 
immigrant children so that increasing non-native school share does not affect immigrant test 
scores. However, albeit using detailed individual level information, the authors apply an 
instrumental variable approach based on larger geographical area ethnic density to instrument 
for non-native presence in each school. This approach is likely to underestimate the effects - 
both in terms of social interactions within the non-native group and between natives and non-
natives - as schools with different ethnic make-up within the same area are subject to the same 
value of the instrument. 
 
                                                 
30
 Between 1987–1991 Swedish authorities assigned refugees to their initial location, since individuals were not 
free to choose, Aslund et al. (2011) argue that the initial location was independent of (unobserved) individual 
characteristics. 
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2.3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
I exploit a unique dataset that combines the Invalsi First Cycle Final Exam data31, 
administrative records from Ministry of Education Statistical Office, and the Italian 
Population Census Survey 2001. Invalsi First Cycle Exam data (hereafter ‘First Cycle’ or 
‘IC’) are the first experience of testing attainment levels of all students enrolled in Italian 
junior high schools. All 8th grade students sit the Invalsi First Cycle Exam in mid-June, at the 
end of the compulsory and comprehensive path of the Italian school system constituted by 
five years of primary education and three years of junior high school. The census dimension 
of Invalsi IC data allows us to overcome problems of underrepresentation of immigrant 
individuals and measurement errors typical of sample surveys (Aydemir and Borjas, 2010), 
while additional information about socio-economic family background are obtained as school-
level averages of Census variables linked to each school using an original matching technique 
that identifies for each junior high school its ‘catchment area’ (Barbieri et al., 2011)32.  
In detail, Invalsi IC dataset contains Math and Language test scores, individual information 
and school level information for each 8th grade student enrolled in a public or private junior 
high school33. I exploit two waves corresponding to 2008-09 and 2009-10 school years final 
exams (about 500,000 students per wave). Individual information cover year of birth, gender, 
citizenship (Italian, non-Italian), place of birth; how long the student is in Italy if born abroad 
(from primary school, for 1-3 years, less than 1 year); mother’s and father’s place of birth 
(Italy, EU, European but non-EU, other non-European country), grade retention (if the student 
is ‘regular’ i.e. if he/she is 14 years old at the end of the school year; ‘in advance’ i.e. younger 
than ‘regular’ students, or ‘retained’ i.e. older than ‘regular’ students). Administrative records 
from Ministry of Education Statistical Office provide general information about school 
characteristics (i.e. type of school, public vs. private, number of students enrolled and number 
of teachers, average class size) and are matched to Invalsi First Cycle data through 
anonymous school identifiers. Each school is finally matched to a group of census divisions 
through an original matching technique designed to associate to each junior high school a 
group of census cells constituting its ‘catchment area’ (Barbieri et al., 2011)34. This procedure 
allows matching to each junior high school variables from 2001 Population Census Survey 
covering demographic and socio-economic information on resident population.  
                                                 
31
 INVALSI (Istituto Nazionale per la Valutazione del Sistema Educativo di Istruzione e di Formazione) is the 
independent public institute carring out the evaluation of Italian school system and test students’ attainment 
levels. 
32
 Notice also that this is the first time that a dataset with such a variety of information and covering the universe 
of 8th grade students is made available for the Italian school system.  
33
 Test scores range from 0 to 100 and refer to the fraction of right answers for each of the two subjects. 
34
 See the Appendix in Barbieri, Rossetti and Sestito (2011) for a detailed description of  the matching technique 
used. 
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I identify native and non-native students according to a citizenship criterion. Sensitivity 
analysis on different categorizations never shows significant differences in the results (see 
Section 2.7). Although the empirical analysis will primarily focus on non-native students, I 
also distinguish between first and second generation students. ‘First-generation’ students are 
born abroad from parents born abroad, while ‘second-generation’ students are born inside the 
receiving country but from parents born abroad (OECD, 2010). The final population is 
constituted by all 8th grade non-native students enrolled in Italian junior high schools in 2008-
09 and 2009-10 school years35 (68,717 individuals).  
[Table 13 here] 
Panel A in Table 13 describes the distribution of these different categories across 
geographical macro-areas. For instance, referring to the IC 2009-10 wave, the overall share of 
non-native 8th grade students is 7.22%, but there are sharp differences across the country. The 
highest average school share of non-native students are in Northern and Centre regions 
(10.01% and 9.18%), while it dramatically falls in the South (1.97%). At the school level, 
Panel B in Table 13 describes school characteristics (share of public schools, pupil-teacher 
ratio, average school size, average class size) with respect to macro-area. On average, more 
than 76% of schools has at least one non-native student: this proportion is very high in the 
North and Centre (more than 90%) and sharply decreases in the South (58%).  
[Table 14 here] 
Table 14 contains general descriptive statistics with average test score results for first and 
second generation immigrants and native and non-native students, according to the definitions 
previously introduced. Second generation students perform better compared to first generation 
peers, and the difference is more pronounced in the Language skills (+5 points) than in Math 
(+2.2 points). Finally, it is worth noting that test scores gap between non-natives and natives 
does not change a lot along the test score distribution.  
To provide evidence of the non-random allocation of non-native students across classes in the 
same school, I calculate a dissimilarity index (D) at the school level. The index was first 
proposed by Duncan and Duncan (1955) and then extensively used in school and residential 
segregation analysis (among the others, Clotfelter, 1999; Echenique and Fryer, 2007). It 
provides a measure of the evenness in the distribution of non-native students. Given that in 
each school there are Nj classes (c=1...Nj), the dissimilarity index at the school level (Ds) 
measures the percentage of non-native students that would have to change class for each class 
                                                 
35
 I exclude all individuals who did not sit either Maths or Italian Language test because absent the day of the 
exam (0.73% of the total students population).  
 77 
to have the same percentage of non-native students as the one of the whole school (i.e. the 
non-native school share). In symbols: 
 
1
1
2
jN
j c c
c j j
Natives Non nativesD
Natives Non natives
=
−
= −
−
∑  
 
[1] 
 
where Nativesc and Non-nativesc represent, respectively, the total number of native and non-
native students in class c of school j, and Nativesj and Non-nativesj represent the total number 
of native and non-native students in school j. Dj ranges from 0 (perfectly even distribution, 
meaning ‘no segregation’) to 1 (perfectly uneven distribution, i.e. ‘maximum segregation’).  
[Figure 5 here] 
The graph box in Figure 5 portraits the results distinguishing among three geographical macro 
areas. The distribution of non-native students across classes cannot be considered even: 
median value of the dissimilarity index is 15% in the North, 17% in the Centre and 13% in the 
South, so that, for example, in the North, on average, 15% of non-native students have to be 
moved from one class to another to obtain an ‘even’ distribution within the school. 
 
2.4. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
 
Starting from a standard linear-in-means reduced-form model with peer interactions (Manski, 
1993), I assume that a student’s outcome (y) depends on individual characteristics (X), the 
share of same-group peers experienced by each student i among the school and grade mates 
(Ps), contextual factors ( sµ ) and an unobserved error term. Thus, for each non-native student i 
attending 8th grade, in school s, it yields36: 
 
' 'NN NN NN NN
ics ics x s s icsy X P µγ β µ γ ς= + + +%  [2] 
 
where: 
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−
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 [3] 
                                                 
36
 Notice that in the reminder of the paper I simply refer to ‘non-native school share’ to easy the exposition. 
However, as expression [3] clarifies, Ps only refers to the share of non-native students attending grade 8 in the 
school s. Ps is a good proxy of peers’ characteristics but it is also predetermined with respect to the outcome 
measure and thus not affected by common school-level shocks (i.e. the correlated effects,
s
µ ) (Ammermüller 
and Pischke, 2009; Angrist and Lang, 2004). 
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The identification of the ‘social interactions effect’ parameter β  - which includes both 
endogenous and exogenous peer effects (Manski, 1993) - in equation [2] has to solve three 
main threats: first, within school sorting given by non-random allocation across classes of 
non-native students; second, the separation of the effects of peers from other confounding 
influences in correlated effects (i.e. omitting relevant components of the contextual effects 
( µ ) that are correlated with Ps will bias the estimation of β ); third, endogeneity of non-
native school share (Ps) due to across schools sorting of non-native students generated by 
households’ residential and working decisions. In the baseline model, I solve within-school 
sorting of non-native students moving from individual-level data to school-level averages: 
aggregation at the school level solves the problem of endogenous within-school sorting of 
non-native students across classes (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Card and Rothstein, 2007; 
Brunello and Rocco, 2011). To clarify this point, I specify the error term in three parts: a 
school-specific component (ηs) common to each student of the non-native group (j=NN) in 
school s, class specific component (ucs) common to all non-native students in class c and 
school s, and a student-specific component (eics) 37:  
 
ics s cs icsu eς η= + +  [4] 
 
Any non-randomness in within school allocation of non-native students determines a 
correlation between the class specific component (ucs) and the observable characteristics so 
that OLS estimates are biased. Under the assumption that the student-specific error and the 
class-specific error average to zero for each group j in each school s, taking school-level 
averages solves this problem38. Thus, the mean outcome for non-native student group in 
school s is given by: 
 
' ' '
s s s s S s s sy X P S Wα β θ θ η= + + + +  [5] 
 
                                                 
37
 Henceforth, I suppress upper index (j=NN) to easy notation: NN
s sy y= . 
38
 The assumption of zero mean for the class-specific error component might fail if some class level 
characteristics are not randomly allocated across classes (within each school). However, since the allocation of 
teachers across classes is a predetermined decision of the School Head and school resources are equally 
distributed in the school (across classes and grades) this issue is not particularly relevant in the Invalsi IC data. 
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where, 
sX
 
represents the mean characteristics of non-native students in school s, school (S) 
and catchment area characteristics (W) calculated as school-level mean characteristics 
(contained in the vector µ ). 
The averaging procedure sidesteps the problems due to correlation in within school allocation 
to classes of non-native students but leaves unsolved the endogeneity problems due to OVB in 
correlated effects and across schools sorting of non-native students. Concerning the possible 
omitted variable bias arising from correlated effects, I first point out that the possibility of 
correlation between W and the peers’ variables in the equations is reduced in the estimates 
thanks to the original features of dataset used. In fact, catchment area variables are school-
specific socio-economic indicators that are not directly obtained as an average of some peers’ 
characteristics and that predate the outcome measure (they are obtained from the Italian 
Population Census 2001). These two characteristics reduce endogeneity problems in peer 
effects estimations limiting possible correlation with peers contemporaneous characteristics 
(X and P) (Ammermüller and Pischke, 2009)39. Then, the omitted variable bias is also reduced 
including school-district by year fixed-effects which capture all omitted and confounding 
factors that are common to all schools in the same school-district40. In other words, they 
capture unobserved heterogeneity mirrored by different socio-economic conditions of schools, 
underlying students’ families populations and recent trends in immigrants’ settlements across 
the territory. Thus, the baseline model to be estimated by OLS takes the following form: 
 
' ' '
s s s s s t sy X P S Wα β θ γ φ η= + + + + +  [6] 
 
where tφ  represents the set of school-districts by year fixed-effects and year dummies 
(included to control for possible time trends in IC test score results in the two waves used). 
 
2.4.1. IV model 
 
I implement an IV approach to tackle the bias from sorting of non-native students across 
schools due to households’ residential choices. For instance, in big cities immigrant families 
tend to settle in suburbs where location rents are lower. Within a given city, these areas 
generally reflect lower socio-economic status of both native and immigrant households living 
                                                 
39
 The different time pattern in the IC Invalsi data and catchment area level variables (W) is not a concern as 
socio-economic conditions across Italian territory did not change significantly in the period considered (Bank of 
Italy, 2008). 
40
 School districts fixed-effects correspond to 110 dummies, one for each Italian province (NUTS 3 level, 
Eurostat Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics). 
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there. Therefore, for schools located there the higher number of non-native students may be 
reasonably correlated to lower scores of both native and non-native peers. Nevertheless, this 
may be due not only because the exposure to higher numbers of non-native schoolmates 
causes negative externalities within the non-native peer group, but also because non-native 
students’ test scores are lower per se, for instance, because of the underlying lower socio-
economic status or because of negative externalities from disadvantaged native peers. With 
respect to the empirical framework proposed, any non-randomness in the sorting of students 
across schools or neighbourhoods produces a serious correlation between Ps and the school-
error component and bias OLS estimates of β in the school-level equations. 
To address this problem I instrument the non-native school share (Ps) with the number of non-
native residents living in the school catchment area in 2001 (Zs). This approach exploits the 
existence of ‘network effects’ in the residential decisions of immigrants due to the evidence 
that early settlements of migrants tend to have an attractive power to successive migrants 
waves, especially in urban areas (Borjas 1995; Card, 2001). This fact is confirmed also in the 
Italian context where important channels that could explain immigrants residential clustering 
have to do with the advantages of proximity to people in the same national, ethnic, linguistic, 
or socioeconomic group for information sharing purposes, reciprocal support and use of 
common local public goods (Barone and Mocetti, 2011; Boeri et al. 2011; Pellizzari, 2011). 
Similar identification strategies are widely exploited in the migration and segregation 
literature. For instance, Boustan (2010) estimates the causal effect between ‘white flight’ from 
U.S. cities to suburbs and the arrival of blacks immigration waves. To solve the potential 
endogeneity in blacks settlements across cities she builds an instrumental variable making use 
of the fact that black migrants from given southern states clustered in particular northern 
cities. Saiz and Wachter (2011) take advantage of the immigrant clustering evidence to 
partially predict the patterns of new immigrant settlement in U.S. metropolitan areas and 
evaluate the causal impact of immigration on neighbourhood dynamics. To this purpose, they 
instrument for the actual number of new immigrants using the predictions of a geographic 
diffusion model that estimates the number of new immigrants in a neighbourhood using 
lagged densities of the foreign-born in surrounding neighbourhoods. Boeri et al. (2011) use 
houses characteristics form the 2001 Census data to instrument for immigrant segregation in 
eight Italian Northern cities. Their instrumental variable approach is very close to mine and 
hinges upon the same exogeneity condition, albeit applied to residential segregation and not to 
the school context. In educational settings, similar strategies have been used to determine the 
causal impact of immigrant concentration on students’ outcomes. Dustmann and Preston 
(2001) and Jansen and Rasmussen (2011) use ethnic concentration in a larger geographical 
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area to instrument for the school ethnic concentration. They ground on the assumption that 
larger geographic area immigrant concentration is a good predictor of school immigrant 
concentration while it does not directly affect children outcomes. 
The IV strategy implemented combines insights from both streams of the literature, although 
being closer in spirit to arguments and the ideas typical of the migration one. The exclusion 
restriction claims that non-native residents in each school catchment-area in 2001 (Zs) 
influence the test scores only through the effects on the actual share of non-native students in 
the school (Ps). The exogeneity of the instrument relies on the fact that it is antecedent to the 
outcome measures used and thus plausibly uncorrelated with test scores: the nine years 
temporal lag between the outcome variable and the instrument ensures the exogeneity 
condition to be met. The coefficient of the social interactions parameter ( ˆβ ) is estimated from 
the reduced form equation [7] with 2SLS:  
 
' ' '
ˆ ˆ
st st st st s t sty X P S Wα β θ γ φ η= + + + + +  [7] 
 
2.4.2. Instrument relevance and validity: a discussion 
 
In this paragraph I discuss possible concerns on the robustness of the instruments validity and 
relevance assumptions while in the sensitivity analysis I perform empirical falsification tests. 
The relevance of the instrument is based on the fact that the number of non-native individuals 
who lived in the school catchment-area in 2001 (Zs) is a good predictor of the actual number 
of non-native residents in the school area, and, as a consequence, of the actual non-native 
composition of the school population.  
[Figure 6 here] 
Figure 6 compares the non-native students’ concentration in junior high schools (average 
values for the two school years considered in the analysis, i.e. 2008-09 and 2009-10) with 
non-native resident population in 2001. The figures almost perfectly overlap corroborating the 
basic assumption on which the instrument relevance is grounded: non-natives tend to cluster 
only in particular areas of the country which can be predicted making adequate use of 
information on past immigration waves. First stage regressions confirm that Zs is positively 
and strongly correlated with the endogenous variable. 
Differently from Dustmann and Preston (2001) and Jansen and Rasmussen (2011), I exploit 
an instrument that is school-specific, thus it is more precise than instruments based on larger 
geographical areas ethnic concentration. In fact, larger geographical areas might contain more 
schools sharing the same value of the instrumental variable. This problem becomes 
 82 
particularly serious in urban areas, where different suburbs within the same city may show 
sharp differences in the school ethnic make-up which an instrumental variable approach based 
on ethnic concentration in larger geographical area would not capture.  
Concerns upon the exogeneity of the instrument arise if Zs is correlated with the outcome 
variable (non-native test scores) through some underling channels other than the presence of 
non-native students in the school. Indeed, the time lag between Zs and ys ensures the validity 
condition to be met. Using measures which are more distant in time with respect to the 
outcome variable would improve, in principle, the reliability of the exclusion restriction. This 
is not the case in the Italian context because the 1991 Census would not capture the ‘network 
effects’ in households’ residential locations as the presence of non-native in Italy was totally 
negligible compared to the actual one (Billari and Della Zuanna, 2008; Mencarini et al., 
2009). In fact, in 1991 the non-native population in Italy was so small that such a hypothetical 
instrument would not have any predictive power on present non-native school shares. Boeri et 
al. (2011) do a similar exercise and conclude that 1991 Census data have not predictive power 
with respect to actual immigrant residential choices in Italy. They focus on eight cities in the 
North and Centre of Italy, but this result can be easily generalized to the whole country41. 
Possible concerns arise if I consider that some of the non-Italian resident population in the 
2001 Census data may be constituted by the parents of the non-native students in Invalsi IC 
data who were 5 or 6 years old in 2001. To test for this, in Section 2.6.2 I repeat the main 
analysis only non-native students born abroad (i.e. first generation). First-generation non-
native students are not born in Italy, thus it is likely that the majority of them and their parents 
either did not reside in Italy in 2001 or were undocumented and in ‘illegal’ status. In both 
cases they would not be recorded in the 2001 Census. Results are not qualitatively different 
from the main analysis and thus further support the reliability of the exogeneity condition42. 
To conclude, the instrumental variable chosen outperforms previous studies both in terms of 
relevance (stronger predictive power) and precision (Zs is school specific), while the nine 
years lag supports the validity of the exclusion restriction.  
 
2.5. RESULTS 
 
This section contains the baseline OLS and IV results, while in Section 2.6 I provide evidence 
of two possible underlying mechanisms: ‘acting-white’ and ‘assimilation’. In the empirical 
                                                 
41
 Notice also that Census 1991data are can not be matched to junior high schools and Invalsi test scores 
(Barbieri et al., 2011) 
42
 Finally, it is worth to notice that it is not possible to build an instrumental variable based on ‘supply-push’ 
factors of immigration waves à la Card (2001) because of data availability constraints. Invalsi IC data only 
record whether the non-native student is from an EU country or not 
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analysis I exclude those schools where only one non-native student is enrolled, so that the 
final sample is constituted by almost 6,200 junior high schools. The outcome variable is 
expressed as the natural logarithm of the non-native school mean test in Math and Language. 
 
2.5.1. OLS results 
The complete list and detailed description of the control variables used can be found in Table 
15.  
[Table 15 here] 
[Table 16 here] 
Panel A in Table 16 contains OLS estimates of the social interaction parameter β from eq. [6]. 
I progressively add the complete set of explanatory variables: individual and family 
background mean characteristics (gender, school path regularity, place of birth, time spent in 
Italy since birth, parents’ origins), school-district by year fixed effects; school characteristics 
(school type and size, ownership, average class size, pupil-teacher ratio, pupil-support teacher 
ratio, students with disabilities school share, average lesson hours per week, ‘cheating’ 
dummy43) and catchment-area socio-economic variables. OLS results show a negative and 
statistically significant impact of non-native school share (Ps) on non-natives’ school mean 
test scores: increasing by 1% non-native school share is linked to a statistically significant 
decrease of -20.6% in Language and -16.7% in Math mean test scores. Results do not vary 
substantially once I control for individual characteristics, family background and add school-
district*year fixed-effects, although school and catchment-area characteristics help to capture 
socio-economic features of the environment experienced by all students in each school 
(correlated effects). The general pattern of the OLS results induce to suppose that there are 
negative within-group peer effects. However, because of the endogeneity of the non-native 
school share causal links cannot be established. 
The direction of the bias is a priori undetermined as it depends on many possible channels 
through which across school sorting and within-group mechanisms of social interactions 
might (or might not) be at work. Across schools sorting arises when non-native students tend 
to cluster in some schools which are plausibly located in urban areas characterized by lower 
socio-economic backgrounds. Given that non-natives have lower test scores than natives, 
                                                 
43
 Because of cheating evidence in IC data outlined by Invalsi (Invalsi 2009, 2010), I add a dummy variable that 
controls for all schools suspected to have ‘cheated’ on reporting test scores results. The dummy identifies the 
schools in the upper decile of the distribution of the school-specific cheating coefficient (ranging from 1, no 
cheating, to 0, full cheating) provided by the Invalsi Statistical Office. Indeed, cheating evidence is limited 
concerning the 2010 wave and sensitivity analysis on various specification of the ‘cheating dummy’ and on the 
use of ‘cheating corrected’ results do not find significant differences once I control for territorial dummies in the 
estimated specifications. 
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‘school segregation’ would determine negative spurious correlation and downward bias in the 
OLS estimates. This downward bias may be also exacerbated by negative spill-overs arising 
from disadvantaged native peers. On the contrary, the OLS estimates may be upward biased if 
both low-skilled and high-skilled non-native students tend to cluster in the same schools. This 
is a case that is well-suited for the Italian context where immigration is a relatively new 
phenomenon and immigrants tend to settle in the same areas irrespectively from their 
characteristics. Boeri et al. (2011) demonstrate that, in a general equilibrium model, even 
high-skilled immigrant (i.e. the ones with better education and, plausibly, better performances 
in the labour market) choose to settle in the same areas of the cities where low-skilled 
immigrants reside, even if their income would allow them to pay higher rents. Their work 
supports this ‘positive selection mechanism’ so that OLS estimates result to be upward biased 
compared to the IV case. A similar argument of ‘positive sorting’ can be translated in the 
school context so that high-skilled non-native students would plausibly attend the same 
schools of low-skilled non-natives and, for instance, do not enrol in schools with only native 
peers. This fact would generate an upward bias in OLS estimates. 
 
2.5.2. IV results 
 
2SLS estimations solve the endogeneity of the variable of interest (Ps) and the omitted 
variable bias induced if equation [6] fails to control for all relevant school and environment 
inputs, and obtain an average causal response measure to the increase of non-native school 
share on the same non-natives’ mean test scores. Panel B of Table 16 contains the 2SLS 
estimation (eq. [7]), Table 17 the first stage regressions.  
[Table 17 here] 
The instrumental variables used (Zs) is the number of non-native residents in the school 
catchment-area in 2001, which is obtained matching the Census 2001 variables to each junior 
high school as described above. First stage estimations show that the coefficients of the 
instruments always have a positive and statistically significant impact on the endogenous 
variable (Ps), and first stage F-statistic strongly rejects the null of weak instrument (Yogo and 
Stock, 2005). Within-group social interactions are still negative, statistically significant and 
increased, in absolute terms, with respect to OLS estimations: a 1% increase in non-native 
school share causes a decrease of -81.6% in Math average test score of the non-native peer 
group, and a decrease of -73.3% in Language. The estimated effects of the increase of 1% in 
non-native school-share are quite huge: they correspond to a 2.37 times the standard deviation 
for Language and 2.56 for Math. 
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In Chapter 1 I estimate the social interactions effects caused by non-native students on 
natives’ attainment so that I can compare those estimates with within-group effects in Table 
16. The average causal response for an increase of 1% in the non-native school share is 
different for the two types of peer interactions. Within the non-native peer group, a one 
percentage point increase in the non-native school share lowers their own mean test scores by 
70-80%. On the contrary, the same increase causes small negative effects or no effects at all 
on natives’ attainment. Although not directly comparable, these results are in line with U.S. 
literature on ‘racial peer effects’ which finds evidence of negative and sizable ‘intra-race peer 
effects’ (Hoxby 2000; Hanushek et al. 2009) but are new in the European schools context. In 
fact, Aslund et al. (2011) document the strong social interactions effects taking place intra-
ethnic groups in Sweden and find that positive externalities on immigrant children education 
may arise if the neighbourhood ethnic reference group contains a higher fraction of educated 
adults. Jensen and Rasmussen (2011) find no significant within-group effects. However, these 
studies focus on Northern Europe countries (Sweden and Denmark) which experience a 
different kind of migration with respect to countries such as Italy, U.K., Portugal and Spain 
where prevalently low-skilled (and often undocumented) immigrants had great impact on the 
labour market and school systems only in the last two decades. Indeed, these results are in line 
with Boeri et al. (2011) who study the effects of residential segregation on immigrants’ labour 
market outcomes in eight cities in Northern Italy. Their instrumental variable approach 
uncovers a positive sorting process between segregation and immigrants’ employment which 
results in IV negative estimates greater, in absolute terms, than the baseline OLS. 
 
2.6. MECHANISMS 
 
The evidence of strong and negative effects in within-group social interactions in the non-
native peer group can be explained through many possible underlying channels. In this 
Section I explore two main mechanisms: ‘assimilation’ and ‘acting-white’. In fact, within-
group negative social interactions might be exacerbated by within-school segregation of the 
non-native group with respect to native peers up to generate ‘acting-white’ behaviours and, on 
the contrary, the same negative effects might be attenuated the more non-native children and 
their families are assimilated in the hosting country society. The ‘acting-white behaviour’ 
comes from the social interactions literature (Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Fryer and 
Torelli, 2011) while the ‘assimilation’ mechanism prevalently follows the migration literature 
(Dustmann and Glitz, 2011).  I focus on these mechanisms for two main reasons. First, they 
can be easily linked to direct policy implications as the assimilation and integration of 
 86 
immigrants are nowadays considered key elements of a good immigration policy (Dustman et 
al., 2012). Second, they are the two main elements considered in the literature as potential 
determinants of non-native students’ underachievement. Given that it is not possible to 
quantify the single contribution of each channel, I indirectly test whether there is evidence to 
support or reject the hypothesis that these two mechanisms are at work in the setting under 
study. To this purpose, I first seek for non-linearity in the effects with respect to a school 
segregation index and then separately estimate the model for the subgroup of ‘first-
generation’ non-native students. 
 
2.6.1. Oppositional cultural behaviours: ‘acting white’ 
 
The linear specifications estimated so far do not take into account that, conditional on non-
native school share, the average test scores of non-natives may also vary with the degree of 
segregation experienced by non-native students in each school (Brunello and Rocco, 2011). It 
is particularly interesting to verify this hypothesis in the light of the ‘oppositional culture 
behaviours’ that may arise in cases in which strong within-school segregation of non-natives 
lead them to cluster, do not interact with native peers, and even refuse to be integrated. The 
general refusal of assimilation to native peers’ could lead non-natives to under-achieve in 
order not to fit-in with ‘native stereotypes of good students’. This mechanism, known in the 
sociological literature as ‘oppositional identity’ (Fordham and Ogbu, 1986; Portes, 1987), has 
been used to explain the evidence of ‘acting-white’ behaviours in U.S. schools (Fryer and 
Torelli, 2011).  
In this context, I name ‘acting-white’ the particular form of ‘oppositional culture behaviours’ 
that might arise when negative within-group effects increase with the degree of school 
segregation. To test for this hypothesis I add non-linearity in the within-group social 
interactions effects interacting the non-native school share with the school dissimilarity index 
(eq. [1]) and estimating the following model: 
 
' ' '
ˆ ˆ
where 
st st st st s t st
st st st
y X I S W
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α β θ γ φ η= + + + + +
= ⋅
 
[8] 
 
The new interaction variable (Ist) represents a weighted version of the simple non-native 
school share where the within-group social interactions effects are weighted by the degree of 
segregation experienced by non-native students in each school. Given that Dst (as well as the 
interaction variable Ist) is a refinement of the simple non-native school share variable (Pst) 
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used in previous equations, I exploit the same instrumental variable (Zs) of the main IV 
analysis. Results (Table 18) confirm the existence of non-linear effects increasing in within-
school segregation. The estimated coefficients for the interaction term between the non-native 
school share and the dissimilarity index are negative and statistically significant both for 
Language and Math, while first stage F-statistic show that the IV estimates are strongly 
identified. Hence, increasing non-native school share has larger negative effects the more the 
school is segregated. That is, the more non-native students are allocated together in the same 
class the greater are the negative within-group social interactions effects. This finding 
supports the existence of ‘oppositional culture’ mechanisms that exacerbates the negative 
within-group social interactions effects. While the ‘acting-white’ theory has been recently 
debated in the American literature (Torelli and Fryer, 2010, for the U.S., and Friesen and 
Krauth, 2011, for Canada), it is new to the European context and these findings are the first 
that support the possible existence of ‘acting-white’ mechanisms also in the school systems of 
European countries that experienced relatively recent and massive migration waves.  
Indeed, results are in line with the limited European evidence on peer effects within the non-
natives at school. In particular, these findings are in line with Maestri (2011) who provides 
evidence to support the benefits from ethnic diversity (which is opposed to ethnic segregation) 
on students attainments in Dutch primary schools. Using cross-country data based on PISA 
test scores, also Brunello and Rocco (2011) establish that school segregation exacerbates the 
(small) negative effects on natives’ attainments due to the presence of immigrant peers. 
 
6.2. First generation students and assimilation effects 
 
Non-natives’ children assimilation in the hosting country is a complex process that involves, 
at least, three main factors: (i) parental background and parental decisions on children 
education; (ii) school system characteristics; (iii) the social context and ‘ethnic capital’ in 
which children grow up (Dustmann and Glitz, 2011; Schneeweis, 2011; Schnepf, 2007). In 
general terms, better assimilated households help the assimilation of non-native children in 
schools and, more broadly, in any aspect of the social life in the hosting country so that 
within-group negative social interactions should be decreasing with respect to degree of 
assimilation of the immigrants’ households. Notice that I refer to ‘assimilation’ in an 
extremely broad sense, ranging from the acquisition of skills in the use non-mother tongue 
language to the degree of integration the non-native family has reached in the host country. 
To test this hypothesis, I rerun the analysis focusing on the sub-group first-generation students 
(1G, non-native students born abroad) making the assum
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proxy of arrival time, first-generation non-native students usually face more difficulties in 
assimilation processes compared to second generation peers44 (Dustmann, Machin and 
Schonberg, 2010; Dustmann, Frattini and Lazzara, 2012). In fact, international surveys on 
students’ attainment generally find that second generation usually perform better than first 
(especially in language skills) and seem to benefit from their longer stay in the hosting 
country (Schnepf, 2007; Dustman and Glitz, 2011).  
To test this assumption in the Invalsi IC data, I perform OLS regressions on the Invalsi IC 
2009-2010 individual test scores (for about 870,000 8th grade students, both native and non-
native) using school-fixed effects to capture unobserved heterogeneity at the school level, 
year dummies and individual characteristics as controls (dummies for gender, retention, 
immigrant status, first and second generation immigrants).  
[Table 18 here] 
In the first regression (Table 18, column a) I simply use the dummy for being a non-native 
student, while in the second regression (Table 18, column b) I distinguish between first and 
second generation immigrants. Coeteris paribus, being a non-native student implies a 
Language test score 12.41% lower than native peers and 6.16% lower in Math. First 
generation students score 13.74% lower in Language and 6.05% lower in Math than native 
peers. Second generation gaps are reduced for Language (-8.41%), while there is not 
statistically significant difference in Math test score between first and second generation 
students. Thus, a descriptive pattern emerges concerning differences in achievement gaps 
between subjects and immigrants’ generations. Although non-native students show a sizable 
gap, it is more pronounced in Language than in Math. Moreover, the difference between first 
and second generation students’ achievement gaps with respect to native peers is relevant in 
Language skills, but not for Math.  
This evidence suggests that the greater difficulties in achievement could be potentially linked 
to language difficulties and difficulties to interact with teachers and native peers and that 
second generation students benefit from their longer stay in the hosting country showing a 
greater assimilation to the hosting country language. Further descriptive evidence can be 
drawn from a recent survey on non-native adolescent integration in the society which 
confirms that first-generation non-native have more difficulties at school mainly driven by 
shyness, language, difficulties in interactions with classmates and teachers (CNEL, 2011). 
Thus, I focus on first generation non-natives and their contribution to the within-group social 
effects estimating the following model: 
                                                 
44
 Ideally, I would also perform the analysis on second-generation non-native students (the ones born in Italy) 
but given their limited presence, results cannot be considered robust. 
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If the ‘assimilation’ channel plays a role in the within-group social interaction effects I would 
expect different estimates of the social parameter with respect to the baseline model. In detail, 
if lower assimilation of first generation non-natives is associated with greater within-group 
negative externalities I would expect the social interaction parameter to be negative and 
greater in absolute terms with respect to the baseline IV estimates of the effects of the whole 
non-native group (i.e. 1ˆ ˆGβ β> ). On the contrary, if assimilation does not play a role, I would 
not find differences (i.e. 1ˆ ˆGβ β≅ ).  
[Table 19 here] 
Table 19 shows the results both for the OLS and IV estimates. Focusing on IV estimates, I 
find that social interaction effects are negative and greater in absolute terms for first-
generation peers with respect to the estimates for the whole group of non-native students 
( 1ˆ ˆGβ β> ). The hypothesis that assimilation plays a substantive role in shaping within-group 
peer interactions cannot be rejected. In fact, the ‘less assimilated’ sub-group of first-
generation students generate greater negative within-group social effects with respect to the 
whole group of the non-native students. Thus, ‘difficulties in assimilation’ can be considered 
a channel that exacerbates the negative within-group externalities. In this sense, integration 
through education is a powerful tool to favour assimilation of immigrants, at least by reducing 
the negative within-group social interactions effects. 
 
2.7. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
In this section I test the robustness of the results paying particular attention to the instruments 
used. I repeat the analysis to test the robustness of the results according to: (i) a different 
specification of the endogenous variable; (ii) a different definition of the ‘non-native group’; 
(iii) alternative indices to measure segregation at the school level. The sensitivity analysis 
shows that, once the assumptions on the instrumental variable Zs are accepted, results are 
stable and robust. 
 
2.7.1. Different specification for the endogenous variable and for the ‘non-native group’ 
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I test the robustness of the results using a different specification of the endogenous variable. 
Instead of the non-native school share in 8th grade students I simply use the number of 8th 
grade non-native students in the school.  
[Table 20 here] 
Table 20 contains the estimation of the baseline model (eq. [7]) substituting the endogenous 
variable Ps with the simple number of non-native students in the school. First-stage F-
statistics show that the coefficients are always strongly identified. There are not significant 
differences in the results, apart from the interpretation of the coefficients. Including the full 
set of explanatory variables, 2SLS results show that there is a negative impact of the number 
of non-native students on the test scores of the same non-native students: one additional non-
native student determines a decrease in the average test score by -0.8% in Language and -
0.9% Math.  
So far, I have focused the analysis on the effects within the peer group composed by the non-
native students, where for the identification of the ‘non-native status’ I rooted upon a simple 
citizenship criterion: non-native students are students without Italian citizenship which means 
that both student’s parents do not have the Italian citizenship (so called ius sanguinis rule). 
This is because the citizenship is an administrative record and does not show severe missing-
values problems in the Invalsi IC data. However, I also rerun the analysis exploiting a slightly 
different specification and identifying the ‘immigrant’ group following the OECD-PISA 
definition already introduced (OECD, 2010). This definition partially overlaps with the ‘non-
native status’ definition, but it is stricter and include less students. Notice also that Invalsi IC 
data offers for the first time the chance to identify separately first and second generation 
immigrant students in Italy although this classification could be less precise. In fact, ‘student 
citizenship’ is an administrative compulsory information that parents are obliged to give to 
schools staff at the moment of the enrolment, while the information about parents’ place of 
birth used to identify the ‘immigrant status’ is given on voluntary basis. I rerun the analysis 
using the ‘immigrant school share’ as endogenous variable. Results (Table 20) always point to 
a negative effect between immigrant share (or number) and the average test score results of 
the same immigrant peer group; first stage F-statistics always reject the null of weak 
instrument. A 1% increase in immigrant school share determines a decrease of -27% in 
Language and -34% in Math. Even if the general pattern of the results confirm the ones 
obtained in the main analysis, the magnitude of the effects is smaller compared to the results 
obtained with the ‘non-native status’ definition. This can be due to the fact that the 
‘immigrant’ definition is ‘stricter’ as it encompasses only students born from both foreign-
born parents and to measurement error due to missing data. 
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2.7.2. Alternative segregation measures 
 
Finally, I also implement two alternative measures of segregation at the school level: the 
isolation index  and the inverse of the exposure index (Clothfelter, 1999). Both indexes range 
from 0 (no segregation) to 1 (maximum segregation). The isolation index measures the extent 
to which non-natives are exposed only to one other, rather than to natives: at the school level, 
the index is computed as the non-native-weighted average of each class non-native 
population. In symbols, using the same terminology as the one of the dissimilarity index: 
 
1 ( )
jN
j c c
c j j j
Non natives Non nativesI
Non natives Non natives Natives
=
 
− −
= ⋅  
− − + 
∑  [10] 
 
The inverse of the exposure index is a measure of isolation similar to the isolation index, and 
it is computed as the inverse of the standard exposure index (Echenique and Freyer, 2006). I 
choose these two indexes because they offer a measure of school segregation which is based 
on the ‘extra-groups contacts’ between natives and non-natives rather than on the unevenness 
of the distribution of non-natives, as the dissimilarity index.  
[Table 21 here] 
The estimated coefficients (Table 21) are all negative and statistically significant, confirming 
the robustness of the results. In general, increasing segregation at the school level is 
associated with greater within-group negative social interaction effects. 
 
2.8. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
 
Although U.S. scholars have long focused on the social interaction effects of desegregation 
policies on minority students attainments (Angrist and Lang, 2004; Hanushek et al., 2009), 
European literature has rarely focused on peer effects as a potential channel which contributes 
to explain the well-known gap in achievement between natives and non-natives. Recent 
studies investigating the causes of non-native students’ underachievement in European 
schools have primarily focused on immigrant families socio-economic background, without 
investigating the contribution that school segregation and social interactions have on 
explaining the gap. In this light, a clearer understanding of the internal dynamics of the 
minority students groups of peers is fundamental in order to understand whether and 
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following which channels social interactions within non-native students widen the existing 
attainment gap and under which mechanisms (Fryer, 2010).  
From the methodological point of view, I solve the endogeneity of non-native school share 
exploiting the original features of the dataset and building an instrumental variable which is 
school-specific, shows a strong predictive power and that is plausibly exogenous to the 
outcome measures. Once the assumptions on the instrumental variable are accepted, results 
are stable and robust under a variety of falsification tests and alternative specifications. The 
population for the analysis is constituted by all non-native students enrolled in the 8th grade of 
Italian junior high schools in the 2008-09 and 2009-10 school years and the Italian 
background is similar to those of European countries (among the others, Spain and U.K.) 
which experienced massive migration waves of unskilled and often undocumented individuals 
in the last two decades.  
I find strong negative within-group social interactions effects: increasing by 1% the non-
native school share determines a decrease of -73% in Language and -82% in Math mean test 
scores of the same non-native students. The analysis of the mechanisms at work supports the 
evidence of ‘acting-native’ behaviours in Italian junior-high schools. That is, I find that the 
negative within-group effects are stronger the greater is the degree of within-school 
segregation (i.e. the less uniformly non-native students are allocated across the classes of the 
same school) and the lower is the degree of assimilation (focusing on first generation students 
results are negative and greater, in absolute terms, compared to the entire group of non-
natives). Findings are robust to different specifications of the segregation index and to 
different definitions of the endogenous variable and of the ‘non-native’ group. These results 
are new in the European context while in line with the negative ‘within-race effects’ found in 
the U.S. and close to Maestri (2011) who finds that ‘ethnic diversity’ within classes has 
positive externalities both on attainments levels and behaviours of native and non-native 
students. 
The evidence on the existence of acting-white behaviours and negative within-group effects 
supports the general idea that a successful immigration policy has to be concerned with the 
assimilation and integration of the immigrants (Dustman and Glitz, 2011) and that successful 
integration policies for immigrant children should start as early as possible in the school path. 
Focusing on school policy implications, this work suggests avoiding any sort of segregation 
of non-native students across schools and across classes within the same schools. Schneeweis 
(2011) points out that school segregation of non-native students in European contexts is 
primarily due to two factors: immigrants’ families residential segregation and (explicit or 
hidden) selectivity criteria in the school system. However, the formation of ‘enclave classes’ 
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by school heads or the (more or less explicit) constitution of ‘segregated schools’ has often 
found policy justification under the idea that ‘special schools’ or ‘special classes’ might 
favour the work of teachers which can concentrate their efforts on a group of non-native 
students with homogeneous educational needs and difficulties. In some sense, if schools are 
only concerned in maximizing their profit function, or equivalently, in maximising the 
average school performance in test scores and national assessment programs, it can be shown 
that the non-native students’ segregation in ‘enclave’ classes may lead to the result (Lazear, 
2001). However, this view totally disregards the social implications of such programs. I show 
that increasing school segregation is detrimental to the educational outcomes of non-native 
students and to their integration with native peers. Similar policies heavily neglect the 
importance played by social interactions: ‘oppositional culture’ behaviours and the ‘lack of 
assimilation’ with native peers could dramatically exacerbate the existing attainment gaps 
(Fryer, 2010). On the contrary, adequate mixing rules in schools and class composition 
criteria could easily mitigate these negative effects. 
Moreover, from a school-path perspective, within-school segregation must be avoided 
especially in the lowest levels of the education path, where pupils could be more easily 
integrated with native peers. This aspect is particularly relevant in educational systems with 
explicit tacking. For instance, Ludemann and Schwerdt (2012) show that, conditional on 
students’ attainments, the early tracking system in German schools generates greater negative 
effects for second generation immigrant students which largely explain the wage gap 
differential between native and second generation immigrants. It is also relevant in 
educational systems, like the Italian one, where an ‘implicit tracking’ for non-native students 
takes place at the end of the 8th grade, in the passage from the comprehensive compulsory 
education to the upper secondary education. In fact, non-native students tend to cluster in 
vocational schools or even drop out after junior high school (MIUR, 2010). As an indirect 
result, the sorting effects leading to enclave vocational schools in secondary education 
potentially prevent non-natives from an effective assimilation if this has not started as early as 
possible during the school path, from primary and junior high schools.  
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TABLES CHAPTER 2 
 
Table 13. Individual and school level descriptive statistics. 
 
IC 2008-09 IC 2009-10 Panel A:  
Individual Level North Centre South Tot. North Centre South Tot. 
No. Students 211,567 93,440 205,856 510,863 206,530 91,629 199,405 497,564 
% Non-natives 11.20 8.97 1.83 7.04 11.24 9.28 1.84 7.12 
% Immigrants 11.42 9.02 1.98 7.21 11.24 9.47 1.99 7.22 
% First Gen. Imm. 8.56 6.62 1.28 5.25 8.41 6.82 1.24 5.21 
% Second Gen. Imm. 2.22 1.63 0.45 1.37 1.01 1.17 0.40 0.78 
IC 2008-09 IC 2009-10 Panel B: 
School Level North Centre South Tot. North Centre South Tot. 
No. Schools 2359 1017 2427 5803 2368 1009 2356 5733 
No. Schools with 
non-native students 2103 932 1425 4460 2096 911 1356 4363 
% Schools with non-
native students 89.15 91.64 58.71 76.86 88.51 90.29 57.55 76.10 
% Public Schools 83.59 86.52 95.09 88.91 83.78 86.72 95.33 89.04 
% K-8 schools 66.21 63.32 95.10 63.26 69.04 67.19 66.04 67.49 
Avg. No. Students 
per School 341.94 342.03 298.58 322.21 306.61 315.50 291.01 301.72 
Avg. No. Students 
per Class 21.20 20.83 19.75 20.48 21.30 21.00 20.08 20.74 
Pupil-teacher Ratio 11.60 11.64 10.30 11.02 21.15 15.74 13.12 16.77 
% Schools linked to 
Catchment Area Info. 94.82 94.00 93.08 93.95 93.12 92.86 91.85 92.55 
 
 
 
 
Table 14. Descriptive statistics at the individual level on IC 2010: students’ origins and test 
scores. 
 
 Language test score 
 
% 
Students Mean Median 2nd Q. 3rd Q. Variance 
∆ Mean 
[(a)-(b)] 
Native (a) 92.878 60.904 63.110 51.125 73.440 304.074 
Non Native (b) 7.122 53.486 54.251 42.418 65.250 274.005 7.418* 
1st Gen. Imm. (a) 6.021 53.398 54.165 42.351 65.067 271.577 
2nd Gen. Imm. (b) 0.931 58.444 59.983 48.699 69.612 256.839 -5.046* 
 Math test score 
  
% 
Students Mean Median 2nd Q. 3rd Q. Variance 
∆ Mean 
[(a)-(b)] 
Native (a) 92.878 52.262 52.195 41.865 64.049 272.017 
Non Native (b) 7.122 47.659 47.126 37.226 57.292 229.224 4.602* 
1st Gen. Imm. (a) 6.021 47.663 47.134 37.232 57.263 226.876 
2nd Gen. Imm. (b) 0.931 49.916 49.731 39.671 59.884 240.780 -2.253* 
Notes. Test scores range from 0 to 100 (percentage of right answers) and are cheating-corrected. The last column 
contains standard t-test (with different variances) results on the difference between means of each (a) – (b) 
category; star indicates whether the mean difference is statistically significant (p.val≤0.05).  
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Table 15. Variables description. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type Name Description Source 
female Fraction of non-native females in 
school s 
late Fraction of non-native retained 
students in school s 
father place of birth Fraction of non-native  students in 
school s with father born abroad  
mother place of birth Fraction of non-native  students in 
school s with mother born abroad 
Individual (X) 
always_italy Fraction of non-native students in 
school s in Italy since birth 
Invalsi 
istituto Dummy equal 1 if “K-8 school” 
statale Dummy equal 1 if State school Invalsi 
tot_alunni 
tot_alunni2 
School size, given by the total number 
of students in the school and its 
square 
avg_class 
avg_class2 
Average class size in each school and 
its square 
handicap_percent Percentage of students with disabilities in the school 
pt_ratio Pupil-to-teacher ratio 
it_ratio Non-native students-to-support Teacher ratio 
tl_class_iii Fraction of 40-hours classes in 8th gr 
School level (S) 
High_cheating_dummy  
(subject specific) 
Dummy equal 1 if the school is in the 
9th decile of the school cheating 
coefficient distribution 
MIUR / Invalsi 
 
Province by year 
Fixed Effects provyearFE_* 
Interaction dummies for provinces 
(103 dummies) and years (2 
dummies) 
 
lpop Log of total resident population 
illiterate Fraction of illiterate pop. 
university_edu Fraction of pop. with university level 
education 
m_occup_rate Male occupation rate 
f_occup_rate Female occupation rate 
agri_oc Fraction of workers occupied in 
agriculture 
self_empl Fraction workers self-employed 
commuter 
Fraction of resident commuting every 
day for school or working reasons 
avg_family_members Average number of family members 
house_poor Fraction of houses without clean 
water 
house_new Fraction of houses built after 1980 
Catchment Area 
(W) 
 
avg_rooms Average number of rooms per house 
Census 2001 
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Table 16. Baseline estimates OLS and IV: effect of non-native school share on school mean 
test of non-native peers.  
 
  Dep. Var.: log School Mean Score for NON-NATIVE students 
  Panel A: OLS estimates 
  Language Math 
Non-Native School Share  -0.2891***  -0.1976***  -0.2059***  -0.2316***  -0.1594***  -0.1659*** 
                         (0.0399)    (0.0548)    (0.0566)    (0.0405)    (0.0559)    (0.0579)    
R sq.    0.187       0.219       0.222       0.202       0.237       0.240    
Adj.R sq.    0.159       0.190       0.193       0.174       0.210       0.211    
N 6201 6201 6201 6201 6201 6201 
  Panel B: IV estimates 
                         Language Math 
Non-Native School Share  -0.4656***  -0.6856***  -0.7328***  -0.5130***  -0.7652***  -0.8156*** 
                         (0.1320)    (0.2108)    (0.2561)    (0.1330)    (0.2113)    (0.2524)    
R sq.    0.184       0.210       0.212       0.196       0.223       0.224    
Adj.R sq.    0.156       0.181       0.182       0.168       0.195       0.195    
N 6201 6201 6201 6201 6201 6201 
1st stage F-statistic 294.56 231.64 203.22 294.56 231.11 202.75 
Individual Charact. (X) 
and Province*Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
School Charact. (S)  yes yes  yes yes 
Catchment Area (W)     yes     yes 
 
Notes. Sig. level: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 17. First stage regressions. 
 
  
Endogenous Dep. Var.: Non-native students 
school share 
Non-Italian residents in the school catchment area in 2001 
(Population CENSUS 2001)  0.00871***  0.00568***  0.00521*** 
 (0.00051)    (0.00037)    (0.00036)    
First stage F-statistics                        294.56 231.64 203.22 
R sq.                        0.340       0.629       0.640    
Adj.R sq.                    0.317       0.616       0.627    
N                         6201 6201 6201 
Individual Charact. (X) and Province*Year FE yes yes yes 
School Charact. (S)  yes yes 
Catchment Area (W)     yes 
 
Notes. Sig. level: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 18. Individual level OLS estimates. 
  Dep. Var.: log (individual test score) 
 Language Math 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Female  -0.0042***  -0.0042***   0.0085***   0.0081*** 
 (0.0006)    (0.0006)    (0.0007)    (0.0007)    
Retained  -0.1888***  -0.1860***  -0.1619***  -0.1635*** 
 (0.0016)    (0.0016)    (0.0015)    (0.0016)    
Advance   0.0633***   0.0634***   0.0600***   0.0598*** 
 (0.0018)    (0.0018)    (0.0021)    (0.0021)    
Non-native  -0.1241***              -0.0616***  
 (0.0017)                (0.0017)     
First Gen. Imm   -0.1374***              -0.0605*** 
  (0.0021)                (0.0020)    
Second Gen. Imm   -0.0841***              -0.0690*** 
  (0.0034)                (0.0035)    
R sq.                       0.173       0.173       0.259       0.259    
Adj.R sq.                   0.167       0.167       0.254       0.254    
Clusters                 47887 47872 47890 47875 
N                        874157 868203 874185 868233 
Year fixed effects X X X X 
School Fixed Effects X X X X 
Notes. Robust std. errors clustered at class level. Sig. Lev. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Female: dummy 
equal 1 if female; Retained: dummy equal 1 if retained; Advance: dummy equal 1 if younger than normal age for 
8th grade (i.e. enrolled one year in advance); Non-native: dummy equal 1 if non-native; First Gen. Imm.: dummy 
equal 1 if first generation immigrant; Second Gen. Imm.: dummy equal 1 if second generation immigrant 
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Table 19. Mechanisms: non-linear effects with the interaction of the Dissimilarity Index and 
assimilation effects in the subgroup of first generation non-native students. 
 
  
Dep. Var.: log School Mean Score for Non-native students 
                         
Language Math 
 
OLS IV OLS IV 
Non-native SS*D_Index   0.0052*    -0.0897**    0.0080***  -0.1002*** 
 
(0.0027)    (0.0361)    (0.0027)    (0.0369)    
R sq.    0.221       0.081       0.240       0.049    
Adj.R sq.    0.192       0.047       0.211       0.013    
N 6200 6200 6200 6200 
1st stage F-statistic  26.54  26.49 
                         
Language Math 
 
OLS IV OLS IV 
First Gen. school share   0.2604***  -0.9829***   0.3241***  -1.0981*** 
 (0.0590)    (0.3588)    (0.0592)    (0.3549)    
R sq.    0.223       0.174       0.242       0.175    
Adj.R sq.    0.194       0.143       0.214       0.144    
N 6200 6200 6200 6200 
1st stage F-statistic   122.00   121.81 
All Controls yes yes yes yes 
 
Notes. Sig. level: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 20. Sensitivity analysis: different specification of the endogenous variable (Panel A) 
and of the immigrant group (Panel B). 
 
  Dep. Var.:  log School Mean Score for Non-native students 
Panel A Language Math 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
Non-native No.  -0.0022***  -0.0084***  -0.0015***  -0.0094*** 
 (0.0004)    (0.0030)    (0.0004)    (0.0029)    
R sq.    0.223       0.202       0.240       0.205    
Adj.R sq.    0.194       0.172       0.211       0.175    
N     6201        6201        6201        6201    
1st stage F-statistic   134.23   133.53 
                         Language Math 
Panel B OLS IV OLS IV 
Immigrant school share  -0.0395     -0.2787     -0.0683***  -0.3400    
 (0.0283)    (0.2356)    (0.0259)    (0.2247)    
R sq.    0.174       0.162       0.219       0.203    
Adj.R sq.    0.142       0.129       0.189       0.172    
N     6021        6021        6021        6021    
1st stage F-statistic    60.11   59.88 
All Controls yes yes yes yes 
 
Notes. Sig. level: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
Table 21. Sensitivity analysis: different segregation measures.  
 
  Dep. Var.: log School Mean Score for Non-Native students 
                         Language Math 
 D  I IE D  I IE 
Non-native SS*Index  -0.0719***  -0.0929**   -0.0014***  -0.0880***  -0.1138***  -0.0017*** 
                         (0.0276)    (0.0380)    (0.0004)    (0.0277)    (0.0386)    (0.0004)    
R sq.    0.152       0.041       0.369       0.111      -0.031       0.354    
Adj.R sq.    0.120       0.004       0.345       0.077      -0.070       0.329    
First Stage F-stat Zs 47.33 35.13 32.8 47.05 34.89 32.5 
N 6201 6201 6201 6201 6201 6201 
All Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Notes. Sig. level: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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FIGURES CHAPTER 2 
 
Figure 4. Non-native students percentage in the Italian school system, from s.y. 1996-07 to 
2008-09. 
 
Source: elaboration on Ministry of Education Statistical Office data (2009).  
 
 
Figure 5. Dissimilarity Index and non-native school share. 
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Figure 6. Comparison between non-native school share (endogenous variable), on the left, 
and non-Italian residents in 2001 (instrument), on the right. Geographical distribution by 
province. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
STUDENTS’ CHEATING AS A SOCIAL INTERACTION: 
EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT  
IN A NATIONAL EVALUATION PROGRAM∗ 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We analyze students’ cheating behavior during a national evaluation test. We model the 
mechanisms that trigger cheating interactions between students and show that, when 
monitoring is not sufficiently accurate, a social multiplier may magnify the effects on 
students’ achievements. We exploit a randomized experiment, which envisaged the presence 
of an external inspector in the administration and marking of the tests, to estimate a structural 
(endogenous) social multiplier in students’ cheating. The empirical strategy exploits the 
Excess-Variance approach (Graham, 2008). We find a strong amplifying role played by social 
interactions within classrooms: students’ cheating behaviors more than double the class 
average test scores results. The effects are found to be larger when students are more 
homogeneous in terms of parental background characteristics and social ties. 
 
JEL Classification: C31, D62, I21. 
Keywords: social multiplier, students’ cheating, randomized experiment 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗
 This chapter is a joint work with Claudio Lucifora (Università Cattolica and IZA). 
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“It’s seen as helping your friend out. If you ask people, they’d 
say it’s not cheating. I have your back, you have mine.” senior 
student at Stuyvesant High School in Manhattan. 
“We want to be famous and successful, we think our colleagues 
are cutting corners, we’ll be damned if we’ll lose out to them, 
and some day, when we’ve made it, we’ll be role models. But 
until then, give us a pass.” student at Harvard Graduate School 
of Education. 
The New York Times, September 25th, 2012 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In many social and economic contexts individuals often face the choice to adopt different 
types of opportunistic or even illicit behavior to increase their welfare taking advantage of 
others for personal interests. Leaving aside major crimes, there is abundant evidence 
indicating that cheating on taxes, free riding on public goods, claiming benefits without 
entitlement, bribing and corrupting public officials, abusing of drug and drinking, smoking 
when not permitted, as well as other types of dishonest behaviors are widely diffused 
phenomena in most countries (Kleven et al. 2011; Fortin et al. 2007; Powell et al. 2010; 
Gaviria and Raphael 2001; Clark and Loheac, 2007). 
In this paper, we focus attention on a specific type of such fraudulent behavior, that is 
students’ cheating when taking an exam. Several surveys document that students’ cheating 
has grown, over the last decades, hand in hand with the more extensive use of testing 
programs (Davies et al., 2009; McCabe 2005; Rimer 2003)45, yet there is little evidence on the 
effects of cheating behavior for educational outcomes, as well as on the measures taken to 
contrast its diffusion46. Students’ cheating behavior can have important consequences in the 
process of human capital accumulation and for the functioning of the labor market. For 
example, cheating can interfere with the evaluators ability to assess students’ performance and 
                                                 
45
 Large-scale cheating has been uncovered over the last year at some of the US most competitive schools, like 
Stuyvesant High School in Manhattan, the Air Force Academy and, most recently, Harvard University (The New 
York Times, September 7, 2012). A survey conducted as part of the Academic Integrity Assessment Project by 
the Center for Academic Integrity (Duke University) and covering 80,000 students and 12,000 faculties in the 
U.S. and Canada, between 2002 and 2005, reported that 21% of undergraduates admitted to have cheated on 
exams at least once a year (McCabe, 2005). Another survey run - in 2010, on a national sample of U.S. public 
and private high schools students - by the Josephson Institute of Ethics – ‘Report on honesty and integrity’ 
(2011) - found that 59.3% of the U.S. students interviewed cheated at least once during a test, while more than 
80% of them copied from others’ homework at least once. 
46
 In many countries, policy interventions make extensive use of test scores to determine the allocation of 
resources across schools and to evaluate teachers’ work but little has been done to develop objective measures of 
students’ cheating. 
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can decrease the external validity of grades (Anderman and Murdock, 2007). ‘Cheating bias’ 
may contaminate the information used in many educational decisions, such as: promoting 
students from one grade to the next, or awarding a diploma without the required knowledge. 
In one case, cheating detracts from the signaling validity of education titles on the labor 
market; in the other case, it determines negative externalities on the learning processes, for 
example, slowing down the teaching activity47.  
Moreover, students’ cheating raises a number of concerns not just for the unfairness with 
respect to students who do not cheat, but more generally for the externalities that are created 
on others (McCabe, Treviño and Butterfield, 1999; Carrel et al. 2008; Dee and Jacob, 2012). 
In particular, when a student breaks an ethical code of behavior exchanging information, 
cooperating with other students or using any prohibited materials during an exam (Cizek, 
2003), many others – who might otherwise have behaved honestly - end up being influenced 
thus reacting to such behavior. Many students may feel that they cannot afford to be 
disadvantaged by those who cheat without being reported or punished by school authorities48. 
In this context, even an isolate cheating behavior may propagate and become larger through 
social interactions. Hence, as widely discussed in the social interaction literature, the 
aggregate outcome is likely to depend on a direct effect (a reaction via private incentives to 
cheat) and an indirect effect on behavior (a reaction to the cheating behavior of others): the 
ratio between the equilibrium aggregate response and the sum of the reactions of individuals 
to cheating is the so-called social multiplier (Glaeser et al., 2003). The cheating outcome is 
amplified by the multiplier generating large differences in variance across different groups 
(i.e. school, classroom, etc.) with otherwise similar characteristics. While unobserved 
heterogeneity and sorting of individuals across groups may account for part of the differences 
in cheating behavior, social interactions within group of students linked by different types of 
contextual ties are often necessary to explain the excess variation that is observed in the data 
(Manski, 1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2001). 
Note that in many circumstances the driving force for dishonest or illicit student’s behavior 
during an exam may be found in some personal traits, such as: greed, envy, competitive 
pressure, etc.; however, social norms, low trust, a widespread acceptance of illicit behavior 
                                                 
47
 The consequences of cheating can be even more severe in educational settings in which the school system is 
based on a strict tracking system (e.g. Germany). 
48
 Note that reporting the offenders, as contemplated in many schools’ ethical codes, is required to halt the 
diffusion of cheating behaviors, nevertheless it should be noted that small transgressions and dishonest behavior 
are very often overlooked or tolerated within many schools, either because students do not like to be directly 
involved in the accusation, or because schools themselves do not want to be associated to the judiciary 
procedures required to support the allegations of student’s dishonesty. 
 106
and other background characteristics may also increase the likelihood of dishonesty within 
students. 
In other words, cheating behavior can be seen a genuine free-riding problem, where students, 
for any given level of effort, try to maximize their performance (i.e. pass-rate probability, 
exam grades, test scores, etc.) and exploit the possibility of opportunistic behavior – i.e. 
exchanging information or cooperating - anytime the monitoring system tolerates it or is not 
efficient in reporting the offenders49. The interdependencies between students’ decisions to 
cheat are at the basis of the positive covariance in individual behavior that triggers the (social) 
multiplier effect. In terms of the framework introduced by Manski (1993), and extensively 
discussed in the literature on social interactions, the above cheating behavior represents the 
endogenous part of social effects (Bramoullé et al. 2009; De Giorgi et al. 2010)50.  
The literature on social interactions in education has largely focused on peer effects in 
students achievements in classrooms and schools, or on social outcomes within fraternity (or 
sorority) membership (Sacerdote 2001; Zimmerman 2003; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 
2006; Foster 2006; Graham 2008; Hanushek, et al. 2003; Lyle, 2007; Lefgren 2004; Carrel et 
al. 2009; Lavy et al. 2012). Conversely, the effect of students’ cheating interactions has not 
received much attention and even less is known about the potential mechanisms that may 
drive cheating behavior. 
An extensive literature in educational psychology has documented cheating behavior in 
schools51, while only few papers have addressed the issue of social interactions in cheating 
behavior using a credible identification strategy. Most papers in the literature use statistical 
techniques that cannot reliably separate the endogenous and exogenous effects – i.e. the effect 
                                                 
49
 Monitoring activities are introduced to validate testing procedures in national evaluation programs. However, 
contrary to international programs of students’ assessments (e.g. PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS) - which are usually 
conducted on a survey basis and sampled students sit the test under the supervision of inspectors -, national 
assessments programs are conducted on a census basis and the same school teachers supervise students while 
tacking the exam (U.S. Department of Education, 2009; Eurydice, 2009). 
50
 Manski (1993) identifies three main factors that are likely to influence social interactions: exogenous (or 
contextual) effects (i.e. when the propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with the exogenous 
characteristics of the group), correlated effects (i.e. common shared group-level factors) and endogenous social 
interactions (i.e. when the propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with the behavior of the 
group). Only the latter effect can determine the social multiplier. 
51
 Stephens and Gehlbach (2007) count more than an hundred empirical studies on this issue over the last decade. 
Research in this area documents that cheating occurs among students from all grades, from elementary schools to 
colleges, and even in graduate schools. From a developmental perspective, Miller et al. (2007) find that cheating 
tend to occur less in younger children than in adolescents. These developmental differences are due to changes 
both in students’ cognitive abilities and in the social structure of the educational contexts in which children and 
adolescents interact (Murdock et al., 2001). From a motivational perspective, Anderman and Murdock (2006) 
document different reasons for engaging in academic cheating: some students cheat because they are highly 
focused on extrinsic outcomes such as grades; others cheat because they are concerned with maintaining a 
certain image to themselves or to their peers or because they lack the requisite self-efficacy to engage in complex 
tasks. 
 107
of the group upon an individual from the effect of an individual upon the group due to the 
well-known reflection problem (Carrel et al. 2008). Starting from an early study by Stanard 
and Bowers (1970), where it was shown that cheating tended to be higher among members of 
a fraternity or sorority, the psychological literature has focused attention on how social norms, 
peer pressure, environmental pressure and self-perception of cheating behavior affect 
individual cheating decision. McCabe and Trevino (1997), for example, found peer-related 
contextual factors to be the strongest predictors of cheating in their multi-campus 
investigation of individual and contextual influences related to academic dishonesty. Students 
who perceived that their peers disapproved academic dishonesty were less likely to cheat, 
while those who perceived higher levels of cheating among their peers were more likely to 
report cheating. Grimes and Rezek (2005) estimate a probit regression model to determine the 
factors that contribute to the probability of cheating. Their results indicate that the most 
important determinants are personal beliefs about the ethics and social acceptability of 
cheating and various attributes of the classroom environment52. Carrel et al. (2008) are the 
first to analyze cheating behavior as a social interaction using separate estimation procedures 
to identify an exogenous (contextual or pre-treatment) peer effect and an endogenous (during 
treatment) peer effect. Their model assumes that peer effects are completely driven either 
through experiences of cheating behavior at high school or completely through peers’ 
behavior while at college. Their results for the endogenous peer effects indicate that one 
additional college cheater ‘creates’ approximately 0.61–0.75 additional college cheaters.  
There is also a parallel literature that has focused on other forms of cheating, for example 
cheating on taxes is one of the most interesting cases. Kleven et al. (2011) analyze a tax 
enforcement field experiment in Denmark confronting different types of tax reporting 
methods (i.e. third-party reporting vs. self-reported income), as well as different auditing 
methods faced by tax filers. The authors show that tax cheating is close to zero for income 
subject to third-party reporting, but substantial for self-reported income and that prior audits 
and threat-of-audit letters have significant effects in reducing cheating on self-reported 
income. Galbiati and Zanella (2012) estimate a social multiplier effect in tax cheating 
generated by the congestion of the auditing resources. They use a rich dataset from Italian 
Local Tax Authorities and find that an exogenous shock altering concealed income 
independently across individuals produces an equilibrium variation that is up to three times 
the initial response. 
                                                 
52
 Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999) explore the determinants of source-specific cheating behavior including student 
characteristics and deterrent measures. They conclude that large alcohol consumption and low grade point 
average increase the probability of cheating. Jordan (2001) finds a significant correlation between college 
students’ perceived social norms and their self-reported cheating. 
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We develop a simple theoretical model to highlight the mechanisms that may drive social 
interactions in cheating behavior and to derive testable predictions. We show that students 
may optimally decide whether to engage in cooperative effort exchanging information (e.g. 
conform to other student cheating behavior) and do so taking into account other students’ best 
response. The equilibrium solution takes the form of a linear-in-means model with 
(endogenous) social interactions à-la Manski, so that we can attach a structural interpretation 
to our estimate of the multiplier (Cooley 2010a,b). In particular, our model posits a specific 
social spillover: by observing or expecting that student achievements depend also on cheating 
interactions, students adjust their behavior in response to the cheating behavior in the 
classroom. 
We use a unique data set drawn from the ‘National Survey of Students’ Attainments’ 
(henceforth SNV) (in both Mathematics and Language), which is compulsory for all schools 
and students attending different grades of primary and junior-high school in Italy, and exploit 
a randomized experiment which envisaged the presence of an external inspector in the 
administration and marking of the tests.  
In particular, we contrast the behavior of students in classrooms where the test is administered 
only by the school teachers, with the behavior of students in classroom where an external 
inspector invigilates over students’ behavior during the exam, to identify students’ social 
externalities in cheating behavior. In the non-monitored classrooms (i.e. our control group), 
we may expect monitoring to be more ‘benevolent’ vis-à-vis student interactions during the 
exam, while no interactions are expected to occur in the monitored classrooms (i.e. our treated 
group). 
In this context, we interpret the presence of a positive covariance in students’ behavior, when 
exchanging information or engaging in any sort of collaborative behavior during the test in 
the non- monitored classroom, as a form a behavioral externality which may produce a social 
multiplier53. Students’ cheating behavior during the test has few relevant implications. First, it 
generates excess variance in individual behavior with respect to individual and group 
characteristics in the monitored classrooms. Second, it introduces a difference among the 
between-group and the within-group variance of individual behavior. These two features are 
the foundations of the empirical strategy proposed by Graham (2008), which exploits the 
Excess-Variance (henceforth, E-V) approach to separate the part of variability due to 
                                                 
53
 Note that students’ cheating during an exam is an interesting case study of social interactions in the classroom, 
since it is likely to capture the same network of friendships and cooperative behaviors that take place during the 
school year. Students are more likely to collaborate with closer friends, with classmates they share out-of-the 
school activities (like sport practice), as well as with classmates sitting closer. 
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individual and group level heterogeneity from the excess variability genuinely originating 
from social interactions.  
We contribute to different strands of literature. First, to the literature on the identification of 
grade inflation due to various types of cheating behaviors (Dee and Jacob, 2012, for 
plagiarism; Carrel et al., 2008, for students’ cheating; Jacob and Levitt, 2003, Jacob 2005 for 
teachers’ cheating)54. Focusing on students’ cheating behavior, our approach departs from 
Carrel et al. (2008) since we do not identify the effects of a given ‘share of cheaters’ on 
individual test score, rather we provide a measure of endogenous interactions due to students’ 
cheating behavior. In this sense, we contribute to the part of the literature on social 
interactions which tries to overcome the ‘reflection problem’ and directly estimate the effects 
of the endogenous social multiplier (among others: De Giorgi et al. 2010; Calvò-Armengol et 
al., 2009; Bramoullé et al. 2009)55. Second, we use data on test scores and other individual 
characteristics drawn from the whole student population at different grades in a national 
evaluation test, which is a significant improvement from studies which rely on representative 
samples. We also match our data with other administrative archives, at the school level, and 
with a follow-up survey to get additional information on parental background characteristics 
as well as motivational questions concerning the test. Third, we implement a rather innovative 
estimation method based on the Excess-Variance approach to estimate (endogenous) social 
interactions by exploiting an exclusion restriction provided by a randomized experiment and 
illustrate the presence of heterogeneity in the estimated social effects56.  
We find a strong amplifying role played by cheating social interaction within students in the 
classroom: in the baseline estimates we identify a social multiplier ranging between 2.26 and 
2.43 for Math, and between 2.05 and 2.18 for Language. This implies that students’ cheating 
behavior more than double the class average test scores results and the effects are found to be 
                                                 
54
 Evidence of cheating behavior mostly refers to academia (Mc Cabe and Trevino, 1999; Mc Cabe, 2005; 
Carrel et al. 2008), less from other type of schools. In the Italian context, Ferrer-Esteban (2012) and Bertoni et 
al. (2012) use SNV dataset to study the effects of supervision on students’ performance. 
55
 Grounding on Manski’s seminal works (1993), empirical literature on peer effects has focused on the 
estimation of reduced form equations which collapse the endogenous and the exogenous effects into one 
parameter of interest, that is identifiable and defined to as ‘social effect’ parameter (Ammermüller and Pischke, 
2009; Lavy et al. 2012). Recent works in the field of social interactions in education addressed the reflection 
problem in the estimation of the classical linear-in-means model à la Manski (1993) using data where social 
groups are endogenously defined (i.e. networks, Calvo-Armengol et al. 2009; Bramoullé et al. 2009), introducing 
appropriate exclusion restrictions (e.g. partially overlapping groups in De Giorgi et al. 2010; group-size 
variations in Davezies et al. 2009), or even just plugging into the reduced form equation a lagged value of peers’ 
achievement as proxy of the contemporaneous one (Hanushek et al. 2003, 2009). In these cases, random 
assignment is usually ensured in the specific characteristics of the data used (e.g. random assignment to classes 
and courses at the first year of college), or controlled for using multiple levels fixed-effects. 
56
 Galbiati and Zanella (2012) also implement the Excess-Variance approach to tax cheating behavior using a 
more standard exclusion restriction given by group-size variations. 
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larger when students are more homogeneous in terms of parental background characteristics 
and ‘social ties’.  
Our findings show that tolerating cheating behavior, as it is often done, can amplify the 
negative effects on students’ performance, alter the signaling role of education in the labor 
market, and raise collective indulgence with respect to various forms of dishonest practices. 
Also, given that increasing competition in school achievement and in the job market are likely 
to exerts considerable pressure on students to perform well in exams, more resources should 
be devoted to monitoring activities in order to avoid cheating interactions to become 
widespread.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we build a theoretical framework to define 
the social multiplier parameter. Section 3.3 describes the institutional setting, the data and the 
randomized experiment, and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 3.4 discusses the 
identification strategy while Section 3.5 and 3.6 present the main results and some robustness 
checks. Section 3.7 concludes and provides some policy implications. 
 
3.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
We develop a simple model to investigate the mechanisms that may drive social interactions 
in cheating behavior. We consider the (endogenous) decision students face, when taking an 
exam, as to whether work individually or, alternatively when the monitoring technology is 
loose, engage in any kind of prohibited cooperation exchanging information with other 
students. We assume that students derive utility from achievement, which depends on own 
(costly) effort and on the effort of classmates57. Since own effort and peers’ effort in the 
classroom are complementary inputs in the achievement function, students may decide to 
cheat choosing the optimal level of cooperative effort to be shared with their peers (Anderman 
et al., 2007). In this context, cheating originates a behavioral externality among individuals, 
who simultaneously choose their utility-maximizing level of effort taking into account peers’ 
best response to each level of effort chosen (Brock and Durlauf, 2001). Note that the type of 
social externality that emerges from student’s cheating behavior is different from the 
traditional peers’ achievement externality (i.e. based on predetermined characteristics of the 
students, such as unobserved ability or ‘quality’) considered in the literature, since here 
individual decisions play an important role in shaping students’ behavior which, in turn, 
originates the endogenous effects needed to determine the social multiplier (Sacerdote, 2001; 
                                                 
57
 Notice that we assume no cost of cheating. This is consistent with the institutional setting (and the empirical 
application, i.e. SNV surveys) as in practice disciplinary measures or sanctions have never been applied to 
students and teachers who behave dishonestly. 
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Cooley, 2010a,b; De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2011; Imberman et al. 2012; Lavy et al. 2012)58. 
In particular, in the present context, peers’ achievement per se may not affect a student’s 
achievement when cheating or any other form of behavioral interactions are absent59.  
We model students’ achievement (yi) as dependent on the following elements: xi and xj are, 
respectively, individual and peers’ predetermined characteristics (i.e. gender, parental 
background, non-native status, etc), µ
 
represents shared class-level factors (i.e. school and 
class environment, teacher’s experience), while ei and ej are, respectively, unobservable 
individual and peers’ endogenous behaviors where j indicates any other student different from 
i: 
' '
i i x j x i e jy x x e epi pi pi µ= + + + +% %
 
[1] 
 
The above specification describes the Achievement Production Function (APF) suggesting 
that achievement is increasing in both the student and peers’ unobservable behavior, such that 
individual achievement may improve when cheating externalities are present (i.e. 0epi >% ). The 
parameter of interest here is epi%  which identifies the endogenous social interactions 
characterizing students’ behavior in the presence of cheating. The other parameters xpi , and 
xpi%  describe exogenous (or contextual) effects (Cooley, 2010b)60. To get further insights on 
                                                 
58
 In terms of behavioral interactions, the literature on drug use, smoke habit or alcohol addiction provides a 
better illustration of a social mechanism through which group’s behavior directly affects individual decision. In 
these cases, we have endogenous peer effects whenever the ‘average behavior’ of the reference group directly 
influences the individual behavior or choice. It is the group’s decision to drink, smoke or use drugs that 
influences the individual decision to take some action, and both group and individual behaviors are directly 
captured by some quantifiable measures (alcoholic drinks per day, binary decision to smoke/not smoke, or 
cigarettes per day etc.) (Cooley, 2010b; Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; Sacerdote, 2001). 
59
 The empirical literature on peer effects, traditionally, does not distinguish between the effect on test scores 
deriving from unobservable pre-determined characteristics of the students and their unobservable behavioral 
choices (Sacerdote, 2001; Imberman et al. 2012; Lavy et al. 2012). However, as noted by Cooley (2010b, p. 7) 
“[…]Annual standardized exams are often the outcome of interest, and, in the absence of cheating, are not a 
group effort. Thus, peer achievement per se may not affect a student’s achievement. In contrast, the decision of a 
teenager to smoke or drink alcohol might be readily affected by having peers that engage in these behaviors”. 
Examples of endogenous peer behavior on achievement are discussed in Lazear (2001) where peer disruptive 
behavior imposes negative externalities on other students in the classroom. Similarly, Figlio (2007), Lavy and 
Schlosser (2011) and Kinsler (2006) present empirical evidence that disruptive peers may negatively affect 
achievement. In the robustness section we also test whether achievement peer effects play a role in our data. 
60
 Note that human capital externalities still operate in the APF (eq. [1]) but, in some sense, they can be thought 
as being part of the individual and peers’ predetermined characteristics and contribute to individual outcome as 
‘endowment effects’ (i.e. exogenous effects incorporated in
x
pi% ). Given that we only want to estimate the 
endogenous component of the social interactions process due to cheating behavior during the test, and that 
students’ quality is likely to be same in the two sub-populations used for the empirical estimation, we assume 
that xi also includes unobserved predetermined individual characteristics. 
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how student’s behave, we specify individual’s utility (Ui) as a quadratic function that depends 
positively on achievement ( 0yβ ≥ ) and it is concave in own effort costs ( 0eβ ≥ ): 
 
( ) 2, , , ( )12i i i j y i e i e i jy e e c y e e cU e µβ β β −= − + %  [2] 
 
The component ( )c µ represents an exogenous cost due to teacher’s monitoring activity 
during the test. All individuals have to bear this cost which is likely to depend on class-level 
characteristics (strictness in teacher monitoring, class physical dimension, desks allocations, 
etc.). Notice that peers’ behavior matters as long as there are social interactions during the 
exam (i.e. loose or benign monitoring allows cheating) and students are willing to share their 
effort cooperating with other students (i.e. conforming to other students’ cheating behavior): 
hence individual utility increases with peers’ effort ( 0eβ >% ). Students maximize utility 
choosing the level effort as best response to peers’ (simultaneous) effort choices and subject 
to the achievement function (i.e. given by the structural APF): 
 
' '
2
 ( )
. .       
1
2i je
i i x j x i e j
i y i e i e iMax y e e e c
s t y x x e e
U µ
pi pi pi µ
β β β −
= + + + +
= − +
% %
%
 
[3] 
 
Solving for ei the first order condition yields the effort best response function: 
j
yBR e
i
e e
e e
β β
β β+=
%
 
[4] 
 
The effort best response is a function of the marginal utility of effort relative to the cost and is 
increasing in the average effort of peers when cheating interactions occurs (i.e. cooperative 
peers’ effort, 0eβ >% ). Given the assumption that achievement is monotonically increasing in 
cooperative effort behavior (ei), the effort best response can be mapped into an achievement 
best response which is observable to the researcher61: 
 
' ' '
0
BR
i i x j x jy x x Jy µδ δ δ µ δ= + + + +% %
 
[5] 
 
                                                 
61
 See Appendix A for the detailed derivation. 
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Given the linear-in-parameters form of the achievement best response, it can be shown that a 
unique Nash equilibrium exists ( * *;i jy y ) so that equation [9] can be rewritten as: 
* ' ' * '
0i i x j x jy x x Jy µδ δ δ µδ= + + + +% %
 
[6] 
 
Under the assumption that the achievement observed during any exam or test (i.e. grade, tests 
scores, etc.) originates from the described utility-maximising behavior - when cheating occurs 
- we can use peer achievement to proxy for peer cooperative behavior (effort) such that 
equation [6] expresses individual achievement as function of individual and peers’ 
characteristics as well as peers’ achievement. The parameter J corresponds to the ‘unobserved 
endogenous social effects’ and it is a measure of the endogenously determined effect of 
individual behavior on the reference group average behavior: 
e e e
e e e
J β β piβ β pi
+
+
=
% %
% %  
[7] 
 
It is composed by three structural parameters: the marginal (dis)utility from own effort 
exerted in cheating activities ( eβ ), the marginal utility derived from peers’ effort in 
cooperative cheating behavior ( eβ% ), and the marginal effect of peers’ effort exerted in 
cheating on individual achievement ( epi% ). 
The linear-in-means model in equation [6] requires 1J <  (i.e. a stability condition to ensure 
that a small change in cheating behavior will not determine a diverging response in 
aggregate), and this is true if two restrictions are imposed to the structural parameters: that is 
e eβ β<%  and 1epi <%  62. The first condition states that the utility from cooperative cheating 
behavior (i.e. peers’ effort) must be smaller than the disutility from own effort; the second 
condition requires the marginal contribution of peers’ effort on individual achievement to be 
smaller than own contribution (i.e. normalized to 1 in the APF, see equation [1]). Both 
conditions are rather intuitive and realistically met in our framework. Notice also that, when 
monitoring allows cheating to occur, the assumption of cooperative peer effort (i.e. 0eβ >% ), 
implies that J is always positive ( 0J ≥ )63. In other words, as we show in the descriptive 
evidence, when the monitoring technology prevents students to interact or cooperate during 
                                                 
62
 
0
x
pi >
 is without loss of generality, assuming that covariates are constructed accordingly. 
63
 It is easy to show that, since we have assumed cooperative peer effects ( 0
e
β >% ), and given that 
e eβ β> % , this 
necessarily implies that 0
e
β >
 and also 0
e
pi >%
 thus ensuring that 0J ≥ . 
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the test, their achievements (or test-scores) tend to be more dissimilar and exhibit a larger 
within-class variance as compared to the achievements of the non-monitored students where 
behavioral interactions are present. 
 
2.1. The social multiplier 
 
The simple model described above implies a social multiplier, such that any shock to 
individual behavior - via social interactions - determines relatively larger aggregate responses. 
To frame the model in a way suitable for empirical estimation, we need to retrieve an 
expression for the social multiplier. First, without loss of generality, we can rearrange 
equation [6] substituting average peers’ characteristics and average peers’ achievement: 
 
* ' ' * '
0  ic i x c x cy x x J y µδ δ δ µ δ= + + + +% %
 
[8] 
 
Averaging within the reference group (i.e. the classroom) and solving for cy  yields 64: 
 
' '
0 ( )c c x xy x µγδ γ δ δ µγδ= + + +% %
 
[9] 
 
Where 1(1 )Jγ −= − represents the social multiplier in students’ cooperative efforts, when 
during the exam cheating can occur (Glaeser et al., 2003). Substituting equation [9] into [8] 
we obtain the following reduced form model: 
* ' ' ' '
0 ( 1)i i x x c x cy x x x µγδ δ γδ γ δ γδ µ= + + + − +%
 
[10] 
 
The achievement best response takes the form of the classical linear-in-means model of social 
interaction à la Manski (1993). While this has been obtained at the cost of introducing some 
ad hoc linear functional forms, it has some clear advantages65: first, it highlights the 
mechanism through which cheating behavior may generate students’ social interactions; 
second, it provides a specification that allows direct estimation of the social multiplier 
parameter (γ) using the Excess-Variance approach (Graham, 2008).  
                                                 
64
 In the social interactions literature the group whose (average) behavior influences the behavior of each 
individual is considered a “reference group”, in our setting the classroom is the natural reference group to be 
considered in the empirical analysis. 
65
 See Cooley (2010a) for an illustration of the general case. 
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Note that, in some sense, the interpretation of the social interaction parameter as students’ 
cooperative effort is specific to our model, since cheating is the only social externality we are 
modeling. However, while we think that cheating externalities are the main driving force in 
the estimation of our structural social multiplier, we cannot exclude that other social 
mechanisms may also play a role. We briefly discuss some alternative interpretations 
hereafter. 
One hypothesis, also discussed in the literature (Jacob and Levitt, 2003a,b; Jacob, 2005; Lavy, 
2009), is that our social multiplier parameter may originate also from explicit teacher cheating 
rather than students’ cooperative efforts in exchanging information when monitoring is more 
benevolent or looser. Teacher cheating may take the form of suggesting the right answers to 
all students, or even altering students’ answers sheets during the marking phase. Indeed, 
besides the ethical implications of such behavior, there are several reasons why teachers may 
want to alter students’ outcomes: for example, they may wish to improve their students’ 
results in the exams, alternatively teachers may dislike sharp differences in results across 
classes within the same school, or feel pressure because of monetary incentives linked to 
student performance, or because the allocation of resources to schools depends on students 
outcomes (Jacob, 2005; Lavy 2009). A second hypothesis is that students in classroom with 
an external inspector feel intimidated and are negatively affected in their performance during 
the test (Bertoni et al. 2012). Finally social effects may also derive from the presence of some 
ethical norms of behavior whose strength decreases with the extent of cheating itself (Algan et 
al. 2011; Myles and Naylor, 1996). 
In a later section we provide evidence to prove the robustness of our results to these 
alternative effects and their interpretation. Moreover, while we cannot exclude that some of 
the above effects is at work, it should be stressed that their presence does not invalidate our 
estimation procedure to provide a structural estimation of the social multiplier, while the 
randomized experiment in the data allows us to identify precisely behavioral interactions (i.e. 
cheating) during an exam. 
 
3. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT, DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The Protocol for the SNV survey entails the use of external inspectors for the administration 
of the tests, in a representative and random sample of classrooms.  We define a ‘sampled 
school’ as a school where there are one or more ‘monitored classrooms’, and a ‘monitored 
classrooms’ (in a sampled school) as a classroom where an inspector is present during the test. 
Moreover, a ‘non-monitored classroom in a sampled school’ is a classroom in a sampled 
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school where the inspector was not present. The natural experiment in SNV surveys 
administration determines a random variation in the type of classrooms subject to and not-
subject to the external monitoring (monitored versus non-monitored classrooms) which is 
exploited to identify social spillovers due to students’ cheating behaviors. 
 
3.1. The National Survey of Students’Attainments 
 
Starting from 2009-10 school-year the ‘National Institute for the Evaluation of the Education 
System’ (Invalsi, from now onwards), carries out a yearly evaluation of students’ attainment 
and schools quality administering the SNV survey based on questionnaires and test scores 
evaluations66. SNV takes the form of an annual census, since it is compulsory for all schools 
and students attending the second and fifth grade, in primary schools, and the sixth and eighth 
grade, in junior high schools (about 500,000 students in each grade) 67. Each student takes a 
test in Mathematics and Language in two different days in late May. Test administration and 
marking is carried out by school teachers, while Invalsi enforces a detailed Protocol (i.e. 
Invalsi, SNV Report 2010) for the administration and marking of the tests to reduce the 
possibility of teachers’ cheating. For example, as often done in National Evaluation programs 
(Eurydice, 2009), the test is not administrated by the class teacher but by teachers of other 
classes and specialized in a different subject with respect to the one that is tested. All school 
teachers are simultaneously involved in the marking process, so that they cross-check each 
other during the marking, and the School-head - who is responsible for the correct 
implementation of the Protocol - supervises the whole process. Finally, an external 
specialized institution is charged to compute the test scores using an automatic procedure. 
However, what cannot be excluded a priori is that teachers adopt forms of soft monitoring. 
Teachers might simply adopt some form benevolent supervision because they allow students 
to exchange information or use prohibited material, or even because they are not able to 
implement a strict monitoring simply because of classrooms dimensions. Another kind of 
teachers’ benevolent behavior which is not possible to control ex ante concerns the so called 
‘teaching to the test activity’ (Lazear, 2006; Jacob, 2005; Kohn, 2007). For instance, since the 
                                                 
66
 Since 2005-06 school year a similar survey was carried out on a representative sample of schools, while all 
the other schools not in the survey sample were invited to participate on a voluntary basis.  
67
 The choice of these grades corresponds to the requirement to test students’ abilities at the beginning and at the 
end of the education path in primary and junior-high school levels. Formally, 8th grade test is part of the final 
exam at the end of the junior high school and follows different procedures and protocols. Pupils with disabilities 
are recognized by a team of specialists since the beginning of their schooling path, sit special formats of the tests 
and their results are not included in the official reports. In any case, it is not possible to change their ‘disability’ 
status during the school year. 
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beginning of the SNV surveys in 2008, it has become a common practice in many schools as 
teachers want to prepare students to test and quiz like the ones that they have to solve the day 
of the exam68.  
 
3.2. The randomized experiment in SNV data 
 
External inspectors are sent to administrate and mark the SNV tests in a representative and 
random sample of classrooms both to validate the general results of the survey and give each 
school a ‘certified’ benchmark. In particular, inspectors are required to perform a number of 
tasks in the selected classrooms: (i) invigilate students during the tests, (ii) provide specific 
information on the test administration, (iii) compute the test scores and send results and 
documentation to Invalsi within a couple of days (Invalsi, 2010).  
The allocation of inspectors to a random sample of classroom in the SNV data provides the 
ideal framework for our empirical strategy, for it introduces a random treatment with respect 
to the possibility of students to interact exchanging information or cooperating during the test 
– i.e. ‘monitored classrooms’ constitute the treated group of students, while ‘non-monitored 
classrooms’ are the control group. While, the possibility of any interactions among the students (cheating behavior) in the 
monitored classrooms is totally excluded and rigorously tested by Invalsi (Invalsi, 2010)69, there is evidence 
that students in the non-monitored classroom received a more ‘benevolent’ supervision 
allowing the possibility of exchange of information and cooperative interactions. The latter is 
also confirmed by a number of studies which have used Invalsi data to investigate the extent 
of ‘cheating bias’ in test scores (Invalsi, 2010; Ferrer-Esteban, 2012; Bertoni et al. 2012; 
Castellano et al. 2009)70. Given that the choice of the monitored classrooms was random and 
done after classrooms formation, there is no sorting or matching between the treatment and 
school or classroom characteristics. The only exclusion criterion from the sample is 
constituted by classrooms with less than 10 students71: this feature will require a careful 
analysis in the empirical estimations (see Section 3.5). On average, monitored students 
                                                 
68
 A confirmation can be easily found looking at how text books have changed with the introduction of the SNV 
Program and started to include tests and quiz similar to the SNV exams structure. 
69 To test this Invalsi implemented sophisticated statistical techniques based on fuzzy-logic algorithms – i.e. see, 
Castellano et al. (2009) - and reported no evidence of cheating in the monitored classes. 
70
 Bertoni et al. (2012) find that the presence of the external inspector reduces the average score (i.e. in terms of 
percent of correct answers) in the classroom by 5.5 to 8.5 per cent as compared to classrooms in schools with no 
external monitoring. They also find evidence of indirect effects on non-monitored classrooms in sampled 
schools, although the magnitude of the effect in this case is much smaller. 
71
 In case in which a class with less than 10 students was selected, it was discarded and replaced with another 
class. 
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correspond to 7-8% of the total student population in each grade, while sampled classrooms 
corresponds to 6-7% of the total number of classrooms in each grade. 
 
3.3. Data and descriptive statistics 
In the empirical analysis we use the 2009-10 SNV data for sixth grades72, for each student 
SNV data provides the test score for Math and Language and micro-data containing individual 
level information which are discussed in detail in Appendix B. Test scores are obtained as 
percentage of right answers for each subject and are standardized with zero mean and unitary 
standard deviation for the empirical analysis73. Individual characteristics cover information on 
gender, year and place of birth, Italian citizenship, grade retention, kindergarten attendance 
and school and class (anonymous) identifier. Table 22 sums up the major characteristics of the 
dataset: number of schools, classes and students by each grade tested, average number of 
students per school and class while Table 23 shows that the two groups are not different in 
terms of observable characteristics.  
[Table 22 here] 
[Table 23 here] 
The only systematic difference is found in the presence of immigrant students who are 
oversampled. This feature suggests particular care when estimating the social multiplier (see 
Section 3.5). The two groups mainly differ because of the cheating behaviors of non-
monitored students. Invalsi excludes the possibility of any interactions among students in 
monitored classes (SNV 2010 Report, Appendix 10, p.330) and provides statistical evidence 
of cheating behavior occurring in non-monitored classes by computing an index of ‘cheating’ 
(i.e. a class-level and subject-specific indicator ranging from 1, cheating is high, to 0, no 
cheating)74. The statistical method implemented by Invalsi highlights a high probability of 
cheating behaviors in non-monitored classrooms: the average cheating coefficients are .97 for 
Math and .92 for Language tests (Table 22). On the contrary, Invalsi Report shows that 
cheating coefficients for monitored classrooms are statistically not different from 0. 
[Table 24 here] 
Finally, Table 24 provides statistical evidence on the differences in test score results between 
monitored and non-monitored students. The mean and the median test score of non-monitored 
students is generally higher compared to monitored students, while the total variance is lower. 
                                                 
72
 We also repeat the analysis using SNV 5th and 2nd grade data in the robustness section. 
73Students with special education needs take appropriate versions of the tests compatible with their physical or 
mental disability. Their results are not available due to privacy regulation restrictions. 
74
 Invalsi uses these techniques to detect cheating behaviors also in other surveys and official national 
examinations. For further details about the “fuzzy c-means clustering” technique which is at the base of the 
indicator, see Castellano et al. (2009), Dunn (1973), Bezdek (1981). 
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The effect of the inspector’s supervision becomes more clear when we decompose the total 
variance in its within- and between-class components75: within-class variance is greater in 
monitored classes while the between class variance is lower.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
To identify the endogenous social multiplier effect originating from students’ cheating 
behavior, we implement the Excess-Variance approach developed by Graham (2008). This 
approach, by relying only on the cross-group variation that originates from endogenous social 
effects, allows a direct estimation of the (structural) social multiplier - i.e. parameter γ in 
equations [9] and [10] as derived in the theoretical section. One advantage of this empirical 
strategy is that it bypasses most of the identification problems that characterize the classical 
reduced-form linear-in-means model76. For example, most studies in the social interactions 
literature (i.e. Gleaser et al. 1996, 2003; Entorf and Lauk, 2006; Entorf and Tatsi, 2009) have 
not been able to reliably separate the different sources of variability of individual and group 
level heterogeneity from the ‘excess variability’ genuinely originating from social interactions 
(Sacerdote, 2010)77. Moreover, the E-V approach has other notable advantages: first, it is 
robust to individual and group-level heterogeneity; second, the data requirements necessary to 
overcome the bias originating from standard omitted bias variable – i.e. which is a rather 
fundamental problem in social interactions setting due to the various sources of correlated 
effects - are very limited78.  
In practice, we observe N classrooms, each composed of Nc students. For each student we 
observe yi, the outcome variable (test score), Zc and Ψc, vectors containing group-level 
information, while individual-level ( iε ) and classroom-level heterogeneity ( cµ ) are 
unobserved latent variables. Following Galbiati and Zanella (2012), we can rewrite the 
reduced form model from equations [10] and [9] in variance-components: let the classroom-
                                                 
75
 The formula is corrected with appropriate weights to take into account the different size of the subgroups (i.e. 
classes) (see Ammermüller and Pischke, 2009) 
76
 For example using proxy for peers’ education level (Hanushek et al. 2003, 2009) or having to rely on specific 
exclusion restrictions (De Giorgi et al. 2011; Bramoullé et al. 2009). 
77
 Some recent papers in the social interaction literature refer to the concept of social multiplier as the 
‘multiplicative effect due to social interactions’ and derive the estimation of the multiplier indirectly (e.g. Maurin 
and Moschion, 2009; for female labour market participation decisions; Drago and Galbiati, 2012, for crime and 
recidivism).  
78
 Durlauf and Tanaka (2008) discuss the advantages of the E-V approach compared to the regression approach 
and conclude that the former requires stronger assumptions on the variance covariance matrix which are not 
needed in the classical estimation of peer effects parameters from linear-in-means models. However, the authors 
suggest that E-V can be better justified whenever the sort of exclusion restriction needed on the variance 
covariance matrix of the outcomes can be substituted by appropriate prior information on the variance matrix 
structure. Our implementation of the EVA follows exactly this direction: we implement EVA exploiting the 
exclusion restriction which directly arises from the natural experiment in Invalsi SNV data. 
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level heterogeneity be,
 
0c x cx µµ δ δ µ δ= + +% ; the individual-level heterogeneity,
 
i x ixε δ= ; and 
the classroom-level average of individual heterogeneity,
 
c x cxε δ= . This transformation yields 
the following behavioral equations: 
 
( 1)ic i c cy ε γ ε γµ= + − +
 
[11] 
c c cy γε γµ= +
 
[12] 
 
The social multiplier parameter to be estimated is, γ (with γ ≥ 1), which captures the 
equilibrium social effect on individual achievement (i.e. test score) due students’ cheating 
cooperative behavior during the exam. Equation [12] shows that the social multiplier is 
related to both the average of classroom-level (individual) heterogeneity, cε , as well as to the 
classroom-level heterogeneity, cµ , such that - as implied by the theoretical model – 
exogenous shocks to contextual factors can also contribute (feeding-back through individual 
behaviors) to amplify the effects social externalities79.  
 
3.4.1. The Excence-Variance approach 
 
Following Galbiati and Zanella (2012), a simplified notation for the conditional variances and 
covariance of individual and group-level heterogeneity is given hereafter: let 2 2( , )c cZε εσ σΨ =  
be the conditional variance (i.e. on Zc and Ψc) of individual-level heterogeneity; 
( , )c cZεε εεσ σΨ =  the conditional covariance of across individuals 
heterogeneity; 2 2( , )c cZµ µσ σΨ =  the conditional variance of group-level heterogeneity; 
( , )c cZµε µεσ σΨ =  the conditional covariance of group-level heterogeneity with individual 
heterogeneity; while ( , )w wc c c cV Z VΨ =
 
and ( , )b bc c c cV Z VΨ =  are, respectively, the within-group 
and the between-groups conditional variance. Notice that: εεσ  can be considered a measure of 
the degree of student sorting across classrooms; while 2µσ  represents the variance of 
unobserved teachers’ characteristics, such as experience, strictness, ability and effectiveness, 
as well as the variance of all other unobserved characteristics that are common to all students 
                                                 
79
 Note that Graham (2008) defines the social multiplier parameter as a combination of both endogenous and 
exogenous peer effects - as group level heterogeneity there is obtained through group level averages of both 
observable individual characteristics and unobservable behaviors –, while in our setting it incorporates only the 
endogenous part of the cheating interactions. 
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in a classroom; µεσ  is a measure of ‘matching’ between these characteristics and the students. 
The latter is non-zero any time teachers (or classroom characteristics) and students are not 
randomly allocated – i.e. student can choose the school or, within each school, the classroom 
in which enrol. Then assuming that: ( , )c cZεε εεσ σΨ = , 2 2( , )c cZµ µσ σΨ = , ( , )c cZµε µεσ σΨ =  are 
independent of Zc; and that the portion of the between-group variance independent from the 
within-group variance can be approximated by a linear function, such as: 
2 2 ( ) 2 ( ) ( )
c c c cµ µε εεγ σ σ σ pi Ψ + Ψ + Ψ = Ψ 
 
[13] 
 
Graham (2008) shows that wcV  and bcV  can be rewritten as follows: 
2( , ) ( ) | ,w c c cc c c
c
ZV Z
N
ε εεσ σ Ψ − Ψ
= Ε Ψ 
   
[14] 
2 2 ( ) 2 ( ) ( )b w
c c c c c
V Vµ µε εεγ σ σ σ = Ψ + Ψ + Ψ + 
 
[15] 
 
where, substituting expression [13] into [14], it yields: 
2b w
c c cV Vpi γ= Ψ +
 
[16] 
 
It is easy to show that the within-group variance of students’ achievements in classroom c 
(denoted wcV  in equation [14] above) is independent of social interactions and classroom-level 
heterogeneity. Note that, within-classroom differences in individual cheating behavior, when 
teachers are not sufficiently scrupulous in supervising students during exams such that 
cheating occurs, cannot be attributed to social externalities – since in our model, by definition, 
are the same for all students - but only to differences in individual characteristics and the 
covariances arising from students’ sorting. Conversely, the between-group variance (denoted 
b
cV  in equation [15] above) depends on classroom heterogeneity and, when students’ cheating 
behavior occurs, is magnified by social externalities. In this case, part of the variability in 
students’ achievement between two different classrooms, one in which teachers do not strictly 
supervise students and another where strict monitoring is efficiently enforced, must 
necessarily depend on supervision. Then, since students’ achievement in a classroom is also 
driven by cheating interactions, the cross-classroom variation will be affected. Cheating 
interactions introduce a wedge between the variance of students’ achievements (measured by 
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test scores) at different levels of aggregation, which is what we exploit to identify the social 
multiplier. 
Expressing the conditional variances, as in [14] and [15] above, as conditional expectations of 
the relative within- ( wcG ) and between-classroom ( bcG ) statistics, namely: 
| ,w w
c c c c
V G Z = Ε Ψ  and | ,b bc c c cV G Z = Ε Ψ  , we can rewrite equation [16] as80: 
( ) ( )2| , | ,b wc c c c c c cG Z G Zpi γ  Ε Ψ = Ψ + Ε Ψ 
 
[17] 
 
which implies the following conditional and unconditional moment restrictions, respectively: 
 
| , 0b w
c c g c cG G Zpi Ε − Ψ − Ψ = 
 
[18] 
( )2 0c b wc c c
c
Z
G Gpi γ  Ε − Ψ − =  Ψ    
[19] 
 
Equation [19] delivers the appropriate specification to estimate (i.e. by GMM) the social 
multiplier, γ2, using Zc as instrumental variable. 
 
3.4.2. The identifying assumption 
 
The randomized experiment in Invalsi SNV data provides the ideal setting for identification. 
We observe two classrooms with, otherwise identical, students interacting in different ways: 
in one classroom achievement can also be attained by student cooperative behavior (i.e. 
control group); in another classroom external monitoring limits students’ possibilities to 
interact, such that achievement is only based on individual effort (i.e. treatment group)81. 
Given the perfect randomization in treatment assignment, both individual and group level 
heterogeneity are likely to be the same across the two classrooms, such that the only 
difference in achievement between the two is the one originating from social externalities in 
students’ cheating behavior: which are present only in the control group. Notice, that the 
                                                 
80
 For each class c we observe the outcome for a (random) sample of students (
c c
n N≤ ) given by all students 
who sit both Language and Math test scores. For this reason we rewrite expressions [14] and [15] using the 
appropriate statistics containing correction terms to take into account the difference between the sample and the 
population means. See Galbiati and Zanella (2012) web supplement for a formal derivation of conditional 
expectations. 
81
 We may also expect that supervision is more efficient in treated-group classroom simply because of the joint 
presence of the inspector and a school teacher rather than just one teacher as in the control-group classroom. 
Note that in this case, the test score incorporates both the ‘endowment type’ peer effects (i.e. ability) and the 
‘behavioral peer effects’ due to students’ cheating interactions (see Section 3.6.3). 
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presence of an inspector, by virtue of randomization, has no effect on the allocation of 
students and teachers to classroom, nor any effect on matching and sorting process of 
students’ characteristics. According to our main identifying assumption (i.e. see equations 
[14] and [15]), Zc generates an exogenous variation that affects the between-classroom 
variance in students’ achievement only via the effect that cheating interactions have on the 
within-classroom variance. That is, by comparing the conditional variance of individual 
behavior within and between classrooms that we can identify the contribution due to 
endogenous social interactions only. In practice, we define a dummy variable identifying 
classrooms with external monitoring, (Zc=1), and classrooms without external monitoring 
(Zc=0)82. The standard rank condition for Zc to be a valid instrument can be easily assessed 
empirically: ( ) ( )| 1, | 0,w wc c c g c cG Z G ZΕ = Ψ ≠ Ε = Ψ .  
Since the model is just-identified, we can simply estimate it by two-stage least squares and 
given that the instrument, Zc, is a dummy variable, the estimator of the social multiplier takes 
the form of a Wald estimator: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
| 1 | 0
| 1 | 0
b b
c c c c
w w
c c c c
G Z G Z
G Z G Z
γ
Ε = − Ε =
=
Ε = − Ε =  
[20] 
 
The numerator is a contrast of observed (or actual) between-classroom variance in student 
achievement across treatment states (i.e. Zc=1 versus Zc=0). As discussed above, under 
perfect randomization, this contrast is purged of the influence of teacher heterogeneity, 
matching, and sorting; thus it solely reflects differences in the variance of achievements 
across the above treatment states as amplified by the cheating interactions. The denominator 
also equals the difference in the variance of achievements across the treatment states, but 
unaffected by social interactions (Graham, 2008; Sacerdote, 2010). 
Finally, the feasible estimator requires an estimate of the conditional expectation of students’ 
achievement  ( )| ,ic c cy ZΕ Ψ  which we obtain from a regression of yic on Zc and Ψc. We then 
use the residuals to replace bcG  with 
' ' 2
1 2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )bc c c cG y Z pi pi= − −Ψ , where 1pi  and 2pi  are least 
squares estimates.  
Randomization also implies that (in principle) we do not need to include any variable in the 
vector Ψc to control for sorting or matching of students with respect to assignment to 
treatment, Zc, and class characteristics. Descriptive evidence provided in Section 3.3 shows 
                                                 
82
 Graham posits that identification relies on: “[…] two subpopulations of social groups where assignment to 
groups is as if random” (Graham, 2008, p. 658). In his paper, Graham identifies a social multiplier arising from 
differences in peer quality across groups, in our setting however peer quality is homogeneous across groups the 
only source of excess variation being cheating behavior. 
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that the two subgroups constitute a representative and random sample of the students 
population for the sixth grade (see also Appendix B). There are, however, a couple of matters 
for concern: first, we may need to control for the share of immigrant students as they appeared 
to be slightly oversampled in treated classroom (see Table 23); second, there may also be 
spill-over effects of external monitoring in treated classroom on non-monitored classrooms of 
sampled schools, which we need to control for (Bertoni et al. 2012). For these reasons, we 
include two additional controls: a dummy variable indicating whether a classroom is a ‘non-
monitored class in a sampled school’, and a dummy variable indicating whether there is a 
‘high share’ of immigrant students in the classroom (i.e. takes value 1 if the immigrant share 
is greater than the 75th or the 90th percentile of the immigrant class share distribution). We 
discuss further extensions in the following section. 
 
3.5. RESULTS 
 
The estimates of the social multiplier are obtained through two-stages least squares where we 
regress the feasible estimator for the between-groups variance ( ˆ bcG ) on the additional controls 
(Ψc), and on the within-groups variance, ˆ wcG , instrumented by the class type indicator (Zc). 
We first report our estimates of equation [20], without including any control variable (i.e. 
baseline social multiplier), then we progressively add other control variables to the vector Ψc 
to account for selected features of randomization, or test the existence of spill-over effects. 
Social externalities exist if the social multiplier is different from one (eq. [11] and [12]), thus 
we test the null that γ2=1 and report the correspondent p-value in each table. To allow for the 
comparability of the results across subjects, we focus on all students who sit both Language 
and Math test scores. In fact, given that the tests were in two different, although subsequent, 
days there are students who sit just one of the two tests and students who do not sit none of 
them because they are absent in both days. The percentage of absent students in 6th grade is 
about 0.6%. As previously discussed, the only criterion Invalsi used in the randomized 
experiment to drop, a priori, some classrooms from receiving the treatment (i.e. external 
monitoring) was classroom size – i.e. less than 10 students (723 classes for corresponding to 
2.7% of the total number). For this reason we conduct the analysis dropping classes with less 
than 10 students, while robustness checks to the inclusion of these classes are tested in the 
next section. 
Note, that the E-V approach leaves the sign of the social multiplier (γ2), in principle, 
undetermined (since we estimate its square). Hence, the sign has to be inferred from the 
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underlying theoretical model which, in our case, posits a positive effect of social multiplier (γ 
and J >0) due to the assumption of students’ cooperative effort, such that cheating 
interactions among students during the exam are likely to increase each student’s achievement 
and the class average performance. Next, we explore the heterogeneous effect of social 
interactions comparing sub-populations with a different degree of heterogeneity according to 
a set of selected (exogenous) characteristics.  
 
3.5.1. Baseline estimates 
 
First stage F-statistics reported in Table 25 show that instruments are not weak and the 
standard rank condition is always satisfied (the coefficient of the excluded instrument is 
always positive and statistically different from zero at 1% significance level).  
[Table 25 here] 
First-stage results, not reported in the tables, indicate that in monitored classrooms the 
variance of the tests scores is higher compared to non-monitored classrooms. This reflects the 
larger dispersion of individual heterogeneity in test scores when behavioral interactions are 
not at work and students cannot exchange information or engage in any cooperative effort. 
From our baseline specification we obtain an estimate γ2 of 5.13 for Math and 4.18 for 
Language. Progressively adding the control variables described above does not alter the 
results: estimates for Math range between 5.13 and 5.89, while estimates for Language range 
between 4.18 and 4.77. This confirms that the two subgroups are (almost) identical in terms of 
observable characteristics, and that adding control variables (included in the Ψc vector) only 
has a negligible effect on the estimated social multiplier. All estimates are significantly 
different from 1 at 1% confidence level: this means that we can strongly reject the null of ‘no 
social interactions’ (i.e. that γ=1, Graham, 2008).  
Our results imply a strong amplifying role played by social interactions within students in the 
classroom. The above estimates correspond to values for γ ranging between 2.26 and 2.43 for 
Math, and between 2.05 and 2.18 for Language, and  values for J ranging between 0.56 and 
0.59 for Math, and are slightly lower for Language (0.51 - 0.54)83. In terms of our structural 
parameters, a cheating social multiplier close to two (i.e. [2.05;2.43]γ ∈ ) means that 
cooperative behaviors, when external monitoring is loose or benevolent, may generate a 
change in the equilibrium of students’ achievements that is twice as big as the class average 
                                                 
83
 Standard errors for the model parameters ( , Jγ ) are obtained using the delta method. The delta method 
expands a function of a random variable (i.e. the estimated parameters) about its mean with a one-step Taylor 
approximation. Then, it computes the variance to obtain an estimate of the standard errors (see Davidson and 
MacKinnon 2004, chap. 5.6). 
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achievement without behavioral interactions (equation [9]). In terms of individual test score, 
the estimates for J (i.e. [.51;.59]J ∈ ) imply that the marginal contribution due to cheating 
increases individual test score by almost a half of the standard deviation (equation [10]), 
which corresponds to almost 10 points in Math and 8 points in Language tests84. 
For what concerns the general pattern of the results with respect to the two subjects, the 
magnitude of the estimated social multiplier is slightly larger in Math with respect to 
Language. This small difference can be explained considering that cheating behavior may be 
easier for mathematics, which are based on closed answers and quiz, rather than in language 
since text comprehension exercises require more effort and longer time to get through the text, 
to interpret it and derive the answers. This result is also in line with educational psychology 
literature which finds that cheating occurs more frequently in the hard sciences compared to 
the arts and social sciences (Miller et al., 2007). 
Our results, although not directly comparable, confirm in general the evidence available from 
other studies in the social interactions literature (see Carrel et al. 2008; Glaeser et al., 1996; 
Drago and Galbiati, 2012; Maurin and Moschion, 2009) which find social multipliers between 
2 and 3 in order of magnitude. A more direct comparison can be done with those studies that 
use the E-V approach to recover an estimate of the social multiplier. In his analysis of 
students’ peer effects in class learning activities, using Project STAR data, Graham (2008) 
reports an estimate for the social multiplier of approximately 1.9 for Math, and 2.29 for 
Reading. Galbiati and Zanella (2012) estimate a social multiplier arising from congestion 
externalities in tax cheating between 3.1 and 3.2. In other words, in all the above settings an 
exogenous shock altering the variable subject to social interactions (respectively, school 
achievement and concealed income) produces an equilibrium variation that is between two 
and three times the initial response. Note, however, that when comparing the results reported 
in Graham (2008) and Galbiati and Zanella (2012) to our own, some important differences 
should be born in mind. First, while we exploit the identifying restriction given by the natural 
experiment in Invalsi SNV data, both Graham (2008) and Galbiati and Zanella (2012) identify 
the social multiplier through exogenous variations in the size of the reference group. As 
standard in this literature (Sacerdote, 2001; Imberman et al. 2012), Graham’s social multiplier 
due to peer interactions in achievement embeds both exogenous and endogenous effects85. 
Galbiati and Zanella (2012) provide a structural interpretation of the social multiplier 
generated by externalities in concealed income due to tax congestion within Local Tax 
                                                 
84
 According to the corresponding values of J, the cheating marginal contribution for Math ranges between 10.1 
– 10.7 points. For Language it is sensibly smaller (between 7.8 – 8.2 points). 
85
 Graham (2008) points out that the estimated structural parameter for the social multiplier should be referred to 
an explicit structural model to highlight the underlying social mechanisms which originate the peer effects. 
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Authorities so that their social multiplier represents an upper bound of the long run effects of 
the endogenous effects of tax cheating. 
 
3.5.2. Heterogeneous effects 
 
We exploit the richness of individual-level information in the SNV data to explore different 
dimensions of students’ characteristics which may give rise to heterogeneous effects in 
cheating behavior. In practice, we test whether the social multiplier differs across selected 
subpopulations of classrooms characterized by large amounts of heterogeneity in some 
observed students’ attributes, with respect to a subpopulation of classrooms with low 
heterogeneity (Graham, 2008). Since cheating requires some cooperative effort between 
students within each classroom, one may expect that classrooms in which students are more 
homogeneous with respect to some exogenous attributes86 exhibit stronger social interactions 
as compared to classrooms in which students are more heterogeneous. This corresponds to 
test whether there is complementarity or substitutability between the intensity of cheating 
behaviour, due to looser external monitoring, and the strength of classroom social ties. With 
complementarity, moving a group of students with more homogeneous characteristics and 
stronger social ties (i.e. low heterogeneity subpopulations) to a non-monitored classroom 
should, in addition to increase average test scores, reduce its variance more than for a 
comparable group of students with less homogeneous characteristics (i.e. high heterogeneity 
subpopulations). Thus, if external monitoring and classroom heterogeneity are 
complementary, the social multiplier estimated on the low heterogeneity subpopulations 
should be greater compared to the one calculated on the high heterogeneity subpopulations. If 
they are substitutes, the opposite will occur. 
In particular, we select the following attributes for the subpopulations: number of books at 
home, sport practice (outside school), participation to outside school activities (other than 
sport, e.g. music, arts and foreign languages courses) and time spent playing with friends 
(outside school)87. In all the above cases, we split the sample of classrooms into two groups 
characterized by high and low degrees of heterogeneity. We refer to the number of books that 
students have at home as a proxy for heterogeneity of parental background in terms of 
education and socio-economic status (Ammermüller and Pischke, 2009). In this case, the high 
(low) heterogeneity group is defined as the subpopulation of classrooms having a standard 
deviation higher or equal (lower) to the median standard deviation observed in the entire 
                                                 
86
 Note that all the attributes are considered exogenously pre-determined with respect to students’ achievement 
during the exam. 
87
 See Appendix B for further details on the definition of the variables.  
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classroom population. The ‘sport’, the ‘outside school activities’ and the ‘time spent playing 
with friends’ variables are themselves a proxy of the strength of the social links within each 
classroom, measured as the amount of time classmates meet and spend time together outside 
the school. Classrooms in which social ties, proxied by the above variables, are below the 
median level of the whole population belong to the high heterogeneity group. In other words, 
classrooms above the median level of these variables encompass situations in which a lot of 
students interact more outside school (sport, music, arts, playing with friends) thus showing 
stronger social ties. An opposite reasoning is true for classrooms below the median levels. 
[Table 26 here] 
Table 26 shows the main results: for each selected attribute we report γ2 - the square of the 
social multiplier - for the group of classrooms with high and low heterogeneity, respectively, 
and test the null of no differences (p-values reported)88. We exclude from the analysis 
students with missing values in any of the four variables used and drop classrooms with less 
than ten students because of the above discussions89. First stage F-statistics show that the 
effect is always strongly identified. We find that the social multiplier is larger in the 
subpopulation of classroom with low heterogeneity with respect to parental background 
characteristics and students’ outside school activities both in Language and Math. For 
Language, the same result holds also for the sport variable. No statistically significant 
difference is detected with respect to time spent playing with friends. This suggests that 
higher strength of social ties and more homogeneous classrooms in terms of family socio-
economic background favour social interactions in cheating behavior90. 
In general, we find support for the hypothesis that cooperative efforts in cheating interactions 
require a more homogeneous pool of classmates and deliver a greater social multiplier. In 
particular, the results for the sport practice and the outside school activities variables, seem to 
suggest that practicing sport with classmates outside school and doing other leisure activities 
such as arts and music courses are to be considered complementary to the social links that are 
useful to support cheating. 
 
                                                 
88
 We test the null, H0: γ2H  = γ2L , using the Sargan-Hansen test of over-identification associated with the 
estimates of the combined sample where the binary instrument (monitored/non-monitored classrooms) and its 
interaction with the high heterogeneity dummy serve as excluded instruments (Graham, 2008). 
89
 The same pattern of results holds keeping classrooms with less than 10 students. Dropping these classrooms 
slightly improves p-values for the ‘books at home’ variable. 
90
 We also calculate heterogeneous effects with respect to classrooms showing high and low heterogeneity in 
teachers’ marks given to students at the end of the first semester, in late January. We find that cheating social 
multiplier is higher the more the class is homogeneous in terms of ‘perceived’ ability level (as proxied by 
teachers marks). We do not include these results as teachers’ marks cannot be considered plausibly exogenous to 
students’ test scores results.  
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3.6. ROBUSTNESS 
 
We test the robustness of the empirical results taking into account different forms of social 
mechanisms that could affect our estimates of the cheating social multiplier. For example, we 
investigate whether teachers’ cheating in non-monitored classes, or stress induced by the 
presence of an external inspector in monitored classes may explain (part of) the gap in 
performance between monitored and non-monitored students, as opposed to students’ 
cheating. Next, we replicate on our data Graham’s empirical analysis of achievement peer 
effects in the Tennessee Schools STAR Project. All the robustness checks support our 
identification strategy and show that estimated values of the cheating multiplier are not 
affected by alternative mechanisms that could bias the results. There alternatives are discussed 
hereafter. 
 
6.1. Teachers’ cheating  
 
Several forms of teachers’ cheating are discussed in the literature. There could be totally illicit 
activities, so called ‘explicit cheating’, such as changing student responses on answer sheets, 
providing correct answers to students, or obtaining copies of an exam illegitimately prior to 
the test date and teaching students using knowledge of the precise exam questions. There is 
‘hidden cheating’ in which educators attempt to raise a school overall performance profile by 
retaining low-scoring students in grade, classifying more students as ‘special needs’ in order 
to exclude their scores from school averages, or lavishing attention on students who are close 
to passing, and ignoring those who are sure to do well and those likely to fail (Kohn, 2007). 
Additionally, there could also be ‘soft’ forms of teacher cheating such as ‘teaching to the test’. 
One reason why teachers’ cheating should not play a significant role in the Italian schools is 
due to the fact that the career of teachers follows a simple experience-age rule and is not 
linked in any way to students’ performance. In fact, teachers’ cheating has been found to be a 
substantial problem when high-stakes testing programs are introduced in the school system 
(Jacob, 2005; Jacob and Levitt, 2003a,b). Moreover, Invalsi controls that the SNV Protocol is 
strictly followed by school teachers and School-heads are responsible for any illicit behavior 
of the school staff. However, teachers may be induced in illicit behavior because, for 
example, they simply dislike sharp differences in results across classes within the same school 
(Bertoni et al. 2012). Anytime teachers help students in suggesting the right answers or 
changing their answers while marking the test, the estimates for the social multiplier will also 
include this component and be upward biased.  
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Ferrer-Esteban (2012) and Bertoni et al. (2012) analyse the effects of monitoring on students 
test scores using SNV data and show that external monitoring has a negative effects on 
students’ test scores. Bertoni et al. (2012) use Math tests of elementary school students (5th 
grade) and argue that the better performance of classes without the external inspector is due to 
the manipulation of tests by students and/or teachers. The authors do not distinguish between 
students and teachers’ cheating so that they interpret the performance gap between monitored 
and non-monitored classrooms as a measure of the average intensity of (generalized) cheating 
taking place in non-monitored classrooms. They also show that spill-overs effects are present 
in non-monitored classrooms of sampled schools. This fact also justifies the inclusion of the 
‘non-monitored classroom in sampled school’ indicator variable in the vector of controls. 
Ferrer-Esteban (2012) uses data both from elementary schools (2nd to 5th grades) and junior 
high schools (6th to 8th grades) in the 2009-10 SNV to build an individual level cheating 
indicator. Similarly to Jacob and Levitt (2003 a,b), a student is suspected of cheating if the 
entire path of the answers of the test - item by item, independently of whether answers are 
right or wrong - is equal to the one of a class-mate. He shows that the distribution of 
‘suspected cheaters’ conditional on the result in the tests is sharply different across grades. In 
the elementary schools ‘suspected cheaters’ are all distributed in the upper tail of the test 
score performance distribution while in the junior high schools ‘suspected cheaters’ are 
normally distributed along the test score performance range of results. The author interprets 
this evidence as teachers’ cheating playing a substantive role especially in the elementary 
schools, as ‘suspected cheaters’ always give right answers as if they are suggested by teachers 
and not by each other copying or cheating. Taken together, Bertoni et al. (2012) and Ferrer-
Esteban (2012) studies suggest that teachers’ cheating - if any - is particularly concentrated in 
elementary schools and less in the junior high schools.  
As robustness check, we replicate the analysis on elementary school students in 5th and 2nd 
grades who sit the 2009-10 SNV test (see Appendix B for details). Grounding on the 
aforementioned studies, we expect cheating social multiplier to be higher in magnitude than 
the 6th grade as it potentially includes bias given by teachers’ cheating which is likely to 
increase class average test scores. 
[Table 27 here] 
Table 27 shows descriptive evidence on test score means and variances across grades. It is 
easy to notice that the gap between mean test scores of monitored and non-monitored students 
is much higher in the elementary grades compared to 6th grade (Language test score gap 
between sixth grade monitored and non-monitored students is not even statistically different). 
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The same is true for the total variances, while the variance within classes is always higher in 
monitored classes. 
[Table 28 here] 
The estimates of the cheating social multiplier for 5th and 2nd grade students do not show 
significant differences in terms of strength of identification and statistical significance, but 
they are always higher in magnitude (Table 28)91. This confirms that teachers’ monitoring is 
looser in elementary schools as compared to junior high schools. Restricting our main 
analysis to 6th grade students, thus minimizes possible bias due to teachers’ cheating behavior. 
 
3.6.2. Stress induced by external monitoring 
 
The presence of an external inspector in the classroom during the test (under the external 
monitoring regime) may exert psychological pressure or induce stress among student, which 
might alter their performance and lower the average test score in monitored classroom. In this 
case, the observed gap in test scores between monitored and non-monitored classrooms might 
incorporate a component that is due to psychological stress. We use the SNV ‘Student 
Questionnaire’ (see Appendix B), which contains a set of motivational questions that students 
have to answer immediately after taking the test, to ascertain the emotional feelings and 
psychological pressures that students experience while taking the test or preparing for it92.  
[Figure 7 here] 
We find no difference in the answers to the motivational questions between monitored and 
non-monitored students (Figure 7), which leads us to exclude that our estimates might be 
biased (upward) due to the stress induced by external monitoring. Exploiting the same 
variables for elementary schools (5th grade), Bertoni et al. (2012) discuss in detail the 
possibility that young students under-perform as a consequence of the distraction induced by 
the presence of a stranger in the class and find no evidence that being in a classroom with an 
external inspector increases anxiety or nervousness. 
 
3.6.3. Achievement peer-effects and class-size 
                                                 
91
 Because of the differences in the test structure, 2nd grade Language results are not directly comparable across 
grades. School and family background information are not provided for 2nd graders as students do not have to fill 
in the ‘Student Questionnaire’. The estimates obtained without dropping classes with less than 10 students (not 
included in the text) do not change the overall pattern of the results and confirm their robustness. 
92
 Students are asked whether they totally agree / partially agree / partially disagree / totally disagree with the 
following statements: ‘I already was worried before taking the tests’; ‘I was so nervous I could not find the 
answers’; ‘While taking the test I was calm’.  
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Since randomization ensures that students’ quality across monitored and non-monitored 
classrooms is the same, social interactions can only arise from students’ cheating behavior. In 
this section, we test this proposition and investigate whether a more conventional ‘peer effects 
in achievement’ may also influence the social multiplier we estimate. Peer effects may work 
either via peers’ characteristics (contextual effects such as aptitude to learn, readiness, ability 
to focus), or via alternative endogenous social interactions (such as information gathering, 
endogenous preference formation, congestion externalities) (Sacerdote, 2001). We replicate 
the empirical strategy proposed by Graham (2008), which relies on classroom-size variation 
as instrument, estimating our model separately on for monitored and non-monitored 
classrooms (Lazear, 2001; Graham, 2008; Carrel et al. 2009; Cooley, 2010a,b)93. The key 
assumption, in this case, is absence of sorting and unobserved heterogeneity across small and 
large classrooms. Since, general rules for class size formation in junior high schools are 
considerably influenced at the school-district level by the availably of tenured versus non-
tenured teachers and the allocation of resources across schools in the same district, we include 
in our baseline specification the usual classrooms level controls (Ψc), as well as school-
district fixed effects (i.e. 110 dummies corresponding to Italian provinces, NUTS 5 level). 
Specifically, we run the analysis separately for monitored and non-monitored classrooms and 
calculate an achievement (squared) social multiplier, that we label γa2 to keep it distinguished 
from the usual cheating social multiplier94. We expect the value of the social multiplier 
estimated for the group of non-monitored classrooms (γa2|Zc=0) to be larger than the social 
multiplier estimated for the group of the monitored classrooms (γa2|Zc=1), since the former is 
likely to be inflated by cheating interactions while the latter is not.  
[Table 29 here] 
The instrument we use is a dummy for ‘small class size’ that takes value 1 if class size is 
below the median class size. Table 29 contains the different estimates for the (squared) social 
multiplier. The standard rank condition is satisfied, as the coefficient of the excluded 
instrument – not reported in the Table - is always positive and significantly different from 
zero at 1 per cent confidence level, and the first-stage F-statistics show that the effect is 
always strongly identified. The positive sign in the first stage regressions confirms that small 
class size tends to increase individual-level heterogeneity. Interestingly, estimates of the 
(squared) social multiplier are found to be not statistically different from 1 in the subgroup of 
monitored classes - where only interactions in achievement may have taken place -, while the 
                                                 
93
 Group-size is a good instrument for the E-V approach because, provided that group-level heterogeneity is the 
same across the two subpopulations (small vs. large classes), the dispersion of individual heterogeneity typically 
is not the same. 
94
 We run the analysis on the whole population as well as excluding classes with less than 10 students. Results do 
not change. 
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estimates show up statistically different from 1, ranging between 2.08 and 3.21 (close to 
Graham’s estimations), in the subgroup of non-monitored classes95. In other words, since we 
cannot reject the null of ‘no-achievement social interactions’ in the monitored classrooms 
(both for Language and Math), while we find sizable social interactions in the non-monitored 
classes, it seems reasonable to expect any effect of ‘achievement social interactions’ to be 
negligible as compared to the effect of ‘cheating social interactions’. 
[Table 30 here] 
A final concern with respect to class-size might arise with respect to classrooms with less than 
10 students which were dropped from the main analysis to meet the only ex-ante selectivity 
criteria implemented by Invalsi in the random selection of the monitored classrooms. To 
assess whether this threshold introduced some selectivity in the sample of treated versus 
control classrooms, we repeated the analysis also including all the classrooms with less of 10 
students (723 classes for grade 6 corresponding to 2.7% of the total number)96. Results 
reported in Table 30 show no significant differences with respect to the baseline estimates. 
 
3.7. DISCUSSION AND CONLUSION 
 
There is abundant evidence showing that students’ cheating has worsened over the last few 
decades, becoming a widespread practice in schools, college and high-ranked universities 
(Dee and Jacob, 2012). Experts say that cheating has grown hand in hand with high-stakes 
testing systems, such as the No-Child-Left-Behind-Act (2001) in the U.S. (Jacob, 2005), and 
it has become easier and more widely tolerated, as both schools and parents fail to give 
students clear messages about what is allowed and what is prohibited (The New York Times, 
September 7, 2012). In this paper we provide evidence on the social interactions which are 
generated when students’ cheat - either exchanging information and cooperating with other 
students, or using any prohibited materials - while taking an exam. We develop a simple 
theoretical model describing the mechanisms that drive social interactions in cheating 
behavior, and show that students optimally decide whether or not to cheat taking into account 
other students’ best response. We estimate the social multiplier generated by cheating 
behaviors using data from a randomized experiment in a national evaluation tests. Our 
findings suggest a strong amplifying role played by cheating social interactions in the 
classroom, which increases in the strength of social ties. The value of the social multiplier 
                                                 
95
 Graham (2008) finds a (squared) social multiplier of 2.33 for Math and 2.11 for the Reading test scores in the 
complete specification. However, while we exploit junior high school students, Graham (2008) focuses on 
kindergarten students.  
96
 Due to students absence on the day of  the test, we do find classrooms with less than 10 students also in the 
treated group. This, of course, was not known ex-ante, and absent students re-sit in September. 
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implied by students’ cheating behaviors is estimated to be between 2 and 3 in all the 
specifications, suggesting that cooperative behaviors, when a strict external monitoring is 
missing, may generate a change in the equilibrium of students’ achievements that is twice as 
big as the class average achievement. In terms of individual test score, the marginal 
contribution of cheating interactions increases individual test score by almost half of the 
standard deviation (i.e. between 7 and 10 points). Heterogeneous effects show that the 
strength of social ties in the classroom is a complementary input to cheating behaviors such 
that the effect is larger the more the classroom is homogeneous. Several sensitivity checks 
confirm the overall robustness of our results. 
Our findings have a number of relevant policy implications. First, we show that tolerating 
cheating behavior, as it is often done in schools, is a very dangerous practice, since the social 
multiplier magnifies the negative effects on both students’ performance and on the signaling 
role of education in the labor market. McCabe (2005) documents that a large share of college 
students considers cheating and other forms of illicit collaboration with classmates as a minor 
offence or no offence at all. He also finds that most high school teachers and college 
professors fail to report and pursue most of the violations that are detected. Moreover, 
commitment to academic integrity and sanctions to violations are still not adequately 
considered: few schools place any meaningful emphasis on academic integrity, and colleges 
are even more indifferent than high schools97. Our estimates also show that tolerating such 
behaviors is particularly relevant as cheating is likely to feedback onto social norms thus 
raising collective indulgence with respect to various forms of dishonest practices. In other 
words, ethical or honor codes of behavior in schools should be strictly enforced and students’ 
cheating behavior reported and sanctioned. Second, given that increasing competition in the 
job market and high-stakes testing systems are likely to exert considerable pressure on 
students to perform well in exams, it should be recognized that where (and when) the pressure 
is higher, more resources should be devoted to monitoring activities in order to avoid cheating 
interactions to become widespread. In this sense, the social multiplier mechanism would also 
magnify the effects of policies directed to stricter monitoring and sanctioning of cheaters. 
From the policymaker perspective a commitment to rigorous monitoring and sanctioning - by 
changing the individual’s private incentives to cheat, would deliver significantly larger social 
effects (Durlauf and Cohen-Cole, 2004). Our results also show that strong social links among 
classmates are likely to facilitate social interactions and cheating behaviors. In this context, a 
rather inexpensive way to reduce students’ illicit behaviors would consist in a random 
reshuffling of students and teachers across classrooms, within any given school, so to reduce 
                                                 
97
 Michael Josephson, president of the Institute for Academic Integrity, The New York Times, September 7, 2012. 
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students’ tendency to conform to other students’ behavior. Finally, the presence of spill-over 
effects of monitoring in non-monitored classrooms of sampled schools, suggests that another 
rather inexpensive intervention to contrast cheating would be to spread the inspectors on more 
schools as non-monitored classrooms in sampled schools show a significantly lower degree of 
cheating interactions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 136
APPENDIX A. DERIVATION OF THE ACHIEVEMENT BEST RESPONSE 
Under the assumption that achievement is monotonically increasing in cooperative cheating 
effort behavior (henceforth simply referred to as effort), we can solve from the APF (eq. [1]) 
for the unobservable effort. Thus, for individual i and j  - where j represents any i’s classmate 
peer - we have: 
 
i i i x j x j ee y x x epi pi pi µ= − − − −% %
 
[A.1] 
j j j x i x i ee y x x epi pi pi µ= − − − −% %
 
[A.2] 
 
Plugging the expression for ej from equation [A.2] into [A.1] and solving for ei, we obtain: 
 
1 ( ) ( ) ( 1)
1i i j e i x x e j x x e ee
e y y x xpi pi pi pi pi pi pi µ pi
pi
 
 = − − − − − + −   
− 
% % % % % %
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[A.3] 
 
Similarly, for individual j: 
 
1 ( ) ( ) ( 1)
1j j i e j x x e i x x e ee
e y y x xpi pi pi pi pi pi pi µ pi
pi
 
 = − − − − − + −   
− 
% % % % % %
%  
[A.4] 
 
Substituting equation [A.4] into the effort best response of individual i from equation [4] 
yields:  
 
1 ( ) ( ) ( 1)
1
yBR e
i j i e j x x e i x x e e
e e e
e y y x x
β β
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%  
[A.5] 
 
Finally, substituting the LHS of equation [A.3] with the equation of the best response effort 
function from equation [A.5] and rearranging we obtain the expression of the achievement 
best response function (Cooley, 2010b): 
1 ( ) ( ) ( 1)1
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APPENDIX B. INVALSI SNV DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
School system in Italy starts with five years of primary school (grades 1 to 5, corresponding 
to ISCED level 1) and three years of junior high school (grades 6 to 8, ISCED level 2). These 
two form the ‘first cycle’ of the educational system which is compulsory and identical for all 
students, while secondary education lasts three to five years depending on the path chosen 
(vocational, technical, academic). Children enrol in the first grade of the primary school the 
year they turn six, and start the junior high school when they turn eleven. Primary and junior 
high schools are quite different in terms of organization and types of teaching activities. In 
primary schools pupils spend almost all school time with two teachers, one teaches Language, 
History, Geography and the other teaches Math and Science. The two ‘reference teachers’ 
usually follow the pupils from the first to the fifth grade establishing a strong personal link. 
Junior high school is more similar to high school. Students experience a kind of more rigorous 
teaching, with several professors, one for each subject, and acquire a wide range of core skills 
necessary to succeed in high schools.  
Invalsi SNV data contain test scores results and individual level information. Individual level 
information are gathered in the dataset from three different sources: (i) students’ general 
information from school administrative records compiled directly from school administrative 
staff on each student’s answer sheet; (ii) family background information collected through a 
‘Family Questionnaire’ sent to each family some days before the test; (iii) additional 
individual information on family, school and environmental characteristics collected through 
a ‘Student Questionnaire’ taken by each 5th and 6th grade students the same day of one of the 
test (after finishing the exam). They are collected by the school administrative staff on the 
same answer sheets of the students’ test and are taken from the administrative register data 
which are given by the families at the moment of the child’s enrolment (at the beginning of 
each school year in September). Other parental background information are available and 
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cover mother’s and father’s place of birth (Italy, EU, European but non-EU, other non-
European country), occupation and education level.  
Some variables (e.g. kindergarten and pre-kindergarten attendance; parental occupation and 
education) which are not administrative data records kept by the school but rather provided by 
the families filling in the ‘Family Questionnaire’ suffer from a relevant problem of missing 
information (from 9% to 30% depending on the grade and variable). This problem may be 
considerably mitigated for 5th and 6th grade students exploiting additional information about 
school characteristics and family background contained the ‘Student Questionnaire’ which is 
filled by each student in the class the first day of the test and does not entail problems of 
missing data. Second grade students did not have to fill such additional information. The 
‘Student Questionnaire’ is different for 6 and 5 graders, but the more relevant variables are 
common to both. From these sources we obtain variables that are commonly used as proxy for 
socio-economic background and family information in international programs of students’ 
attainments testing (e.g. PISA, TIMSS) and applied research. For instance, students have to 
answer questions such as “How many books have you at home?”, “Which language do you 
usually speak at home?”; “Do you currently speak dialect at home?”.  
In the heterogeneous effects analysis (Section 3.5.1) we exploit some variables taken from the 
‘Student Questionnaire’. The ‘number of books at home’ is a categorical variable with 5 
levels (0-10 books; 11-25; 26-100; 101-200; more than 200). The ‘sport’ variable asks 
students how many times per week he/she practices sport activities outside school (never, 1 or 
2, 3 or 4, more than 4). Similarly, the ‘outside school activities’ variable asks students how 
many times per week he/she takes part to leisure activities outside the school time (e.g. music, 
arts, theatre or foreign language courses)(never, 1 or 2, 3 or 4, more than 4). Finally, the 
variable indicating the time spent each day playing with friends outside school takes the 
following values: never, 1 hour or less, 1 or 2 hours, more than 2 hours. 
 
B.1 The sampling procedures: randomness and representation 
Invalsi exploits a simple random computer routine that ensures the representation of the 
sampled group of students, classes and schools. First, for each of the 20 Italian regions they 
randomly choose a representative sample of primary schools for grade 2 and 5, and a sample 
of junior high schools for grade 6. Then, within each school they randomly picked up one or 
two classrooms for each grade. The sampling procedure starts at the regional level, so that the 
final sampled group is representative of the whole student population at the national and 
regional level. However, also the province dimension (NUT5) was implicitly taken into 
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account so that the final sample can be considered also representative at the province level 
(Invalsi, 2010). The number of units to be sampled within each region to ensure the sample 
representation was calculated on the basis of past SNV surveys using the Neyman procedure 
which is able to generate a sample size in such a way that both the dimension and the 
variability of the phenomenon under study are correctly mirrored in the sampled units 
(Invalsi, 2010). Sampled schools could not refuse to receive the inspectors and were informed 
just a couple of weeks before the test was taken. 
To test the effective goodness of these subsamples, we repeat the same analysis as in Table 23 
using two other subsamples which are defined according to whether a school is a monitored 
school or not. Thus, the group of students in monitored schools contains the subgroup of the 
treated, but is larger because it also contains students in non-monitored classrooms of a 
sampled school.  
[Table B.1 here] 
Results are shown in Table B.1. Although now the group of the students in monitored schools 
is much larger (more than 20% of the population) the t-test for the comparison of the means 
are statistically significant for almost all the observable characteristics we observe in our 
dataset. We take this piece of evidence as a further confirmation about the goodness of 
representation of the two subsamples given by ‘monitored’ and ‘non-monitored’ classrooms. 
We can conclude that the treatment randomly splits the students population of each grade into 
two equally representative subgroups. Finally, notice that the same analysis performed on 
elementary schools data used in the robustness checks (2nd and 5th grade students) confirm the 
same results. 
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TABLES CHAPTER 3 
Table 22. Descriptive statistics. 
% Sampled Schools 22.48 
% Monitored classes 7.78 
% Monitored students (*) 8.01 
% Non-monitored class in sampled school 13.07 
% Absent students 0.71 
Average school size 131.75 
Average class size 20.58 
Average cheating coefficient in non-monitored classrooms: Math 0.97 
Average cheating coefficient in non-monitored classrooms: Language 0.91 
Total no. schools 5,824 
Total no. classrooms 26,707 
Total no. students 522,655 
 
Notes. (*) the percentage of ‘monitored students’ is calculated over the total number of students excluding 
absents. A student is considered ‘absent’ if he/she does not sit either Math or Language test, or both. Average 
class and school size refer to the average number of students in the class or school; the total no. of classrooms 
includes 25 classrooms with missing values in test scores results which are excluded from the empirical analysis. 
Source: SNV Invalsi 2009-10, 6th grade. 
 
 
Table 23. Mean comparison of observable individual characteristics. 
  
Monitored  
students 
Non-monitored  
students  ∆ 
Missing  
(% over total) 
Female 48.3 48.34 0.04 1.3 
Retained 7.31 7.09 -0.22 1.47 
Immigrant 10.26 9.94 -0.32** 1.68 
First gen. immigrants 6.59 6.54 -0.05 3.47 
Second gen. immigrants 4 3.68  -0.32** 6.32 
Kindergarten attendance 96.83 96.82 -0.01 22.6 
Speak dialect at home 16.93 17.08 0.15 5.13 
N (% over total) 41,550 (8.01) 477,395 (91.99)   
 
Notes. Absent students are excluded: a student is considered ‘absent’ if he/she does not sit either Math or 
Language test, or both. ∆ indicates the difference between mean characteristics in the two groups; asterisks 
indicate whether the difference is statistically significant at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), 0.1 (*) confidence levels. 
Source: SNV Invalsi 2009-10, 6th grade. 
 
 
Table 24. Descriptive statistics: test scores mean, median and variance decomposition. 
 Language Math 
 All Pop. Monitored Non-monitored All Pop. Monitored Non-monitored 
Mean 61.44 61.39 61.45 51.95 51.42 51.99 
Median 63.79 63.80 63.79 50.00 50.00 50.00 
Total Var.  232.21 235.75 231.91 329.03 329.78 328.94 
Var. Between Classrooms 48.79 42.88 49.30 76.80 69.44 77.41 
Var. Within Classrooms 183.43 192.86 182.60 252.24 260.34 251.53 
 
Notes. The formula is corrected with appropriate weights to take into account the different size of the subgroups 
(i.e. classrooms) (Ammermüller and Pischke, 2009, p.323). Source: SNV Invalsi 2009-10, 6th grade. 
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Table 25. Baseline estimates of the social multiplier.  
 MATH 
γ
2
 5.135 5.136  5.889  5.390  5.926  5.401  
 (0.211) (0.211) (0.301) (0.244) (0.291) (0.240) 
P-value (H0: γ2=1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Model Parameters       
γ 2.266 2.266  2.427  2.322  2.434  2.324  
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.062) (0.053) (0.060) (0.052) 
J 0.559 0.559  0.588  0.569  0.589  0.570  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
First Stage F-Statistic 10772.44 10772.02 3231.63 6161.20 3820.05 6838.82 
 LANGUAGE 
γ
2
 4.189  4.182  4.713  4.370  4.774  4.383  
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.241) (0.198) (0.234) (0.195) 
P-value (H0: γ2=1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Model Parameters       
γ 2.047  2.045  2.171  2.090  2.185  2.094  
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.056) (0.047) (0.053) (0.047) 
J 0.511  0.511  0.539  0.522  0.542  0.522  
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
First Stage F-Stat 8290.73 8290.42 2868.01 5172.91 3315.70 5641.34 
No. Classrooms 25959 25959 25959 25959 25959 25959 
Additional controls (Ψc)       
Non-monitored class in sampled school  yes   yes yes 
High immigrant share (>P75)   yes  yes  
High immigrant share (>P90)    yes  yes 
 
Notes. Classes with less than 10 students are dropped from the sample. Additional controls (Ψc) include the 
dummy for non-monitored classrooms in sampled school and the dummy for high share of immigrants, 
respectively, for immigrant class shares greater than P75 or P90. Source: SNV Invalsi 2009-10, 6th grade.   
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Table 26. Heterogeneous effects in the cheating social multiplier. 
MATH 
PANEL A High 
heterogeneity 
Low 
heterogeneity 
High 
heterogeneity 
Low 
heterogeneity 
 Books at home Outside-school activities 
γ
2
 4.9199 5.8522 4.7388 6.1082 
 (0.3203) (0.3781) (0.2932) (0.4092) 
First Stage F-Statistic 2876.05 3635.15 3270.83 3187.27 
P-value H0: γ2H=γ2L 0.06 0.01 
No. Classrooms 12031 12107 12040 12098 
 Play with friends Sport practice 
γ
2
 5.4594 5.2770 5.5002 5.0890 
 (0.4135) (0.3044) (0.3907) (0.3151) 
First Stage F-Statistic 2633.23 3811.77 2517.54 4066.95 
P-value H0: γ γ2H=γ2L 0.72 0.41 
No. Classrooms 11897 12241 11903 12235 
LANGUAGE 
PANEL B High 
heterogeneity 
Low 
heterogeneity 
High 
heterogeneity 
Low 
heterogeneity 
 Books at home Outside-school activities 
γ
2
 4.0339 4.7029 3.8383 4.9494 
 (0.2606) (0.2817) (0.2410) (0.3025) 
First Stage F-Statistic 2679.83 2875.71 2881.15 2682.26 
P-value H0: γ2H=γ2L 0.08 0.00 
No. Classrooms 12031 12107 12040 12098 
 Play with friends Sport practice 
γ
2
 4.4492 4.2456 3.8128 4.6742 
 (0.3320) (0.2303) (0.2577) (0.2737) 
First Stage F-Statistic 2133.98 3435.55 2244.61 3547.14 
P-value H0: γ2H=γ2L 0.61 0.02 
No. Classrooms 11897 12241 11903 12235 
Additional controls (Ψc) yes yes yes yes 
Notes. Classes with less than 10 students and with missing values in the relevant variables are dropped from the 
sample. Additional controls (Ψc) include the dummy for non-monitored classrooms in sampled school and the 
dummy for high share of immigrants (immigrant class share greater than P90). Source: SNV Invalsi 2009-10, 6th 
grade. 
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Table 27. Robustness checks. Descriptive statistics elementary school students. 
 LANGUAGE MATH 
 All Pop. Monitored Non monitored All Pop. Monitored Non monitored 
5th grade       
Mean 70.23 67.54 70.44 64.76 61.89 65.38 
Median 73.91 71.01 73.91 65.91 61.36 65.91 
Var. Tot. 144.27 146.62 143.81 65.39 62.5 65.44 
Var. Between Classes 45.90 35.03 46.46 27.05 19.7 27.45 
Var. Within Classes 98.38 111.59 97.35 38.34 42.8 38 
N (students) 475,343 34,554 440,789 475,343 34,554 440,789 
2nd grade       
Mean 65.94 62.05 66.24 62.52 57.17 62.94 
Median 69.23 65.38 69.23 60.71 57.14 64.28 
Var. Tot. 34.85 35.5 34.71 30.81 27.2 30.89 
Var. Between Classes 10.39 7.51 10.52 14.52 8.37 14.8 
Var. Within Classes 24.46 27.99 24.18 16.29 18.83 16.09 
N (students) 466,536 34,201 432,335 466,536 34,201 432,335 
 
Source: SNV Invalsi 2009-10, 5th and 2nd grade. 
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Table 28. Robustness checks. Social multiplier estimates for elementary school students. 
Panel A: 5th grade  
 MATH 
γ
2
 7.482  7.471  7.812  7.562  8.027  7.590  
 (0.365) (0.364) (0.513) (0.408) (0.484) (0.399) 
P-value H0: γ2=1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
First Stage F-Statistic 7113.20 7112.93 2508.88 4840.38 3158.73 5393.57 
 LANGUAGE 
γ
2
 5.245  5.227  5.402  5.267  5.524  5.280  
 (0.323) (0.326) (0.457) (0.368) (0.438) (0.361) 
P-value H0: γ2=1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
First Stage F-Statistic 6504.80 6504.56 2429.27 4440.85 3004.18 4911.43 
No. Classrooms 26942 26942 26942 26942 26942 26942 
Panel B: 2nd grade       
 MATH 
γ
2
 7.419  7.364  6.816  7.228  7.112  7.297  
 (0.379) (0.375) (0.502) (0.418) (0.478) (0.411) 
P-value H0: γ2=1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
First Stage F-Statistic 7867.09 7866.80 2987.77 5115.35 3557.85 5648.61 
 LANGUAGE 
γ
2
 4.437  4.385  4.246  4.273  4.348  4.296  
 (0.201) (0.198) (0.269) (0.219) (0.257) (0.215) 
P-value H0: γ2=1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
First Stage F-Statistic 8809.94 8809.61 3236.33 5608.41 3865.24 6218.09 
No. Classrooms 26850 26850 26850 26850 26850 26850 
Additional controls (Ψc)       
Non-monitored class in sampled school  yes   yes yes 
High immigrant share (>P75)   yes  yes  
High immigrant share (>P90)    yes  yes 
 
Notes. Classes with less than 10 students are dropped from the sample. Additional controls (Ψc) include the 
dummy for non-monitored classrooms in sampled school and the dummy for high share of immigrants, 
respectively, for immigrant class shares greater than P75 or P90. Source: SNV Invalsi 2009-10, 5th and 2nd 
grade. 
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Table 29. Robustness checks. Achievement peer effects using an alternative instrument (class size). 
PANEL A Non-monitored classrooms 
 MATH LANGUAGE 
γa
2
   5.9350   3.2160   5.0901   2.0785 
 (0.1059)    (0.4398)    (0.0976)    (0.3375)    
P-value H0: γa2=1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
First Stage F-Statistic 49602.35 3333.62 48037.98 3914.55 
No. Classrooms 23901 23901 23901 23901 
PANEL B Monitored classrooms 
 MATH LANGUAGE 
γa
2
   5.3363   1.7149      4.2599   1.5793 
 (0.2956)    (1.2544)    (0.2333)    (0.6559)    
P-value H0: γa2=1 0.01 0.57 0.00 0.38 
First Stage F-Statistic 5457.98 257.31 4767.00 309.41 
No. Classrooms     2058        2058        2058     2058 
Additional controls     
Class level variables (Ψc) yes yes yes yes 
School-district fixed effects   yes   yes 
 
Notes. Class level variables (Ψc) include the dummy for non-monitored classrooms in sampled school and the 
dummy for high share of immigrants (immigrant class share greater than P90). School-districts fixed effects 
correspond to 110 dummies. Classes with less than 10 students are dropped from the sample. Source: SNV 
Invalsi 2009-10, 6th  grade. 
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Table 30. Robustness checks. Baseline results including classrooms with less than 10 students. 
 
 MATH 
γ
2
 5.172 5.173 5.965 5.447 5.994 5.454 
 (0.210) (0.210) (0.305) (0.245) (0.293) (0.241) 
P-value (H0: γ2=1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Model Parameters       
γ 2.274 2.274 2.442 2.334 2.448 2.335 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.062) (0.053) (0.060) (0.052) 
J 0.560 0.560 0.591 0.572 0.592 0.572 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
First Stage F-Statistic 8267.11 8266.80 2538.80 4739.77 2960.45 5200.40 
 LANGUAGE 
γ
2
 4.272 4.265 4.819 4.456 4.879 4.468 
 (0.175) (0.176) (0.255) (0.208) (0.247) (0.205) 
P-value (H0: γ2=1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Model Parameters       
γ 2.067 2.065 2.195 2.111 2.209 2.114 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.058) (0.049) (0.056) (0.049) 
J 0.516 0.516 0.544 0.526 0.547 0.527 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
First Stage F-Stat 7353.47 7353.20 2519.57 4558.58 2901.45 4956.61 
No. Classrooms 26682 26682 26682 26628 26628 26628 
Additional controls (Ψc)       
Non-monitored class in sampled school  yes   yes yes 
High immigrant share (>P75)   yes  yes  
High immigrant share (>P90)    yes  yes 
 
Notes. Additional controls (Ψc) include the dummy for non-monitored classrooms in sampled school and the 
dummy for high share of immigrants, respectively, for immigrant class shares greater than P75 or P90. Source: 
SNV Invalsi 2009-10, 6th grade.  
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Table B.1. Mean comparison between students in sampled and non-sampled schools. 
 
 Students in sampled schools Students in non-sampled schools ∆ 
Female 48.35 48.34 -0.01 
Retained 7.27 7.07 -0.2** 
Immigrant 10.36 9.85 -0.51*** 
First gen. immigrants 6.89 6.46 -0.43*** 
Second gen immigrants 3.83 3.67 -0.16*** 
Kindergarten attendance 96.61 96.87 0.26*** 
Speak dialect at home 16.06 17.35 1.29*** 
N (% over total) 111,497 (21.48) 407,448 (78.52)  
 
Notes. Absent students are excluded: a student is considered ‘absent’ if he/she does not sit either Math or 
Language test, or both. ∆ indicates the difference between mean characteristics in the two groups; asterisks 
indicate whether the difference is statistically significant at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), 0.1 (*) confidence levels. 
Source: SNV Invalsi 2009-10, 6th grade. 
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FIGURES CHAPTER 3 
Figure 7. Students stress while taking the test. Comparison between monitored and non-monitored students’ 
answers to motivational questions (1=totally disagree; 2=partially disagree; 3=partially agree; 4=totally agree).   
 
Notes. Students are asked whether they totally agree/partially agree/partially disagree/totally disagree with the 
following statements: ‘I already was worried before taking the tests’ (top histogram); ‘I was so nervous I could 
not find the answers’ (central histogram); ‘While taking the test I was calm’ (bottom histogram).  
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“Lui conobbe lei e se stesso, perché in verità non s'era mai saputo. 
E lei conobbe lui e se stessa, perché pur essendosi saputa sempre, 
mai s'era potuta riconoscere così.” 
 
Italo Calvino, Il barone rampante. 
 
 
